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Competitiveness in the European 
Economy
The book offers an excellent and badly needed review of the several factors that affect com-
petitiveness both in the Eurozone and more specifically in Italy.
 Reading it is highly recommended to those who point at one single factor and concentrate 
their therapy on it only. They might make their labour market even more flexible than the 
German one but eventually they discover that labour productivity remains much lower than the 
German one because of the poorer training of their workers. They might do whatever is needed 
to make their firms and banks more competitive, but inadequately reformed public institutions 
keep producing negative externalities that reduce the total factor productivity of their 
economy.
It is a lesson mostly for Italy. A lesson that unhappily is still to be learned.
Giuliano Amato
This book deals with the relationship between the competitiveness of countries in Europe and 
the analysis of macroeconomic imbalances. It focuses mainly on a European analysis, along 
with special studies of the German economy, which is rarely considered to be a cause for the 
current crisis. The book also compares Germany with Italy, providing a comparative per-
spective on structural reforms.
 The first part of this book analyses macroeconomic imbalances based on a new framework 
from the analysis of the flow of funds rather than balance of payments, and presents an altern-
ative measure of unit labour cost comparisons to investigate the relationship between imbalances 
and competitiveness. The second part is dedicated to the analysis of the trade performance of 
Germany and Italy and the sustainability of the German model in the EMU. The third part 
describes the reform policies implemented by Germany and their effect on imbalances; this 
includes wage moderation, the labour market reforms and weak labour demand. The final part 
explores the regional inequalities within Germany and Italy, providing useful lessons regarding 
fiscal federalism and regional banking developments.
 In conclusion, a big part of the problems within the Euro Area is generated by the use of a 
wrong framework of analysis, where the EMU is considered as a fixed exchange rate regime 
and not a single country. This book provides an alternative view which holds at the core the 
relationship between sectors. It is stressed throughout the book that the German behaviour has 
contributed to the rise of imbalances between countries due to its growth model, not suitable 
for a big developed country in a currency union. This book also finds that stressing banking 
integration within countries helps to reduce regional inequalities, which has important implica-
tions for the management of Europe’s future banking union and macroeconomic imbalances.
Stefan Collignon is a Professor of Economic Policy at Sant Anna School of Advanced Studies, 
Pisa, Italy.
Piero Esposito is a Post- Doctoral Researcher at Sant Anna School of Advanced Studies and 
researcher in internationalisation and international trade at Centro Europa Ricerche (CER), 
Italy.
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of Economic Policy, 12(3): 24.
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Introduction
Stefan Collignon and Piero Esposito
Europe has been obsessed with competitiveness for a long time. In 2000, the 
Lisbon Strategy set the target of making the European Union ‘the most com-
petitive region in the world’ within a decade.1 Few people believe that it has suc-
ceeded. During the first decade of the euro, the north stagnated and the south 
boomed; in the second decade, it was the opposite. Before the crisis, unemploy-
ment rose from 3.6 to 5.2 per cent in Austria and from 2.5 to 5.3 per cent in the 
Netherlands. Germany went through a prolonged period of stagnation after its 
reunification: from 1990 to 2006, German unemployment nearly doubled from 
5.6 to 11.3 per cent. On the other hand, it looked as if southern economies, espe-
cially Spain and Ireland, were rapidly catching up with the more prosperous 
member states in the union. The convergence of interest rates to German low 
standards had generated a boom in the south that translated into high growth, 
huge employment gains and also large current account imbalances. Unemploy-
ment fell from 11.3 to 6.1 per cent in Italy, from 21.3 in 1995 to 8.3 per cent in 
Spain. At the same time, Italy’s current account position deteriorated from a 
surplus of 2.9 to a deficit of 1.3 per cent of GDP; Spain went from balance to a 
deficit of 10 per cent. Prices in the south increased more, and in the north less, 
than the Euro Area average. Then the crisis came. Suddenly the roles changed. 
Germany, which had implemented radical labour market reforms, rose like the 
phoenix from the ashes; the south fell into deep depression. Unemployment shot 
up in the south, but started to come down quickly in Germany (although not in 
the Netherlands or Austria). Noticing the differences in current account deficits, 
the conclusion was easily reached that the crisis countries must have had com-
petitiveness problems, which were only ‘masked’ by excess demand during the 
boom (ECB, 2012).
 How can competitiveness in the European Union be improved? The Lisbon 
Strategy wanted to make Europe fit for the knowledge society of the twenty- first 
century. It had formulated structural indicators, which all member states were 
supposed to achieve. After 10 years, the results were disappointing. This was 
partly a consequence of the open method of coordination, which had left it to 
member state governments to implement structural reforms, partly because the 
macroeconomic dimension, which had been originally the second pillar of the 
strategy, had soon been abandoned (Collignon, 2008). Instead, the policy focus 
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was narrowed to labour market reforms. After the global financial crisis and the 
subsequent debt problems in the Euro Area, attitudes changed again. Debt and 
macroeconomic imbalances became the major concern, but aggregate demand 
was largely ignored and the increase of unemployment was linked to rigid labour 
markets.2 To deal with imbalances, the European Commission set up a monitor-
ing tool and created a new process to avoid macroeconomic imbalances, largely 
based on the model of the Stability and Growth Pact. It uses a scoreboard of 11 
indicators with thresholds triggering an alert mechanism followed by binding 
policy recommendations. While the indicators include competitiveness variables 
like real exchange rates, unit labour costs, etc., the thresholds are primarily 
setting limits for current account deficits, while higher surpluses are asymmetri-
cally tolerated. For example, alert thresholds for current account deficits are −4 
per cent, but surpluses are acceptable up to +6 per cent. Given that imbalances 
within the currency area are always zero, this must imply that the Euro Area as a 
whole is aiming for current account surpluses with the rest of the world. Never-
theless, the focus on current account imbalances within the Euro Area has given 
a very particular flavour to the issue of competitiveness that privileges austerity 
policies.
 No doubt, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 has revealed structural 
weaknesses in the European economy and also in the governance of the currency 
area. The main economic problem is the unequal development of member states 
in the Euro Area. Capital flows have moved from relatively rich to relatively 
poor countries without evidence of fostering a sustainable process of real catch-
ing up. Before the crisis, peripheral countries had developed a credit- financed 
growth model based on high consumption (Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) 
where investment was concentrated mainly in non- tradable sectors such as con-
struction (Spain), tourism (Greece) and other services (Ireland). This model was 
responsible for the deterioration of current accounts and high dependency on 
imports. At the same time, core European countries (Germany and the Nether-
lands) chose export oriented growth as their model and increased their trade sur-
pluses without, however, improving their growth performance.
 With the advent of the crisis, the credit bubble burst and the southern boom 
collapsed. High uncertainties and risks of private and public debt insolvencies 
put a brake on bank lending and interrupted capital flows. Political mishandling 
has prolonged and deepened the recession in the southern member states of the 
Euro Area, and excessive austerity did not succeed in stabilising public finances. 
As a result of these policies, external imbalances were transformed into internal 
ones, with unemployment as the adjustment variable. The northern model 
became now the benchmark for successful economic policy. It was thought that 
Germany had improved competitiveness through structural reforms under the 
Schröder government and if others followed the example, they, too, would 
quickly overcome the crisis. However, the chapters in this book will show that 
this story is too simple.
 The euro crisis has also revealed deep political problems. The causes and con-
ditions of the crisis that are at the root of the disruptive economic imbalances 
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Introduction  3
were primarily interpreted through the ideological frame of neoliberalism. It was 
believed that structural reforms would empower markets to heal themselves. 
Hence, there was little need for proactive economic policies. This belief fitted 
the institutional arrangements of the Euro Area. European institutions are weak 
because they have little decision- making power and they have no power because 
they lack democratic legitimacy. During the crisis, the need for a more powerful 
instrument which could be used to implement austerity policies has become 
obvious. The answer was charging the troika with this task, although it lacks any 
democratic foundation and is often seen as the agent of a German Diktat. The 
only democratically elected institution of the EU, the European Parliament, on 
the other hand, has little power to influence or overrule the opinion of the most 
influential countries like Germany or France. This point became clear when the 
Greek crisis exploded. Germany did not want to pay for Greece, but ended up 
doing it anyway. Uncertainty regarding policy actions, i.e. whether or not to bail 
out the Greek debt, exacerbated the loss of confidence of investors and markets. 
This led to speculative attacks on bonds emitted by countries with high insol-
vency risks. Hence, the political uncertainties generated by Europe’s fragmented 
polity were an important factor in the acceleration of the euro crisis (Collignon 
et al., 2013).
 Given the depth of the economic crisis, eurosceptics have suggested that 
peripheral countries should leave the Euro Area and depreciate their new 
national currencies. We will see in Chapter 1 that this is fallacious economic 
thinking. An exit would serve neither the periphery nor the core of the monetary 
union. It is therefore coherent with the functioning of a monetary union that the 
European Union treaties have no provisions for leaving the Euro Area. Never-
theless, there is an inconsistency between the dominant policy consensus in 
Europe, which reflects the preferences of surplus countries for export- oriented 
growth and puts the burden of the adjustment on deficit countries, and the need 
for more balanced growth. This inconsistency is embedded in the European 
Commission’s Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure and is causing political 
tensions without solving the economic issues.
 The recent literature on the euro crisis discusses three explanations for the 
rise of macroeconomic imbalances: first, imbalances are the natural outcome of 
financial integration (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002; Schnabl and Freitag, 2012; 
Croci- Angelini and Farina, 2012; Collignon, 2012a); second, they are a con-
sequence of wage bargaining and unit labour cost developments in member 
countries (Dullien and Fritsche, 2009; Brancaccio, 2012; Onharan and Stock-
hammer, 2013; Belke and Dreger, 2011; Collignon, 2012b); third, they were 
caused by external trade shocks, in particular from emerging economies (Chen et 
al., 2013; Guerrieri and Esposito, 2012, 2013). In spite of the different starting 
points, most of these contributions share the idea that improving competitiveness 
is the key for rebalancing the European economy and restore growth.
 But what is competitiveness? In general terms competitiveness is the ability 
of a country to compete in the world market. This definition does not translate 
into a well- defined set of indicators unambiguously linked to a country’s 
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 performance. In general terms, competitiveness is a multidimensional concept 
which includes the performance of individual firms or sectors, the ability of the 
public institutions to provide a positive framework for the development of com-
petitive productions and efficient markets, the ability to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by the international economic environment and so on. The 
World Economic Forum Competitiveness Report and the IMD World Competit-
iveness Center (WCC) provide comprehensive surveys of different dimensions 
of competitiveness. Yet, as we will see in more detail in Chapter 2, aggregate 
indicators are not always useful for policy purposes.
 The aim of this book is twofold. On the one hand, we attempt to provide a 
better framework for the analysis of European imbalances and the definition of 
policies aiming at the improvement of competitiveness in the Euro Area as a 
whole. On the other hand, the book provides a comparative analysis between 
Germany and Italy. We critically question to what degree the German model can 
serve as a benchmark for the rest of Europe. The German economy has gone 
through a profound transformation since reunification in the early 1990s. The 
Schröder reforms in the mid- 1990s, called Agenda 2010, have become the glori-
ous beacon of hope and inspiration for many commentators, but few policy- 
makers have been able to imitate them. The Italian economy has had some 
interesting historical similarities with Germany, such as a high share of manu-
facturing and a relatively high export orientation, but today it is the country with 
severe growth problems and the lowest productivity increases in the Euro Area. 
Inevitably, there is a question if and what Italy could learn from the German 
reform experience. The different fates of the two countries since 2003 provide 
useful insights for defining policies to improve internal and external 
competitiveness.
 The book is organised in four parts. The first part analyses the Euro Area as a 
whole, while the following parts are dedicated to the comparative analysis of the 
German and Italian models with respect to external trade (Part II), labour market 
reforms (Part III) and regional convergence (Part IV).
 In the first chapter Stefan Collignon takes a look at how a monetary union 
works and what that means for competitiveness within the Euro Area. He emphas-
ises that a monetary union functions in fundamentally different ways compared to 
fixed exchange rates in international economic textbooks and this fact requires a 
different interpretation of current accounts. Macroeconomic imbalances are better 
reflected in gross lending/net borrowing balances recorded in flow of funds state-
ments than in international balance of payment statistics. This puts the emphasis 
on achieving balanced growth within the Euro Area rather than eliminating 
current account imbalances. However, growth requires investment and credit, so 
that restoring economic balance is not just a matter of relative costs, but also of 
risk–return considerations. Collignon therefore redefines competitiveness as the 
capacity to earn above average returns to capital, given equal degrees of uncer-
tainty in the environment within which firms are operating.
 In Chapter 2, Stefan Collignon and Piero Esposito take this approach into the 
arena of unit labour costs (ULC). They review the different definitions of 
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 competitiveness and propose a production function approach in which the output 
measures of competitiveness (trade and current account balances, market shares) 
are the result of the input measures such as relative costs of labour and capital, 
relative prices, productivities and profits. In this framework the authors propose 
a new competitiveness indicator for the Euro Area called CER Competitiveness 
Index (CCI), which takes into account not only the cost of labour but also the 
productivity of the capital stock and the profit rate. Starting from the simple 
assumption that competitive differences are reflected by the different profit rates 
of return to capital, the CCI indicator reveals how much a country’s ULC are 
overvalued or undervalued compared to the level which would ensure a profit 
rate equal to the Euro Area average. The econometric tests prove the higher 
explanatory power of this index compared to traditional measures.
 Part II focuses on the relation between export performance and competit-
iveness. The two contributions (from Fritsche and from Esposito and Guerrieri) 
stress the fact that Germany is the winner among European countries as it has 
succeeded in increasing exports at the expense of the rest of the Euro Area and 
in particular of the Italian economy (Esposito and Guerrieri). The contributions 
focus on the German model in order to assess its sustainability within a currency 
union and the possibility of applying it to the other countries of the area.
 In Chapter 3, Ulrich Fritsche argues that the German export- led growth model 
is not sustainable if the target is the well- being of the whole of Europe. This is 
because the beggar- thy-neighbour approach implied by the model causes 
unwanted structural divergences, which are magnified when the strategy of belt- 
tightening is implemented by the most advanced country of the area and not by a 
developing country. Fritsche advocates the end of the export- led growth strategy 
and an increase in German aggregate demand as a precondition for the rebalan-
cing of the European economy. This would imply, however, a change in the 
European governance as beggar- thy-neighbours strategies are presently not pun-
ished and often not even part of policy debates.
 The analysis of Esposito and Guerrieri in Chapter 4 supports Fritsche’s con-
clusion that Germany has contributed to the emergence of imbalances. However, 
the authors show that the German success is not only caused by wage modera-
tion and productivity growth, but also by an important transformation of the 
structure of German trade relations, namely production fragmentation and the 
penetration of fast- growing emerging markets. When comparing Italy and 
Germany, the authors find that the German high- tech industries have largely ben-
efited from delocalising activities to Central and Eastern Europe, while this 
effect is null for Italy. In terms of trade integration, the main result is that the 
Italian trade balance has suffered from the overall growth of total trade, while 
trade integration with China and ASEAN countries has in addition displaced 
high- tech industries. By contrast, in Germany the growth of trade integration is 
associated with higher net exports, largely because of German specialisation on 
capital equipment. Esposito and Guerrieri conclude that copying German out-
sourcing and market penetration could be a good strategy for the other countries 
when seeking to mitigate imbalances. Nevertheless, they also stress that part of 
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the German success is due to the creation of European monetary union, which 
implies, of course, that the euro’s integrity needs to be preserved.
 The third part analyses what is seen by many as the most important element 
in improving the German competitiveness: the Hartz reforms of the labour 
market (also called Agenda 2010).
 In Chapter 5, Torsten Niechoj analyses the German model in order to assess 
whether German wage restraint should be a policy benchmark for other Euro 
Area countries. He finds that labour market reforms are not the most important 
element in explaining the German success. The author argues that the coinci-
dence with the end of the negative cycle in 2005 has overstated the advantages 
of the Hartz reform, especially because its ultimate effect was to create many 
low- pay, low- quality jobs and to increase part- time jobs, which had detrimental 
welfare effects.
 In Niechoj’s view the real causes of the German success are twofold: on the 
one hand, its lower inflation rate implied higher real interest rates in the first 
years of the euro, with the effect of reducing consumption and increasing the 
outflow of savings toward countries with a lower real interest rate (i.e. with 
higher inflation). At the same time, domestic investment was concentrated on 
exports, as wage restraint together with fixed exchange rates have boosted the 
competitiveness of German products. Both these factors have contributed to the 
rise of imbalances in the Euro Area.
 The above argument is in line with the analysis by Collignon (Chapter 1) and 
Esposito and Guerrieri (Chapter 4), although it qualifies the mechanism by 
which the euro has turned Germany into the big winner in intra- area trade. Sur-
pluses were achieved by excess savings and under- consumption. Niechoj stresses 
therefore the importance of demand effects for the German economy: stimulus 
measures implemented by the government immediately after the global financial 
crisis and the rapid recovery of the external demand from emerging economies 
have pulled Germany more rapidly out of the crisis than other Euro member 
states. He concludes that wage restraint should not be copied by other countries, 
while stimulus measures can be successful. This would mean that a change in 
the European attitude toward adjustment policies is necessary, while the German 
push for asymmetric adjustment in surplus and deficit countries imposes auster-
ity on countries which are still in the midst of a recession.
 In Chapter 6, Joachim Möller questions whether the Hartz reforms have 
destroyed the German model of social market economy. The standard interpreta-
tion sees the so- called Agenda 2010 of the Schröder government as the main 
factor for improving German competitiveness. It implied wage moderation and 
export orientation by manufacturing firms, but he finds that an additional factor 
for German success was the strong internal flexibility in German firms, espe-
cially during the global financial crisis.
 Möller’s chapter assesses the costs of reforms in terms of living conditions 
for the labour force and changes in industrial relations. He argues that the 
reforms succeeded in reducing structural unemployment, first, by creating low- 
quality, low- pay jobs regulated mainly by ‘non- normal’ contracts and, second, 
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Introduction  7
by hardening the conditions for accessing the social security network. These two 
tendencies have increased both labour market segmentation and income inequal-
ities, in particular in terms of skill premia. These developments have weakened 
one of the pillars of the German model, namely the high level of solidarity, and 
may threaten the survival of the German model.
 In Chapter 7, Enrico Saltari starts from a discussion of Möller’s work and 
seeks to identify the causes for the poor success of the Italian labour market 
reforms. These reforms have started in the late 1990s, and although they may not 
yet be complete they resemble in many aspects the reforms of the Agenda 2010. 
Saltari finds two main differences: first, the Italian reforms have acted only on 
temporary contracts, while leaving the legislation for permanent contracts 
unchanged; second, the Italian reforms have mainly improved external flex-
ibility, while the German model has a high degree of internal flexibility and this 
has helped to shield the country from the negative effects of the global financial 
crisis. Saltari concludes that the low effectiveness of the Italian reforms has to be 
attributed to the different economic structures and political contexts, factors 
which have little or nothing to do with the reforms themselves.
 In Chapter 8, Sebastian Dullien reviews a variety of features of the German 
model with respect to labour market reforms and wage restraint, trade develop-
ments, and the evolution of domestic demand. Given this broad view, his work 
provides an integrated perspective of the main findings of Parts II and III of the 
book.
 Dullien argues, similarly to Niechoj, that the effects of Agenda 2010 have been 
overstated as gradual changes in the German labour market had already started in 
the early 1990s. In addition, he argues that the country has benefited from more 
competitive positions in world trade. On the one hand, German specialisation in 
equipment and high- quality manufacturing met the demand of emerging coun-
tries, a fact that is also stressed by Esposito and Guerrieri; but on the other hand, 
the country’s geographical position has allowed German industry to capture 
demand from high- income countries in Western Europe and from the integration 
of the new member states into the European Union. Additional factors are cer-
tainly wage restraint and the low growth of domestic demand, which has mechan-
ically improved net exports. An interesting point is that domestic demand has 
been influenced not only by consumption but also by the low expenditure on 
investment, R&D and education, which confirms the analysis in Chapter 1.
 Dullien concludes that most of the above- mentioned features of the German 
model cannot be exported to the rest of the area as some elements generate 
negative externalities for the partners and others simply reduce growth. Hence, 
the elements of the German model which can generate growth without negative 
consequences should be carefully selected.
 The fourth and last part of the book deals with regional issues in Italy and 
Germany. This part is interesting for the better understanding of the two countries, 
but it also adds substance to the argument in Chapter 1 that monetary flows in a 
monetary union are one of the possible adjustment mechanisms in case of imbal-
ances. The two countries have deep regional disparities in common, originating, in 
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the Italian case from the historical backwardness of Mezzogiorno, and in the 
German case from the reunification and the relatively disappointing growth per-
formance of the new Länder.
 In Chapter 9, Kristina van Deuverden explains the implementation of fiscal 
federalism in Germany and its effectiveness in fostering regional development. 
Yet, in her view, German federalism suffers from several drawbacks arising 
from conflicts between federal and regional laws. In particular, the Länder have 
less tax- setting power than the federal government and they have high incentives 
to act as free riders by increasing their debt levels. According to van Deuverden, 
Italy and other countries should pay attention and learn from the German experi-
ence by, first of all, carefully defining the system of public finance in order to 
avoid free riding, and second, by setting up an easily understandable equalisation 
mechanism that does not overcharge single regions.
 Gerhard Heimphold and Mirko Titze review in Chapter 10 the economic 
developments in East Germany after reunification and derive the policy implica-
tions for speeding up the convergence with the West. East German firms are 
characterised by low export orientation, small dimension, low level of private 
R&D and specialisation in labour- intensive productions. Additional problems 
arise from the lack of headquarters in East Germany and from the low potential 
for clustering. In this respect, the East German economy resembles features of 
the Euro Area’s periphery.
 Given this picture, the authors stress the role of policies favouring increases 
in firms’ size, suggesting a restructuring of taxation in order to make it neutral to 
the firm’s dimension. In addition, policies should favour the increase of skilled 
labour supply and demand. This objective could be fulfilled by transferring R&D 
activities from public to private institutions, with the additional result of filling 
the technological gap with West Germany.
 In the final chapter of the book, Francesca Bartoli, Zeno Rotondi and Denni 
Tommasi describe the banking system and its integration in the Italian Mezzo-
giorno and discuss the possible lesson to be applied to banking in the neue Bun-
desländer. The authors stress the fact that the two regions share a high 
dependency on regional imports and external (i.e. non- regional) financing as 
well as a consistent gap in economic convergence. However, the lower integra-
tion of the banking system in East Germany, together with the appreciation of 
the deutschmark following reunification and the huge monetary inflows and 
transfers from West Germany have caused a sort of ‘Dutch disease’. The integra-
tion of the banking system plays a crucial role in reducing the external financing 
of the regions by locally increasing private loans. In Italy, banks in the Mezzo-
giorno are integrated with those of northern Italy and the latter’s market share in 
the Mezzogiorno is high, with the result of increasing the loans to deposit ratio 
without draining resources from south to north. By contrast, the German banking 
system provides lower support to the less- developed territories, in the new Bun-
desländer. According to Bartoli, Rotondi and Tommasi, the main lesson that 
Germany should learn from the Italian experience is the need for higher banking 
integration of the less- developed regions with the more- developed ones.
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Introduction  9
 In our view, this is also a fundamental lesson for the Euro Area. As Collignon 
has shown in Chapter 1, the Euro Area is a fully integrated monetary economy, 
economically resembling nation- states, despite being financially fragmented and 
politically fractioned. Bartoli, Rotondi and Tommasi present evidence that 
monetary flows and private credit facilitated by the banking system have a much 
neglected role in a currency area, while government transfers may actually be 
one of the obstacles of balanced growth. Hence, their study reinforces the ana-
lysis of Chapter 1 that currency areas need a properly functioning banking union, 
but not necessarily a fiscal union.
 To summarise, the chapters assembled in this book provide an innovative 
look at competitiveness issues in the Euro Area, with specific focus on Germany 
and Italy. Beyond the slogans of ‘necessary labour market reforms’, a much 
more complex picture emerges when one analyses industrial structures and 
macroeconomic developments. In this respect, the book could make a contribu-
tion towards changing preconceived ideas about Germany and Italy, or about 
how to lead the Euro Area out of the crisis.
Notes
1 The Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council said: 
The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge- based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion.
See www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-r1.
en0.htm
2 ‘The on- going adjustment to imbalances is necessary, but is costly in the short term 
and has resulted in higher unemployment. Adjustment is taking place, but the way 
forward for a complete and durable rebalancing is still long. Reforms in wage- setting 
mechanisms are starting to show their effectiveness in improving cost- competitiveness. 
High or rising unemployment in several member states, in a context of subdued 
aggregate demand, points to a labour market adjustment process that is still incom-
plete’ (European Commission, 2012: 5).
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Part I
European imbalances and 
competitiveness
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1 Taking European integration 
seriously
Competitiveness, imbalances and 
economic stability in the Euro Area
Stefan Collignon
Introduction
The euro crisis presents a challenge nor only to policy- makers, but to economic 
theory as well. The explanation of a problem often traces already the path for its 
remedy. But if the diagnosis is mistaken, the medicine could kill the patient. 
Economic theory plays, therefore, an important role in overcoming the euro 
crisis, in preserving stability, and in keeping Europe together. Five years of 
unabated crisis have eroded the trust of citizens that the euro will improve their 
prosperity and welfare. The rejection of the euro and of European integration is 
gaining ground in public opinion. Hence, if Europe has failed to end the crisis, it 
may have erred in explaining it. It is time to review the theory that has guided 
policies so far.
	 In	this	chapter	I	will	first	look	at	the	link	between	competitiveness	and	macro-
economic imbalances and then discuss the fallacies of this approach. I will 
propose	 flow	 of	 funds	 analysis	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 current	 account	 based	
 theories of the euro crisis and then draw some conclusions.
Competitiveness and imbalances in the Euro Area
Economic	models	 explaining	 financial	 crises	 in	 general	 and	 the	 euro	 crisis	 in	
particular abound. Many deal with money, foreign debt, exchange rates and con-
tagion	 in	global	financial	markets;	 some	deal	with	domestic	 institutions,	banks	
and	 local	 debt;	 but	 increasingly	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 competitiveness,	 or	 rather	 the	
loss of competitiveness in Europe’s south.1 Unfortunately, most of these 
ex planations mix foreign and domestic aspects from different theories into 
inconsistent	policy	advice.	This	amalgam	reflects	the	complex	governance	of	the	
Euro Area, where governments act as if they were fully independent nations 
without considering the external effects of their policies on citizens living in 
other member states. Competitiveness is a prime example for such interdepend-
ence, for the competitive gain of one party is the loss of another. Reforms 
improving competitiveness in one country will inevitably deteriorate relative 
conditions in another. Because policy- makers are ignoring the systemic changes 
and interdependencies caused by monetary integration, they are unable to adopt 
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coherent strategies for overcoming the crisis. The shortcomings in the way gov-
ernments have handled the crisis throw a shadow on the future of the euro and 
European integration. This chapter is an invitation to reconsider one important 
dimension of the crisis explanation: competitiveness.
 Macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro Area are related to competitiveness. 
At	first,	blame	for	the	euro	crisis	was	put	on	public	debt	and	fiscal	irresponsibil-
ity, in particular on the violations of the Stability and Growth Pact. Greece was 
the paradigmatic case. But soon a new aspect emerged: in some countries, 
notably in Ireland and Spain, private debt, granted by commercial banks, had 
been excessive, and when the economy slowed down banks got into trouble. 
Governments	 needed	 to	 bail	 out	 their	 banks	 to	 preserve	financial	 stability	 and	
private	debt	spilled	over	 into	public	debt.	When	the	sum	of	public	deficits	and	
private	investment	exceeds	national	savings,	the	gap	has	to	be	financed	by	bor-
rowing	from	non-	residents	and	this	is	recorded	by	national	current	account	defi-
cits. Because it was observed that most crisis countries had accumulated large 
current	 account	 deficits,	 the	 emergence	 of	 excessive	 imbalances	 became	 the	
prominent explanation of the crisis.
	 Deficits	 increase	 the	 stock	 of	 outstanding	 debt;	 current	 account	 deficits	
increase foreign debt. The sustainability of foreign debt requires, therefore, that 
the discounted value of all future current account positions be equal to the out-
standing value of foreign debt today. Hence, according to standard international 
macroeconomics, countries with large foreign debt must generate current 
account surpluses in the future, because that is how they earn the foreign cur-
rency necessary to service foreign debt. Following this logic, the European Com-
mission has designed a new policy procedure aimed at reducing what it calls 
external imbalances within the Euro Area. It argues that ‘nominal exchange rate 
devaluations are not an available policy tool for the correction of external imbal-
ances in EMU’, so that various ‘internal devaluation’ measures must ‘mimic the 
effects of nominal devaluations by reducing domestic prices and encourage 
expenditure- switching effects’ (European Commission, 2011: 21). In practice 
this means that austerity is the main tool for correcting ‘external’ imbalances and 
promoting net exports from southern states.
 Austerity means cutting public expenditure, reducing wages or lowering stat-
utory wage costs by tax and welfare reforms. Whether current account imbal-
ances are corrected by cutting aggregate demand or changing relative costs and 
prices may depend on where one sees the causes of the imbalances, but in any 
case	different	policies	must	be	applied	in	deficit	and	surplus	countries.	Euroscep-
tics have always insisted that with respect to monetary policy ‘one size does not 
fit	all’,	and	even	the	German	chancellor	Merkel	seems	to	have	been	convinced	
by them.2	The	Walters	Critique	had	argued	long	ago	that	in	high	inflation	coun-
tries	the	unified	nominal	interest	rate	in	monetary	union	would	lower	real	interest	
rates below the euro average and thereby fuel local demand booms and reinforce 
relative price distortions. Mongelli and Wyplosz (2008) have rightly objected 
that this disequilibrium would be corrected by the negative effects on competit-
iveness, because rising prices will bring the demand boom to an end. A better 
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Taking European integration seriously  15
explanation for diverging booms and busts in the Euro Area is, therefore, the 
convergence of nominal interest rates that has followed the creation of monetary 
union. It has made credit cheap in the south which has caused the over- 
accumulation	and	waste	of	capital	resources	(Sinn,	2013;	Giavazzi	and	Spaventa,	
2010)	and	the	excess	demand	that	has	pushed	inflation	over	and	above	the	euro	
average (Wyplosz, 2013). A variant of this argument focuses on the cost side 
and especially on unit labour costs and wage bargaining. ‘Irresponsible’ and 
‘uncoordinated’ price- and wage- setting behaviour is then blamed for the crisis 
(Flassbeck and Spiecker, 2011). The boom was not sustainable because the 
deteri orating competitiveness and the slow growth during the crisis have 
widened	budget	deficits.	However,	 regardless	of	what	kind	of	 explanation	one	
favours,	both	approaches	share	the	idea	that	current	account	deficits	are	a	good	
indicator for emerging macroeconomic imbalances within the Euro Area.
 The recent reconsideration of current account imbalances between member 
states	of	the	Euro	Area	represents	a	significant	shift	in	political	thinking.	In	the	
early	years	of	monetary	union,	rising	current	account	deficits	were	actually	seen	
as	 beneficial,	 because	 they	 reflected	 deeper	 financial	 integration	 and	 the	more	
efficient	allocation	of	resources	across	the	Euro	Area	(Blanchard	and	Giavazzi,	
2002).3 Capital markets could allocate savings to where they would yield the 
highest return within the single currency area, and the Euro Area was seen as an 
integrated monetary economy. After 2009, this interpretation was abandoned. 
Member states were again represented as separate jurisdictions, in which local 
governments had to minimise risk exposure for local taxpayers rather than max-
imise the welfare of all citizens. The resulting lack of political coherence is one 
of the main causes for the continuous deterioration of the crisis.
 The European Commission took the lead in this new interpretation by invent-
ing the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), modelled on the Stability 
and Growth Pact. It aims ‘to prevent and correct the harmful macroeconomic 
imbalances by identifying potential risks early on’.4 The so- called surveillance 
mechanism starts with the Alert Mechanism Report, which uses a scoreboard of 
indicators to identify where and when an ‘in- depth review’ is necessary. If the 
situation is deemed unsustainable, the Excessive Imbalance Procedure sets up 
rules for member states to remedy the situation. The scoreboard indicators 
combine	 stock	 and	 flow	 data	 to	 capture	 deteriorations	 of	 imbalances,	 but	 the	
main	focus	is	on	correcting	current	account	deficits	and	external	debt	caused	by	
distortions in relative prices.5
 In principle, having a tool for avoiding excessive imbalances is progress in the 
Euro Area’s economic governance. If properly used, it could have helped to 
prevent the overaccumulation crises in the south. In practice, however, the new 
procedure’s focus on current accounts and external debt is harmful and mislead-
ing. Today’s adjustment policies in the Euro Area stand in the context of optimum 
currency	area	(OCA)	theory,	which	has	influenced	debates	on	European	monetary	
union for a long time.6	This	theory	interprets	a	currency	area	as	a	fixed	exchange	
rate	 regime	and	calculates	 its	benefits	as	 the	balance	between	gains	 from	lower	
transaction costs and the loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment tool 
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(de Grauwe, 2007). It argues that if a country is hit by a negative shock, say a 
recession or deteriorating competitiveness, and it has its own currency, it can use 
the exchange rate to adjust the country’s relative prices. This depreciates domestic 
wealth relative to the rest of the world, but at least the economy can maintain 
domestic demand and add to it additional demand for exports. By contrast, in a 
fixed	 exchange	 rate	 regime,	 one	 cannot	 use	 the	 exchange	 rate	 to	 devalue;	with	
inflexible	prices	and	wages,	a	prolonged	recession	with	high	and	persistent	unem-
ployment would follow. Furthermore, the higher external debt levels of a country 
are, the steeper should be the real depreciations in order to ‘put the price watch 
back’ (Sinn, 2013). Hence, giving up the possibility of correcting the exchange 
rate is costly. The negative effects of regional recessions could be mitigated by a 
transfer	union,	where	the	surplus	countries	subsidise	the	deficit	countries;	but	this	
solution is resisted by voters in the prosperous north of Europe. Hence, prices and 
wages are the main adjustment tool in the Euro Area, and OCA theory has made 
labour-	market	flexibility	the	principal	criterion	for	judging	the	optimality	of	cur-
rency	 areas.	 In	 this	 model,	 the	 net	 benefits	 of	 monetary	 union	 will	 become	
negative if labour markets are rigid and shocks are large. However, the role of 
financial	markets	and	 the	central	bank	 is	 rarely	discussed	 in	 this	context.	 I	will	
show below that the existence of a single lender of last resort makes monetary 
union	much	more	robust	than	an	ordinary	fixed	exchange	rate	regime.
 No doubt, macroeconomic imbalances must be corrected. The question is 
how this can be done with minimal welfare losses. If current accounts are the 
target, austerity is inevitable because ‘excessive’ domestic expenditure must be 
cut back. However, the burden of such welfare losses depends on who is doing 
the adjustment. Member states with current account surpluses favour asymmetric 
adjustment, where the brunt of the correction must be borne by ‘non- competitive’ 
deficit	 countries,	 while	 they	 themselves	 can	 continue	 with	 their	 ‘competitive’	
performance	as	before.	Of	course,	the	reduction	of	deficits	in	the	south	is	incom-
patible with the maintenance of surpluses in the north, but few policy- makers 
seem	to	notice	the	inconsistency	of	their	demands.	By	contrast,	deficit	countries	
seek more symmetric solutions, where surplus countries increase spending on 
goods	from	deficit	countries,	hoping	thereby	to	soften	the	adjustment	pain.	Sinn	
(2013: 2) has summarised the argument by saying that ‘Europe needs austerity in 
the	south	and	inflationary	growth	in	the	north	to	improve	the	competitiveness	of	
the south and to structurally improve the current account imbalances’. Similarly, 
Flassbeck and Spiecker (2011: 186) have argued that
wages in Germany have to rise for a considerable amount of time by more 
than is warranted by the traditional wage rule (national productivity growth 
plus	the	common	inflation	target)	and	the	Southern	European	countries	must	
pursue the opposite strategy.
While	leaning	towards	asymmetry	in	the	official	policy	documents	submitted	for	
approval by the Council, the European Commission has favoured in its analytic 
studies a more balanced approach.7 However, whether symmetric or asymmetric 
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Taking European integration seriously  17
and whether based on aggregate demand or relative prices, most policy recom-
mendations end up with proposing the correction of member states’ current 
accounts.
 The focus on current accounts implies that national investment must be 
financed	by	national	savings.	There	 is	no	good	reason	for	such	a	proposal	 in	a	
currency	union.	It	violates	the	basic	principles	of	a	single	market	and	creates	fin-
ancial fragmentation. The prevailing policy consensus has the unintended con-
sequence	 of	 unravelling	 the	 European	 edifice.	 Furthermore,	 balancing	 current	
accounts between member states also means that adjustment must work through 
the tradable goods sector. A real depreciation shifts the competitive advantage in 
favour of exports, so that the trade balance improves. When countries have their 
own currencies, a nominal devaluation can support adjustment at least in the 
short run, but we know from a long history of adjustments in the global and 
European economies that such policies often cause substantial welfare losses. 
Nominal devaluations seem initially less painful, but over time they will import 
inflation,	 which	 will	 annihilate	 the	 competitive	 cost	 advantage.	 By	 contrast,	
shifting relative prices in favour of tradable goods without adjusting nominal 
exchange rates may be initially more painful, but might be more sustainable in 
the	long	run.	Europe’s	experience	with	flexible	exchange	rates	from	the	1970s	to	
the	1990s	has	shown	that	exchange	rate	flexibility	is	not	compatible	with	a	fully	
integrated	 internal	market	 in	 Europe	 (Collignon	 and	 Schwarzer,	 2003;	 Padoa-	
Schioppa, 1987). Furthermore, a nominal devaluation will reduce the value of 
domestic assets, liabilities and income and that makes residents poorer. Hence, it 
is not surprising that southern member states resist leaving the euro as this would 
reduce their welfare.
	 However,	if	prices	are	not	flexible	and	devaluations	are	ruled	out,	adjustment	
seems	 impossible	 and	 monetary	 union	 may	 be	 doomed.	 Referring	 to	 fixed	
exchange rate systems like Bretton Woods, Flassbeck and Spiecker (2011: 181) 
have argued: 
persistent	divergences	of	inflation	rates	inside	the	monetary	union	are	fatal	
because the differences in the cost and price level among the member coun-
tries accumulate over time and produce real exchange rate appreciation and 
depreciation, or, in other words, unsustainable over- and undervaluation for 
currencies that no longer exist.
Sinn	 and	Wollmershaeuser	 (2011)	 also	 compare	 the	Euro	Area	with	 the	 fixed	
exchange rate system of Bretton Woods and then talk of nonexistent currencies, 
namely ‘German’ and ‘Irish euros’. This is odd. Why should anyone bother 
about ghost currencies that no longer exist? Clearly, there is a theoretical incon-
sistency in these models.
	 I	will	now	argue	that	a	currency	area	is	not	a	fixed	exchange	rate	arrangement	
and imbalances between members of the same currency union must not be 
treated like ‘external’ imbalances in international economics. Shifting incentives 
in favour of exports is less important in a monetary union than in international 
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economics, because growth in the non- tradable sector can compensate some of 
the welfare losses. Instead, the primary economic policy objective must be bal-
anced growth as already postulated in the Treaty on the European Union, Article 
3.3. Investment is a crucial variable in this context and a better indicator for 
imbalances	is	the	flow	of	funds	between	institutional	sectors	of	the	Euro	Area.
Fallacies in the debate on macroeconomic imbalances in the 
Euro Area
It would be a mistake to believe that because it emerged from the European 
Monetary	 System	 where	 exchange	 rates	 were	 fixed	 but	 adjustable,	 European	
monetary union is nothing else but a permanent locking of national currencies to 
a common currency. This view, widespread as it is, does not take into account 
how	a	monetary	union	works.	I	will	 therefore	first	review	how	a	currency	area	
functions and then discuss the role of the often neglected non- tradable sector, 
before drawing the conclusions for the macroeconomic adjustment programs in 
the Euro Area.
Monetary union as a payment union
A	currency	area	 is	 a	payment	union.	 It	 is	 defined	as	 the	 territory	where	 credit	
contracts	 can	 be	 enforced	 and	 extinguished	 by	 paying	 the	 legally	 defined	 and	
generally accepted currency.8 In other words, everyone has to use the same cur-
rency for making payments. The Euro Area functions exactly like any other cur-
rency area. When European monetary union started on 1 January 1999, the euro 
became legal tender in the participating member states (Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU), Art. 3.4). Previously existing monetary laws in member states 
were abrogated and the European Central Bank (ECB) was set up as the direc-
tive	 organ	 and	 head	 office	 for	 the	 conduct	 of	 monetary	 policy.	 The	 existing	
national central banks (NCB) were merged with the ECB to form the 
Eurosystem.9
 The central bank is the bank of banks. Money, i.e. legal tender, is created by 
the central bank when it is granting credit to the domestic banking system or 
buying foreign assets. The central bank’s assets are therefore claims against 
domestic and foreign economies. Central bank money is credited to the accounts 
in	which	commercial	banks	hold	 their	 reserves	with	 the	 central	bank;	money	 is	
therefore a liability by the central bank, but also a claim (an asset) by banks10 on 
the central bank. Against their reserve holdings, banks can also draw banknotes 
which they put into circulation among their clients, but this fact is analytically less 
interesting and we can concentrate our discussion on central bank money. Thus, in 
the Euro Area, domestic money, i.e. the currency of the currency area, is the liab-
ility of the Eurosystem.11 Contrary to the assumption of ghost- currencies, there is 
no ‘national’ euro. Money proper is central bank money, also called narrow 
money. Broad money	 is	 defined	 as	 currency	 and	 bank	 deposits	 held	 by	 non-	
financial	agents	(corporations	and	households).	It	consists	essentially	of	liabilities	
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Taking European integration seriously  19
of commercial banks. Commercial banks hold reserves of central bank money in 
accordance with legal requirements (minimum reserves) and their own liquidity 
preferences, and they create broad money when they give credit to other economic 
sectors. When economic agents make payments in the Euro Area, they transfer 
these liabilities to each other.12
 By contrast, payments outside the currency area are made in foreign currency. 
Foreign currency cannot be created by the domestic central bank. The money 
readily available for making foreign payments consists therefore of reserve 
assets held by the central bank in foreign currency.13 As the name indicates, 
these reserves are recorded as assets in the central bank’s balance sheet. Thus, 
there is a clear categorical distinction between domestic money (a liability) and 
international money (an asset).	It	follows	that	a	currency	area	is	defined	by	the	
fact that it has a central bank whose liabilities serve for making payments and 
extinguishing debt. The abrogation of national monetary laws has lifted the dis-
tinction of monetary jurisdictions and turned the Euro Area into an ‘economic 
country’. To analyse monetary transactions between residents of different 
member states in the Euro Area as if they took place between independent 
‘foreign’ countries is therefore no longer appropriate.14 Within a monetary union, 
trans- border payments have the same status as payments within a nation- state.
Intra- currency area payments
The distinction between payments within the monetary union and the rest of 
the world (RoW) can be shown by a stylised example.15 Let us assume our cur-
rency area consists of only two countries, Germany and Italy. It operates 
through the Eurosystem, in which the European Central Bank (ECB) is integ-
rated with national central banks (the Bundesbank and the Banca d’Italia). The 
ECB decides on monetary policy and manages the foreign reserve assets for 
the union. National central banks act as intermediaries that hold the deposit 
accounts of commercial banks16 and have a net claim on the ECB’s reserve 
assets.17 Now imagine someone in Italy imports goods from Germany for an 
amount of €120.18 The transaction is settled in domestic currency through the 
banking system. The importer’s local bank makes a transfer to the exporter’s 
bank through the payment system of the Eurosystem: the Italian bank’s 
account with the Banca d’Italia is debited by €120, while the German bank’s 
account with the Bundesbank is credited by the same amount.19 Hence, the 
claims of the German economy on the Eurosystem increase by €120 and the 
net claims of Italy decline as a result of debiting the Banca d’Italia accounts. 
For Germany, the reserve asset claim on the ECB increases and as a balancing 
item bank deposits (i.e. the broad money component held in German banks) 
increase	as	well;	by	contrast,	in	Italy,	the	claim	by	Banca	d’Italia	on	the	ECB	
is reduced and so is local money supply.20 However, the transaction is neutral 
for	 the	 Eurosystem	 as	 a	whole;	 the	 overall	 amount	 of	 foreign	 reserve	 assets	
and money supply does not change. See Table 1.1. This is how payments are 
made within a currency area.
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Inter- currency area payments
Next, we look at international payments into a different currency area. Assume 
Germany exports goods worth €150 to the United Kingdom. The transaction is 
settled in pounds sterling (GBP), which implies that the German exporter sells 
his foreign exchange receipts to his German bank and his account is credited 
€150. The bank sells now the foreign currency to the Eurosystem and its account 
with the Bundesbank is credited by the equivalent amount. Thus, the ECB 
increases its reserve assets and the account of the Bundesbank with the ECB is 
credited by €150. Net claims by Germany on the ECB have increased and so has 
broad money supply in Germany. Nothing has changed in Italy, but for the Euro 
Area as a whole reserve assets and money supply have increased. See Table 1.2. 
Of course, a net import from the rest of the world into the Euro Area would have 
the opposite effect of reducing reserve assets and money supply, assuming that 
the ECB does not sterilise the variations in reserve assets. However, if the ECB 
had reasons to be concerned about price stability, it would tighten monetary 
policy by selling domestic assets equivalent to the foreign assets it bought. In 
that case, monetary tightening would negatively affect growth in the non- 
exporting member states. For our argument here we can assume that prices 
remain stable and the ECB accommodates the growth- induced demand for 
liquidity. Export- led growth in Germany is then compatible with relative stagna-
tion in Italy.
 This analysis throws an interesting light on the role of balance of payments 
for the Euro Area: if Germany is the export champion into the rest of the world, 
it earns the foreign currency which other net importers in the Euro Area can 
spend without running into balance of payment crises. This is clearly a win–win 
situation,	 for	 it	 allows	 to	 efficient	 allocation	 of	 resources	 (buying	 cheaply	
abroad)	 in	deficit	 economies,	while	 it	 increases	net	financial	wealth	 in	 surplus	
countries.	Hence,	by	lifting	the	foreign	exchange	constraint	on	deficit	countries,	
European monetary union is trade- creating in the global economy. These bene-
fits	 are	 a	 major	 reason	 why	 small	 countries	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 joining	 and	
staying in the monetary union. One may argue, however, that the export strength 
of Germany is keeping the euro- exchange rate against the rest of the world 
higher	than	is	advantageous	for	the	deficit	countries.	However,	that	raises	again	
the question of how adjustment within the Euro Area affects member states.
 This analysis does not imply that member states in the currency area are able 
to	 run	 deficits	 without	 constraints.	 If	 regional	 economic	 growth	 slows	 down	
below the rate at which the debt service can be assured, the risk of debt defaults 
increases rapidly. Once the solvency of debtors in stagnating regions is in doubt, 
financial	 markets	 will	 massively	 shorten	 their	 exposure	 to	 private	 and	 public	
debtors	residing	in	these	states.	The	resulting	financial	outflow	will	aggravate	the	
problems of economic growth and cause a negative feedback loop. Thus, funda-
mental factors and market expectations may mutually reinforce each other and 
political	conflicts	will	further	enlarge	these	effects.	There	is	evidence	that	in	the	
euro	 crisis	 financial	 markets	 have	 responded	 more	 to	 political	 news	 and	
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Taking European integration seriously  23
uncertainties than to economic fundamentals (Collignon et al., 2013). This fact 
points at the need to reform the governance of the Euro Area, but it says little 
about the need for adjustment within a currency area.
The role of the non- tradable sector
The truth is that monetary union provides its own adjustment mechanism, which 
is robust in economic terms, but likely to create political problems. This mech-
anism is often overlooked in the literature and in public policy discussions. As 
we	have	seen	in	Table	1.1,	the	effect	of	a	regional	current	account	deficit	without	
a	compensating	capital	 inflow	is	an	outflow	of	money	from	the	deficit	 into	 the	
surplus area. Ceteris paribus, this reduction in money balances will endogen-
ously	 generate	 macroeconomic	 adjustment.	 The	 money	 outflow	 will	 depress	
demand	 and	 reduce	 prices	 and	 wages	 in	 the	 deficit	 economy;	 the	 inflow	 of	
money into the surplus economy is stimulating growth there.21 Thus, current 
account imbalances will not last forever, although the adjustment process may 
be slow. This built- in adjustment mechanism is at work in all currency areas, 
whether	nation-	states	or	monetary	unions,	but	not	in	fixed	exchange	rate	systems.	
This is precisely why multi- currency systems, contrary to monetary unions, need 
the ‘exchange rate instrument’ of nominal devaluations, while currency unions 
do not.
 Yet, this built- in adjustment mechanism is not pleasant. It causes what Olivier 
Blanchard once called ‘rotating slumps’ (Blanchard, 2006). These slumps may 
have disruptive social consequences, which, given that member states retain 
authority for policies, may lead to anti- European backlashes.22 Furthermore, 
recessions in member states will raise the probability of the regional cumulation 
of	debt	defaults.	The	conventional	policy	response	is	to	blame	deficit	countries	
and	to	impose	internal	adjustment	policies	on	them;	but	austerity	and	drastic	real	
exchange rate depreciations through lower wages are unlikely to improve 
regional growth at least in the short and medium run. Germany, to take a promi-
nent example, has gone through nearly a decade of slow growth when pursuing 
such adjustment strategy. The European Commission (2012a: 3) has acknow-
ledged that European adjustment policies have weakened economic growth, but 
it claims that ‘progress in re- balancing will open up the way for growth and con-
vergence’. In other words, adjustment is painful, but once the ‘external’ balance 
is restored, growth will return.
 We now know that this policy view is extremely costly in welfare terms. The 
medicine could actually kill the patient.23 The reduction in wages and in private 
and public spending will in the short run reduce effective demand below the 
growth potential, and in the long run it will slow down the potential growth rates 
themselves, because there will be more bankruptcies, less investment and rising 
unemployment.24	All	this	makes	servicing	debt	more	difficult.	If	the	response	to	
increasing default risks is more austerity, the economy will collapse in a negative 
feedback loop, as we have witnessed in Greece. The question is whether other 
policy options are available. This is where the distinction between domestic and 
926_01_Competitiveness Euro.indd   23 4/12/13   11:07:10
24  S. Collignon
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
foreign currency becomes crucial. If a currency area runs out of foreign reserves, 
its external debt will become unsustainable and a real devaluation must shift the 
incentives toward generating net exports and attracting foreign investment. In 
monetary union, this is certainly one policy option, but not the only one. What is 
needed is generating economic growth out of which the debt can be serviced and 
it does not matter whether it originates in the tradable or non- tradable sector. An 
alternative to ‘internal adjustment’ is therefore to stimulate internal demand in 
the non- tradable sector. I will now show that economic growth in member states 
can be sustained by investment in the non- tradable sector without risk for price 
stability.
 Because aggregate demand is related to the growth of money supply, the 
effects of stimulating demand in the non- tradable sector can be shown by includ-
ing	 the	 non-	tradable	 sector	 into	 Table	 1.1.	 By	 definition,	 this	 sector	 does	 not	
affect the balance of payments. For simplicity, we assume that the Italian gov-
ernment	borrows	from	commercial	banks	to	finance	local	services.	Commercial	
banks	 then	 need	 to	 refinance	 themselves	 by	 obtaining	 liquidity	 from	 Banca	
d’Italia. Let this demand for increased central bank money be €120. Referring 
back to Table 1.1, we see that domestic assets in Banca d’Italia’s balance sheet 
will increase from €550 to €670 and bank deposits will grow by the same 
amount from 30 to 150. Ceteris paribus, domestic assets, as shown by the integ-
rated balance sheet of the Eurosystem, increase also by €120 and money supply 
in the Euro Area goes up to €420.
 So far, this is a standard model of expansionary monetary policy. However, 
let us assume that monetary policy is committed to price stability. As in the case 
of a current account surplus with the rest of the world, the central bank has to 
decide whether it is willing to accommodate the increase in money supply. If it 
considers this to be incompatible with price stability, it will raise interest rates 
and credit demand will slow down. Given that public spending is less sensitive 
to interest rates than private credit demand, we now assume that domestic assets 
and bank deposits will fall in Germany by the same amount (€120) as they have 
increased in Italy, so that Euro Area money supply and prices remain constant 
over	the	medium	term.	In	this	case	the	combined	effect	of	an	Italian	trade	deficit	
plus stimulus in the non- tradable sector increases bank deposits in Italy to €150 
(see Table 1.3) and leaves Germany with bank deposits of €150, which was 
exactly the original position in the balance sheets of Banca d’Italia and the Bun-
desbank shown in Table 1.1. Of course, in reality the adjustment may not be as 
symmetric as in our example, but the point is to show that, in principle, it is pos-
sible to compensate the depressive features of negative regional trade balances 
by stimulating demand in the non- tradable sector without jeopardising price 
stability	and	the	sustainability	of	debt	in	deficit	countries	of	monetary	union.
 For economists who believe that Italy and Germany are still separate eco-
nomies – as they were until 1999 – this may look like voodoo economics. How 
can a country accumulate foreign debt without paying it back by future sur-
pluses? The miracle is possible because the debt is repaid not in foreign, but in 
domestic currency available anywhere in the Euro Area. The sustainability is not 
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assured	by	gaining	sufficient	foreign	currency,	but	by	each	debtor	fulfilling	the	
solvency constraint whereby future discounted income matches the outstanding 
debt. In other words, debtors are responsible for their liabilities not as a com-
munity but as individual borrowers. This is a fundamental difference between a 
monetary	 union	 and	 a	 fixed	 exchange	 rate	 system.	 If	 a	 currency	 area	 did	 not	
work like an integrated payment union in this way, no nation- state would ever 
have survived. Italy’s north and south would have separated, the United 
Kingdom would have split into England and Scotland, and Bavaria would have 
introduced its own currency.
 A common objection to this view is that nation- states and federations are sus-
tained	 by	 the	 solidarity	 of	 fiscal	 transfers,	 which	 citizens	 are	 willing	 to	 pay	
within their nation, but not for others. Yet, the cohesive power of solidarity 
quickly	fades	when	economic	benefits	are	in	doubt,	as	one	can	witness	in	Flan-
ders, Lombardy, Scotland, Catalonia or Bavaria. More importantly, as Fatás 
(1998) has shown, the stabilising effects of automatic interregional transfers are 
grossly overvalued. If this is so, the monetary adjustment mechanism explains 
how the payment union is sustained.
Implications for economic adjustment
We can now sum up how macroeconomic imbalances work out in a monetary 
union:	a	current	account	deficit	within	the	currency	area	shifts	the	distribution	of	
wealth and money supply from the net importer to the net exporter, but does not 
affect macroeconomic aggregates of the area. The distributional effects are not 
banal:	surplus	countries	increase	their	financial	net	wealth,	while	deficits	coun-
tries	become	financially	poorer	–	although	they	may	gain	from	the	more	efficient	
allocation of resources and capital that over time could narrow the gap between 
high- and low- income countries. Nevertheless, the monetary union is robust, 
because	deficit	countries	cannot	run	out	of	reserves.	Foreign	reserves	are	irrele-
vant for the transactions between member states. For domestic transactions, 
money balances are needed and they are obtained either by borrowing from com-
mercial banks in the surplus countries, or from the Eurosystem, which guaran-
tees equal access to liquidity for all solvent banks in the Euro Area. As long as 
this	is	compatible	with	the	money	supply	policies,	the	outcome	is	Pareto	optimal;	
if the ECB tightens monetary policy in order to preserve price stability, export- 
oriented economies have a comparative advantage. Hence, the fragility of the 
Euro Area is not in the economics, but in the politics of monetary union: distri-
butional	conflicts	may	undermine	the	popular	acceptance	of	the	euro	and	the	pol-
icies by which it is ruled.
	 While	 one	 may	 agree	 that	 current	 account	 deficits	 are	 irrelevant	 for	 the	
payment mechanism within the monetary union, one could argue that the accu-
mulation of large ‘foreign’ debt positions will become problematic. Indeed, a 
large	negative	net	international	investment	position,	which	reflects	the	accumu-
lation	of	past	current	account	deficits,	may	not	be	sustainable.	However,	liabil-
ities within the Euro Area are not ‘foreign’ debt and should not be counted as a 
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Taking European integration seriously  27
component of the international investment position. We have seen that intra- 
Euro	 Area	 deficits	 do	 not build up external indebtedness, because they are 
domestic borrowings, which are repaid by transferring domestic money. The 
only international investment position that matters is the foreign debt of the Euro 
Area. This makes a huge difference for the adjustment mechanisms.
 The overall purpose of adjustment within a currency area is to guarantee the 
stability	 of	 the	 financial	 system.	 Intertemporal	 solvency	 requires	 that	 the	 dis-
counted value of future income is equal to today’s debt. Domestic debt solvency 
requires income in domestic currency, while liabilities to the rest of the world 
must be paid in foreign currency. Hence, intra- Euro Area debt is settled by 
drawing on deposits in local banks and it makes no difference for the sustain-
ability of domestic currency debt where the source of future domestic income is 
located.25 Domestic income may be generated by exporting to other member 
states (improving the trade balance) or by economic growth originating in the 
non- tradable sector. But as long as the domestic solvency constraint is met, there 
is no need to switch expenditure from the non- tradable to tradable goods sectors. 
For example, Italy may have a fast growing non- tradable service sector, which 
imports	capital	equipment	from	Germany.	If	this	investment	is	financed	by	bank	
credit,	 it	 will	 at	 first	 increase	 money	 supply	 in	 Italy,	 while	 the	 payments	 to	
German suppliers will reduce money holdings in Italy again. Thus, the credit- 
financed	 investment	 in	 the	 non-	tradable	 sector	 can	 compensate	 the	 outflow	 of	
money	balances	from	the	deficit	country.	As	long	as	profits	in	the	non-	tradable	
sector	are	sufficient	to	service	the	debt,	solvency	is	assured.
 In aggregate, this logic requires that the economic growth rate in the region is 
larger	 or	 equal	 to	 the	 average	 interest	 rate	 in	 order	 to	 fulfil	 the	 solvency	 con-
straint. But this means also that, contrary to the claims by new mainstream ortho-
doxy, one cannot judge competitiveness by developments in the tradable sector 
alone.	Instead,	competitiveness	must	be	measured	by	the	overall	profitability	of	
the national capital stock, because that determines whether the region is able to 
attract new investment, and whether the contracted credit liabilities are sustain-
able. How to use this criterion for assessing competitiveness empirically will be 
shown in the next chapter. Here, we need to insist that balance of payment 
accounting is not the appropriate instrument for detecting imbalances in the Euro 
Area.	The	proper	tool	for	analysing	payment	flows	in	a	monetary	union	is	flow	
of funds analysis which gives a more differentiated picture of macroeconomic 
imbalances	in	the	Euro	Area.	By	using	flow	of	funds	analysis	we	will	also	dis-
cover	that	simply	comparing	returns	to	capital	is	not	sufficient	for	a	full	picture	
of competitiveness.
Flow of funds in European monetary union
Flow	 of	 funds	 analysis	 measures	 payment	 flows	 across	 the	 economy	 and	
presents	the	financial	assets	and	liabilities	of	all	institutional	sectors	in	the	Euro	
Area,	i.e.	households,	financial	and	non-	financial	corporations	(NFCs),	govern-
ment	and	the	rest	of	the	world.	Similar	to	profit	and	loss,	cash	flow	and	balance	
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sheet	 statements	 in	 business	 accounting,	 flow	 of	 funds	 accounts	 provide	 a	
coherent	 and	 integrated	picture	of	 the	financial	wealth	of	 an	 economy	and	 its	
variations. They are tracking funds as they move from sectors that serve as 
sources of capital, through intermediaries (such as banks, mutual funds and 
pension	funds),	to	sectors	that	use	the	capital	to	acquire	physical	and	financial	
assets (Teplin, 2001).Because changes in competitiveness will inevitably affect 
payments,	 the	 flow	 of	 funds	 is	 a	 useful	 tool	 for	 analysing	 imbalances	 in	 the	
Euro Area.
The conceptual framework
One	 distinguishes	 between	 economic	 and	 financial	 accounts.	 The	 economic 
accounts record ‘real’ economy transactions in accordance with the European 
System of Accounts (ESA)26 and show how various categories of income (GDP) 
are	first	 allocated	 as	primary	 income	 to	 labour	 and	property	 (national	 income)	
and then reallocated through the secondary distribution of transfer payments. 
Disposable income (retained earnings for the corporate sector) is either spent on 
consumption and investment or saved and lent to other agents, which means 
savings	 are	 used	 to	 purchase	 financial	 assets.	 The	 financial accounts, on the 
other	 hand,	 are	 a	 picture	 of	 the	 financial	wealth	 and	 record	 the	 balance	 sheet	
positions of assets and liabilities in the different sectors and their variations over 
a period of time. These variations are split into changes due to transactions 
which	 reflect	 the	 balance	 of	 the	 economic	 accounts,	 and	other changes which 
represent	write-	offs	or	changes	 in	values	of	assets	and	 liabilities.	The	financial	
transactions	 indicate,	 therefore,	 how	 the	 financial	 net	 wealth	 of	 institutional	
sectors	 and	 economies	 change.	 The	 link	 between	 the	 economic	 and	 financial	
accounts is the capital account.
 Because transactions are recorded as net purchases (or net sales) at the current 
market prices, exchanges within a sector – for example, the sale of equities by one 
corporation and the corresponding purchase by another corporation – cancel each 
other out and do not show up in the sectoral accounts. Transactions between 
sectors, on the other hand – such as the sale of equities by a household to a mutual 
fund or the purchase of government bonds by households or banks – are recorded 
as a negative value for the sector selling the instrument and a positive value for the 
sector purchasing the instrument (Teplin, 2001: 433). For the same reason, transac-
tions within the same aggregate sector but between different national sectors, say 
between	Italian	and	German	non-	financial	corporations,	may	appear	as	imbalances	
in national accounts, but they cancel out in the Euro aggregate. Hence, nationally 
disaggregated	flow	of	 funds	 statistics	can	 reveal	macroeconomic	 imbalances	not	
only with respect to borrowing or lending between different member states (i.e. 
current account positions), but also between institutional sectors within the cur-
rency	 area.	 However,	 most	 importantly,	 flow	 of	 funds	 accounts	 present	 a	 fully	
integrated picture of an economy, because the lending of one sector must have a 
borrower	in	another	sector	as	its	counterpart.	To	clarify	the	principles,	we	will	first	
concentrate on the Euro Area as a whole.
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 The transaction balances between institutional sectors are easily derived from 
the	 standard	national	 income	 identity,	whereby	 income	 reflects	 expenditure	on	
consumption, investment and net exports:
Y = C + I + X	−	M
Amalgamating	 first	 for	 simplicity	 the	 financial	 and	 non-	financial	 corporate	
sector, we show in Table 1.4 how the four institutional sectors of the economy 
interact.27 The bottom line is the sum of all sectors of the economy. Y1 is the 
factor income earned by households (wages, rents, etc.). Y2 stands for corporate 
profits	plus	rent,	Y3 for the same by government enterprises. After the generation 
of primary income by the factors of production, income is redistributed between 
sectors by the payment of transfers (T), which increases or reduces disposable 
income in the sectors. For example, the corporate sector pays social security con-
tributions,	which	benefit	households.	Obviously,	the	sum	of	all	transfers	is	zero.	
C1 and C3 are consumer expenditure by households and government and the dif-
ference between income and consumption is gross savings. The Is	reflect	invest-
ment in the different sectors, but usually the corporate sector is driving 
investment.
 Reading across the rows of Table 1.4, it is apparent that individual sectors 
may	have	a	surplus	or	deficit	of	 savings	over	 investment.	 In	 the	flow	of	 funds	
statistics	of	the	European	Union	the	financial	surplus/deficit	is	called	net	lending	
(+)	or	net	borrowing	(−)	of	the	different	sectors.	Because	saving	is	income	minus	
consumption,	the	financial	balance	of	a	sector	is	in	surplus	if	its	savings	exceed	
investment.	Wealth	 owners	will	 then	 acquire	 financial	 assets	 (claims	 on	 other	
sectors or cash) instead of real resources for productive purposes.28 The mirror 
image	 is	 net	 borrowing	 (incurring	 net	 financial	 liabilities)	 by	 a	 sector	 where	
investment exceeds savings. However, for the economy as a whole, domestic 
and foreign savings must be equal to total investment.
 The transactions in the fourth sector are entered from the point of view of the 
rest of the world, and not from the point of view of the domestic economy. 
(Y4 + T4) is income and transfers claimed by the rest of the world, while (X – M) is 
net exports. Thus, if the foreign sector is in surplus (F4 > 0), the domestic 
economy must make payments to the rest of the world that are larger than the 
earnings	from	net	exports;	thus,	the	rest	of	the	world	is	lending	and	the	econo-
my’s	 current	 account	 balance	 is	 in	 deficit.	 In	 that	 case,	 part	 of	 GDP	 will	 be	
owned by non- residents. On the other hand, if the trade balance is positive and 
few external liabilities exist (F4 < 0), the domestic economy is lending to the rest 
of	the	world	and	building	up	financial	claims	against	non-	residents.	This	is	why	
current accounts in surplus are often associated with high competitiveness.
Financial flows in the Euro Area
Standard textbooks assume that households’ revenue exceeds their expenditure, so 
that	they	are	net	lenders	to	the	rest	of	the	economy.	Non-	financial	corporations	are	
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supposed to be borrowers because they do not cover their investment out of cash 
flow.	They	must	 therefore	finance	at	 least	part	of	 their	 investment	by	borrowing	
from other sectors. Financial corporations are intermediaries which lend out the 
resources they borrow. Ideally, the government and the external sector are in 
balance. However this is rarely the case. In Europe, governments usually borrow 
(i.e.	run	deficits),	and	the	Euro	Area	in	aggregate	has	at	times	been	a	lender	and	at	
others a borrower vis- à-vis the rest of the world.
	 Figure	 1.1	 shows	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 financial	 surplus/deficit	 for	 the	 four	
domestic sectors of the Euro Area and for the rest of the world.29 Before the 
crisis, balances were relatively stable. When the so- called dot.com bubble in the 
IT	 sector	 burst	 and	 the	 attacks	 of	 September	 11,	 2001	 destabilised	 financial	
markets worldwide, monetary policy became very accommodating. However, 
the excess liquidity then generated the next credit boom which crashed in 
2007–2008. During that early easy money period, euro households were saving 
less and many borrowed to invest in the real estate boom, especially in the south. 
Non-	financial	corporations,	which	had	previously	cut	down	on	their	investment,	
now	 started	 to	 borrow	 again.	 By	 contrast,	 governments	 reduced	 their	 deficits,	
although	arguably	not	enough	to	bring	their	debt	levels	significantly	down.
	 The	global	financial	 crisis	 started	with	 liquidity	 problems	 at	Bear	Sterns	 in	
August 2007 and fully erupted with the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008. 
After this event, all economic agents changed their behaviour. In Europe, house-
holds’	 savings	 increased	 strongly,	 reflecting	 their	 risk-	averse	 behaviour	 in	 a	
climate of general uncertainty. Companies stopped borrowing instead of invest-
ing	their	retained	earnings.	In	2010,	non-	financial	corporations	even	became	net	
lenders,	which	means	they	used	their	profits	to	repay	debt	and	deleverage	their	
balance sheets. Governments were negatively affected by the sudden drop of 
GDP	in	 the	crisis;	 the	associated	 loss	of	 revenue	 increased	budget	deficits,	but	
this fact also stabilised the euro economy because governments borrowed the 
excess savings from households and NFCs. After the election of a new govern-
ment in Greece in late 2009, the sovereign debt crisis pushed policy- makers in 
the	Euro	Area	into	precipitated	fiscal	consolidation.	With	all	the	main	domestic	
sectors – households, corporations, governments – increasing their savings and 
no one borrowing, the Euro Area fell into its second recession which translated 
into a prolonged depression in the southern member states. The external accounts 
of the Euro Area with the rest of the world (RoW) had remained largely in 
balance	before	the	euro	crisis,	but	now	they	turned	into	surplus.	Given	the	diffi-
cult international environment, borrowing by non- residents also remained slug-
gish so that foreign investment presented few alternative outlets for domestic 
euro savings. Instead, the combined excess savings of households, corporations 
and governments were used to reduce outstanding domestic and foreign liabil-
ities. This fact may have helped to improve the net international investment 
 position of the Euro Area, but when the corporate sector does not invest in the 
formation of domestic capital, economic growth will come to a halt (Ahearne 
and	Wolff,	2012).	The	question	is	then	why	did	the	non-	financial	corporations	in	
the Euro Area stop investing and borrowing from the other sectors?
926_01_Competitiveness Euro.indd   31 4/12/13   11:07:11
32  S. Collignon
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Competitiveness and investment
The classic argument for explaining investment is that companies invest in order 
to	make	a	profit.	They	allocate	 funds	 to	 those	projects	which	yield	 the	highest	
return.	Thus,	the	capacity	to	earn	high	returns	to	capital	reflects	high	competit-
iveness.	 However,	 at	 the	 time	 a	 firm	makes	 the	 decision	 to	 invest,	 the	 future	
returns are uncertain. The larger the chance that the future returns will be differ-
ent	 from	what	 is	 expected,	 the	 larger	 the	 risk.	 If	 firms	 are	 risk	 averse,	 higher	
returns may not automatically guarantee higher investment, employment and 
growth. Additional funds will only be invested, if the return to capital exceeds 
the cost of capital plus the risk premium. Companies have the choice of borrow-
ing	and	buying	real	resources	for	productive	purposes	or	of	using	their	cash	flow	
for	redeeming	liabilities	or	acquiring	financial	assets	(including	cash	holdings).	
A comprehensive concept of competitiveness must take the effects of risk on 
corporate decisions into account.30
 Figure 1.2 shows the risk–return trade- off in a simple stylised form.31 The 
steepness of the trade- off curve indicates the degree of risk averseness. The 
return	 for	 riskless	 assets	 at	 the	 intercept	 of	 the	 required	 return	 axis	 reflects	
liquidity	 preference,	 because	 by	 definition	 liquid	 assets	 (money)	 are	 the	 least	
risky assets. The risk premium is the difference between this risk- free required 
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Figure 1.1	 	Gross	 lending	 (+)/net	 borrowing	 (−)	 by	 institutional	 sector,	 four	 quarters	
cumulated sum (% of GDP) (source: Eurostat).
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Taking European integration seriously  33
return and point on the trade- off curve. If the expected return on capital is below 
the trade- off curve, no investment will be forthcoming. Thus, if the perceived 
risk	in	the	firm’s	environment	increases,	or	if	risk	averseness	or	liquidity	prefer-
ence increases, higher returns to capital are required in order to cover the higher 
risk	premium.	 If	 the	firm	wants	 to	 remain	competitive,	 i.e.	maintain	 the	firm’s	
share in the economy’s long- term growth, it must increase the return to capital. 
The	degree	of	uncertainty,	in	the	environment	within	which	firms	are	operating,	
is then an essential part of competitiveness.
	 In	a	financial	crisis,	the	sudden	drop	in	aggregate	demand	and	the	increased	
perception of risk are raising the preference for holding wealth in liquid form 
rather than investing it in resources. The crisis is therefore a cause and not only 
the effect of lower competitiveness. With persistent uncertainty, risk- averse 
entrepreneurs will also seek to reduce outstanding liabilities. This deleveraging 
process	will	become	the	dominant	corporate	strategy	in	financial	crises,	because	
the	value	of	assets	 is	deteriorating	while	 liabilities	are	nominally	fixed,	so	 that	
corporate equity will be reduced (Koo, 2002). Paying back debt will then help to 
restore shareholders’ wealth, but it may have the unintended aggregate con-
sequence of lower output and employment.
	 This	places	the	competitiveness	issue	into	a	new	context:	firms	may	not	invest	
because	 their	 costs	 are	 too	 high	 and	 profits	 too	 low	 (see	Chapter	 2),	 but	 also	
because they operate in an environment that is too uncertain to justify spending 
money on capital accumulation. Of course, higher risks require higher returns on 
capital in order to compensate for the potential losses, but at these high returns 
there are usually fewer investment opportunities available. Furthermore, if 
uncertainty is very high, it may practically be impossible to compensate the risk 
premium	for	investment	by	raising	profits	in	the	corporate	sector.32
	 How	can	an	economy	become	more	competitive?	Our	analysis	says	that	firms	
should increase their returns and policies should reduce uncertainty. In order to 
improve	 profits,	 firms	 could	 increase	 their	 gross	 operating	 surplus	 by	 cutting	
wages, but from Table 1.4 it is clear that this would be counterproductive when 
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Figure 1.2  The risk–return dilemma.
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the reduction in Y1 is not fully compensated by an increase in Y2, which may 
result from the fact that households have less income to spend and do not reduce 
savings	 sufficiently	 to	 keep	 consumption	 stable.	 In	 that	 case,	 compensating	
public policies could substitute for the wage reduction by increasing public con-
sumption	and	a	fiscal	stimulus	would	increase	corporate	profitability.	Aggregate	
income would be stabilised as private consumption would be shifted to public 
consumption. However, this raises distributional issues for the tax burden and its 
consequences for investment.
	 Other	than	cutting	wages,	paying	lower	transfers	could	also	increase	profits	in	
the corporate sector. Structural reforms in the system of secondary income trans-
fers	can	shift	net	benefits	from	households	to	corporations	and	thereby	improve	
competitiveness. Such reforms are typically associated with the Hartz IV reforms 
in Germany (see Dullien in Chapter 8 of this book). However, while wages and 
gross operating surplus are key variables for the primary distribution of income, 
one should not forget that the cost of capital, and in particular interest liabilities, 
needs	 to	be	serviced	out	of	current	cash	flow.	The	balance	of	primary	 income,	
which takes into account the rental cost of capital, or retained earnings, which 
are a measure corporate income after the secondary redistribution, are therefore 
better	indicators	for	corporate	profitability.
	 Which	of	 these	 two	dimensions,	 low	profits	or	high	uncertainty,	provides	 a	
better explanation for Europe’s lack of competitiveness and anaemic corporate 
investment performance? Flow of fund analysis allows us to detect the effects of 
corporate strategies and their consequences for other sectors. Figure 1.3 shows 
corporate incomes and savings in the Euro Area as a percentage of GDP. The 
gross operating surplus has risen during the pre- crisis boom, but it fell in the 
crisis. In 2010 it improved, reaching levels of the early 2000s, but the austerity 
policy	since	2011	has	again	reduced	net	income	for	Europe’s	non-	financial	cor-
porations. Nevertheless, these developments were in part corrected by the strong 
reduction in the cost of capital and especially the reduction in interest payable, 
although the euro crisis has pushed the cost of capital up again. As a result, cor-
porate primary income is now back to the level, where it was before the crisis. 
Furthermore, tax and social transfer payments have also come down during the 
crisis, so that retained earnings of NFCs, which are a good measure of corporate 
cash	flow,	are	now	higher	than	they	were	before	the	Lehman	shock.	Yet,	despite	
this	improved	financial	situation,	companies	are	not	investing.	Even	the	uncon-
ventional	monetary	policies	(long-	term	refinancing	operation:	LTRO)	at	the	end	
of	 2011/early	 2012,	which	 have	 responded	 to	 the	 high	 liquidity	 preference	 of	
banks and other economic agents, did not stimulate demand for investment. The 
investment ratio has fallen after Lehman by three percentage points of GDP and 
although it has regained one point, it is still well below pre- crisis levels. Hence, 
net	 borrowing	 in	 the	 corporate	 sector	 has	 not	 stopped	 because	 of	 insufficient	
profits	or	lack	of	competitiveness,	but	because	in	the	prevailing	environment	of	
crisis	 and	uncertainty	firms	have	deliberately	used	 their	 cash	flow	 to	pay	back	
debt. The Euro Area is caught in a balance sheet recession.33 Hence, Europe’s 
crisis is less a consequence of structural weaknesses than of uncertain expectations 
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by	investors.	Restoring	trust	and	confidence	is,	however,	the	task	of	governments	
and in this they have failed miserably.34
	 The	 reluctance	 to	 invest	 in	 real	capital	and	 the	massive	use	of	cash	flow	 to	
reduce debt can be explained by liquidity preference in an environment of great 
uncertainty. Holding cash and deposits reduces the risk of running into liquidity 
problems when clients default on their obligations or banks ration credit to their 
clients and refuse to roll over credit. Figure 1.4 presents the ratio of currency and 
deposits held by NFCs relative to loan liabilities, a measure of liquidity prefer-
ences. Since the Lehman crisis, the ratio has risen by nearly 25 per cent. A closer 
inspection reveals that in the early 2000s and again after 2004 cash and deposits 
grew at a stable rate, but corporations increased their borrowings more than cash. 
Hence, the ratio came down in those years. By contrast, after the Lehman shock 
the volume of loan liabilities either stagnated or fell, while liquid assets still con-
tinued	to	increase	at	a	steady	rate,	so	that	the	cash/loan	liability	ratio	rose	up.
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Figure 1.3  Corporate income and investment in the Euro Area (source: ECB).
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 The European Commission (2013) has assessed the impact of uncertainty on 
consumption and investment in the Euro Area. It found that uncertainty has 
increased	not	only	 in	financial	markets	but	also	for	enterprises	and	consumers.	
Furthermore,	 the	significant	negative	effect	of	uncertainty	has	become	stronger	
during the crisis. The study also found that this uncertainty is now at record high 
levels in the southern periphery (including Ireland), but remains much lower in 
the core countries. These observations explain why liquidity preference and debt 
deleveraging have become such an important factor in the slowdown of invest-
ment and economic growth in the southern crisis states.
 Figure 1.5 presents evidence for individual member states. We are using 
here	 the	 disaggregated	 flow	 of	 funds	 data	 provided	 by	 Eurostat,	 which	
aggregate to the Euro Area data for all 17 member states. Remarkably, the 
German corporate sector has been a net lender since the early days of monetary 
union, although in small proportions. In France, NFCs have been net borrow-
ing except during the crisis years 2009–2010. Spain and Portugal have been 
the	 largest	 corporate	 net	 borrowers	 during	 the	 boom	 years;	 Italy	 borrowed	
before the crisis, too. But after Lehman and especially since the Greek debt 
crisis, NFCs in all six member states have reduced their external borrowing 
and even started to repay their debt. Greece is a particular case, as retained 
earnings have always exceeded investment to a very large degree. Since the 
start of the Greek crisis, however, companies have dramatically increased their 
profitability;	 retained	 earnings	 in	NFCs	 are	 now	 nearly	 20	 per	 cent	 of	 GDP	
compared to 10 per cent in Germany. However, investment has fallen to zero, 
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Figure 1.4	 	Liquidity	 preference	 in	 the	NFC	 sector	 (currency	 and	 deposits/loans	 liabil-
ities) (source: ECB).
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Taking European integration seriously  37
so	 that	 the	 cash	 flow	of	Greek	 companies	 is	 now	 nearly	 exclusively	 used	 to	
repay debt.
 The broad picture is very similar in all member states: corporate retained 
earnings have improved, but investment ratios have come down. The higher cash 
flow	is	used	to	repay	corporate	liabilities.	Hence,	the	Euro	Area	suffers	primarily	
from	insufficient	 investment	and	less	from	supply-	side	factors	 like	rigid	labour	
markets	which	prevent	higher	profits.
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Figure 1.5  Retained earnings, investment and borrowing in some member states (source: 
AMECO and own calculations).
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 Maybe the biggest surprise is Germany’s lack of investment. The industrial 
hub of the Euro Area has not invested in domestic production facilities, but lent 
its retained earnings to the rest of the world, of which two thirds went to 
Europe’s south. Why? An obvious explanation is that structural reforms and 
wage	 restraint	 have	 improved	 the	 competitiveness	 and	 cash	 flow	 of	 German	
companies,	but	 local	demand	was	 insufficient	 to	 justify	 the	expansion	of	 local	
facilities, so that lending money to the booming south seemed more attractive 
than	real	investment	at	home.	Another	explanation	may	be	that	financial	innova-
tion in the deeper and more integrated euro market has promised higher returns 
for	financial	 assets	 than	 for	 real	 investment.	Chapter	 2	 looks	 at	 the	 returns	 on	
capital	 in	 the	Euro	Area.	The	 facts	 reported	 there	confirm	 this	analysis	 for	 the	
early years of European monetary union, but not for the years after the Hartz IV 
reforms.	By	contrast,	before	the	financial	crisis,	NFCs	in	the	south	had	been	bor-
rowing as economic textbooks would lead us to expect. However, the rapid accu-
mulation of capital generated diminishing returns, which has increased the 
pressures to deleverage once the crisis had erupted and – unintentionally – 
pushed Europe into a balance sheet recession.
Conclusions
The euro crisis is a challenge on many fronts. Mistaken analysis causes bad pol-
icies and bad policies make the economy worse. By putting competitiveness at 
the centre of the euro crisis explanation, the mainstream was not wrong. Com-
petitiveness matters. But interpreting competitiveness exclusively through the 
lenses of macroeconomic imbalances or relative cost distortions does not go far 
enough.	 Because	 the	 European	 Commission	 largely	 identifies	 macroeconomic	
imbalances	 with	 current	 account	 deficits	 it	 neglects	 the	 imbalances	 between	
other institutional sectors in the Euro Area. This leads them to recommend 
excessive austerity policies, which have made the crisis worse. Fringe econo-
mists on the left and the right, by contrast, focus on relative price and cost indi-
cators, which are arbitrary in their construction and devoid of an equilibrium 
theory as benchmark (for further evidence, see Chapter 2). They therefore do not 
shy away from recommending a break- up of the Euro Area. Both these 
approaches are not sustainable and risk destroying 50 years of European 
integration.
 The idea that current account positions of member states of a currency area 
need to be balanced violates the logic and undermines the functioning of an 
integrated	European	internal	market	for	goods	and	capital.	It	ignores	that	deficits	
within	a	currency	area	may	reflect	efficient	resource	allocation;	 it	also	 leads	 to	
the imposition of austerity policies, which not only undermine the cohesion and 
support	for	European	integration,	but	also	 threaten	the	stability	of	 the	financial	
system. Amalgamating intra- and extra- European current account balances in the 
Euro Area is sloppy accounting, bad economics and dangerous politics.
 Similarly, structural reforms of the welfare system and massive wage cuts to 
restore supposedly unsustainable cost divergence, as has been advocated by 
926_01_Competitiveness Euro.indd   38 4/12/13   11:07:12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Taking European integration seriously  39
some, are also counterproductive in today’s European environment. Lower wage 
cost may improve the return to capital, but if economic and political uncertainty 
is	high,	higher	profitability	will	not	necessarily	translate	into	higher	investment.	
In fact, the mismanagement of the euro crisis by national governments, which 
only considered their narrow taxpayers’ constituency instead of the common 
welfare,	has	pushed	the	risk	premium	up	to	levels	at	which	the	volume	of	profit-
able investment has shrunk considerably. Cutting wages and transfers to bring 
actual rates of return to the point where they would compensate entrepreneurs’ 
risk premiums would reduce aggregate demand to levels of unbearable unem-
ployment. These policies make the crisis worse. They are the kind of policies, 
which have thrown Europe into turmoil before. As Feldman (1997: 854) con-
cluded in his thorough study of the German economy in the 1920s:
Germany’s leaders between 1930 and 1933 obviously miscalculated what 
massive unemployment, a rollback of the social welfare system, and meas-
ures creating even more extreme misery than 1923 and 1924 would bring. 
They also failed to realize that the undermining of parliamentary democracy 
would create an unprecedented social and political crisis and unleash forces 
and tendencies in the political culture quite beyond their control.
Germany’s leaders seem to miscalculate again the damage austerity and dis-
respect for European democracy could cause.
 As an alternative to such misdirected policies, this chapter has suggested the 
necessity to take European monetary union seriously and to analyse it for what it 
is: an integrated economic area with a payment union. It was always clear that 
the single market would not survive without monetary stability in space and time 
and the creation of the euro was the only feasible response to the desire to fully 
integrate the European economy.
 If this is properly understood, the policy discourse must change. It does not 
make sense to ponder whether member states with severe debt and growth prob-
lems should leave the Euro Area, not even temporarily. Private and public debt 
sustainability is to a large degree dependent on economic growth and large 
growth	differentials	threaten	the	solvency	of	financial	and	non-	financial	corpora-
tions. The primary objective for economic policy in monetary union must, there-
fore, focus on maintaining balanced growth. Competitiveness in terms of cost 
and price differentials has a role to play in maintaining stability, but it is not the 
only one. A number of important consequences follow.
 First of all, stimulating growth in the euro economy, especially in the periph-
eral regions, requires that NFCs start to borrow again in order to invest in real 
resources rather than repay their outstanding debt. No doubt, the expectation of 
higher returns to capital would be an incentive to invest, provided everything 
else remains unchanged. However, during the crisis, everything else has 
changed. Uncertainty has lowered the propensity to invest and increased liquidity 
preference. Improving the competitiveness of the European economy would, 
therefore,	 require	 restoring	financial	 stability	as	well	 and	not	only	 focusing	on	
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profitability	and	related	structural	reforms.	The	European	Union	has	privileged	
austerity	as	a	tool	for	restoring	confidence,	but	it	has	underestimated	the	damage	
this has created in peripheral member states, where the slowdown of growth has 
threatened the sustainability of private and public debt. By contrast, member 
states have been dragging their feet with respect to the banking union, which 
could	strengthen	trust	and	confidence	in	the	European	economy.	The	hesitations	
and the back and forth in negotiating positions are prolonging uncertainty and 
block the way to recovery.
 Second, the euro crisis is not a balance of payment crisis because member 
states cannot run out of foreign currency. Nor is there a problem of ‘sudden 
stops’	(Calvo,	1998)	of	capital	 inflows	into	southern	member	states,	although	
there	 is	 a	problem	with	money	outflows.	True,	 during	 the	first	 decade	of	 the	
euro, the corporate sector in the north lent to the south directly or through the 
banking	 system,	 and	 these	 transfers	 have	 financed	 investment	 and	 consumer	
demand	and	enabled	huge	current	account	deficits.	It	is	also	true	that	this	large	
volume of lending has come to a halt during the crisis (Merler and Pisani- 
Ferry, 2012). However, in a monetary union, the reduction in lending from 
other member states could be compensated by lending from domestic banks 
which	refinance	themselves	through	the	Eurosystem	–	provided	there	is	suffi-
cient demand for borrowing in the corporate sector. This is the quintessential 
difference that separates currency regimes, where the expansion of domestic 
credit and the ‘printing of money’ are causing the immediate depreciation of 
exchange rates.35 The main problem of the euro crisis has been the credit 
crunch and balance sheet deleveraging. The crisis was, therefore, not caused 
by national balance of payments problems, but by the fragility of the European 
banking system combined with excessive austerity, which has killed the 
appetite for investment.
 Third, macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro Area are not correctly repres-
ented by current account positions, but by growth differentials. These diver-
gences	 point	 at	 significant	 structural	 distortions,	 which	 certainly	 need	 to	 be	
addressed.	 However,	 the	 harsh	 austerity	 policies	 imposed	 on	 deficit	 countries	
have compounded the supply- side problems, because the lack of demand has 
lowered the willingness to invest (Collignon, 2013). Economic policies for the 
Euro Area must therefore concentrate on balanced economic growth. Balanced 
growth is also a necessary condition to restore a sense of social justice and fair-
ness among European citizens. It would therefore sustain the politics of monetary 
union.
 Fourth, balanced growth implies balanced demand, even when lending from 
other member states ceases. The automatic adjustment mechanism in the Euro 
Area	is	the	outflow	of	money,	unless	new	credit	is	generated	in	the	non-	tradable	
sector. This reduction in money balances can cause ‘rotating slumps’. Because 
monetary policy aims at maintaining price stability for the Euro Area as a whole, 
the distribution of money balances becomes a zero- sum game. If Germany 
pursues an aggressive export- led growth strategy toward the rest of the world, 
the burden of adjustment falls on the other economies. On the other hand, if 
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member	states	suffer	from	negative	money	flows	and	seek	to	stimulate	domestic	
demand	by	fiscal	policy,	they	are	constrained	by	Europe’s	fiscal	rules.	The	Euro	
Area’s	present	fiscal	policy	framework	is	not	sufficiently	developed	to	deal	with	
these	issues.	Instead	of	imposing	identical	debt	and	deficit	ratios	on	each	member	
state,	as	stipulated	by	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact,	a	more	diversified	approach	
is recommendable that would take into account the developments in the indi-
vidual member states as well as the aggregate situation in the Euro Area (Colli-
gnon,	2004).	Yet,	reform	of	the	fiscal	framework	would	need	accrued	powers	at	
the European level, which can only happen if European citizens could also exer-
cise	 their	 democratic	 rights	 at	 the	European	 level	 (Collignon,	2002;	Collignon	
and Paul, 2008).
 Fifth, taking European integration seriously also has a political and cultural 
dimension. Because people feel emotionally attached to ‘their’ countries, gov-
ernments use this emotional bond to preserve their power, but the resulting col-
lective action problems prevent the design and implementation of policies 
consistent with the functioning of a currency area.36
 We have analysed the mechanisms which turn a currency area into an integ-
rated economy as if it were one economic nation. But, of course, Europe is not 
one nation. Polities and civil societies are fractioned. Policies diverge because 
there is no epistemic consensus. This is the Achilles heel of the euro. Protecting 
the economic interests of European citizens from the disturbing interferences of 
national governments is the real challenge revealed by the euro crisis. It will 
require a genuine European government, but that will be the subject of another 
chapter in Europe’s history.
Notes
 1 The ‘south’ covers Italy, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and when data available 
Ireland.
	 2	 www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/europas-	schuldenkrise/vor-	ezb-zinsentscheid-	merkel-fuer-	
deutschland-muessten- zinsen-hoeher- sein-12161702.html.
	 3	 Of	course,	markets	are	not	perfect;	as	monopolies,	politics	and	institutions	may	also	
generate waste and misallocated resources. The point is that lifting the foreign 
exchange constraint opens the possibility	to	more	efficient	allocation	of	resources	and,	
as	 the	European	Commission	 (2012b:	 11)	 recognises:	 ‘Current	 account	 deficits	 and	
surpluses are not necessarily macroeconomic imbalances in the sense of developments 
which are adversely affecting, or have the potential to affect the proper functioning of 
economies, of the monetary union, or on a wider scale.’
	 4	 See:	 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_
imbalance_procedure/index_en.htm.
	 5	 See:	 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_
imbalance_procedure/mip_scoreboard/index_en.htm.
	 6	 Collignon	 and	 Schwarzer	 (2003)	 have	 shown	 how	OCA	 theory	 became	 influential	
among academics, and politicians who used it to keep member states out of the euro, 
but less so among policy- makers and the business community, who were interested in 
solidifying the single market.
	 7	 For	the	first	see	European	Commission,	2012a,	for	the	second	European	Commission,	
2012b.
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	 8	 The	IMF	(2009:	44)	defines:	
For an economy, a domestic currency is distinguished from foreign currency. 
Domestic currency is that which is legal tender in the economy and issued by the 
monetary	authority	for	that	economy;	that	is,	either	that	of	an	individual	economy	
or, in a currency union, that of the common currency area to which the economy 
belongs. All other currencies are foreign currencies.
 9 See Collignon, 2012. The IMF (2009: 261) distinguishes between centralised (African 
and Caribbean currency unions) and decentralised currency unions (Euro Area). Their 
main variance consists in whether the central bank has a single balance sheet or a con-
solidated balance sheet with national monetary agencies, but from an economic point 
of view there is little difference between the two.
10	 The	official	denomination	is	monetary	and	financial	institutions	(MFI),	but	the	name	
‘banks’ or ‘commercial banks’ conveys the underlying function more intuitively.
11 
The effects of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations appear on the balance 
sheets of a number of central banks. Given that the Eurosystem conducts a single 
monetary	policy,	its	financial	statements	should	reflect	the	financial	impact	of,	and	
describe, the operations conducted by all Euro Area central banks as though they 
were	one	single	entity.	Consequently,	the	preparation	of	the	Eurosystem’s	finan-
cial statements requires the consolidation of all NCB and ECB data.
(ECB Monthly Bulletin April 2012: 88)
12 
The currency issued in a CU [currency union] is the domestic currency of the CU. 
It should always be considered a domestic currency from the viewpoint of each 
member economy, even though this currency can be issued by a nonresident insti-
tution (either another CUNCB [CU national central bank] or the CUCB [central 
bank]). One consequence is that, in a CU, from a national perspective, holdings of 
domestic currency can be a claim on a nonresident.
(IMF, 2009: 257)
13 Foreign exchange reserves are the equivalent of narrow money in the international 
context. Of course, economic agents can also draw on foreign assets they own, which 
is a form of ‘broad international money’.
14 The wide- spread confusion of economic countries and member states of the Euro 
Area results probably from the fact that as juridical entities member states still record 
national balance of payment statistics which summarise the economic relationships 
between residents and non- residents of an economy, while currency areas with a cen-
tralised government do not do so. However, even this convention has some arbitrari-
ness.	 The	 System	 of	 National	 Accounts	 (SNA:	 United	 Nations,	 2008:	 17)	 defines	
residency in non- jurisdictional terms: 
The concept of residence in the SNA is not based on nationality or legal criteria. 
An institutional unit is said to be a resident unit of a country when it has a center 
of	predominant	economic	interest	in	the	economic	territory	of	that	country;	that	is,	
when it engages for an extended period (one year or more being taken as a prac-
tical guideline) in economic activities on this territory.
The	difficulties	 of	 allocating	 all	 payments	 to	 regional	 residents	within	 the	 currency	
area	 are	 substantial,	 and	 while	 they	 can	 possibly	 be	 solved	 for	 trade	 flows	 (IMF,	
2009), they are literally impossible for movements of cash (Jobst, 2011). Balance of 
payment statistics are much more reliable for international payments between territ-
ories with different currencies, because commercial banks acquire foreign currency 
for their clients from the central bank and these transactions are well documented.
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15 The following is based on IMF, 2009: 265–268.
16 According to the ECB, there are three main reasons for having a ‘system of central 
banks’ in Europe instead of a single central bank: (1) The Eurosystem approach builds 
on the existing competencies of the NCBs, their institutional set- up, infrastructure, 
expertise and operational capabilities. Several central banks also perform additional 
tasks beside those of the Eurosystem. (2) Given the geographically large Euro Area 
and the long- established relationships between the national banking communities and 
their NCBs, the credit institutions should have an access point to central banking in 
each participating member state. (3) NCBs are better suited to deal with the multitude 
of nations, languages and cultures in the Euro Area instead of the supranational ECB. 
See:	www.ecb.int/ecb/educational/facts/orga/html/or_002.en.html.
17 National central banks are remunerated for these claims.
18 The same logic would apply if we consider the net purchase of German securities by 
Italian investors.
19 These claims show up in the ECB balance sheet as ‘intra- Eurosystem claims’ which 
are netted out in the consolidation of the Eurosystem balance sheet. Sinn and Woll-
mershaeuser (2011) have interpreted the claims by national central banks on the 
TARGET2	payment	system	as	reflecting	current	account	payments.	In	our	simplified	
example	 here,	 where	 no	 autonomous	 financial	 transactions	 are	 taking	 place,	 this	
would be valid, but when one takes cash payments (Jobst, 2011) and autonomous 
credit	and	payment	flows	between	banks	(Collignon,	2012)	into	consideration	this	is	
no longer correct. It is also worth noting that intra Eurosystem claims can only be 
interpreted as potentially risky if the commitment by political authorities to sustain 
monetary	union	is	put	into	question.	Economically,	they	have	no	significance.
20	 It	 is	useful	 to	recall	 that	all	 transactions	are	made	by	 individual	actors;	Germany or 
Italy do not exist as actors. These are simply names for a group of actors who happen 
to live in the jurisdiction of a state.
21	 This	 mechanism	 resembles	 the	 classical	 specie	 flow	 mechanism	 of	 the	 pure	 gold	
standard.
23 For the destabilising effects of the crisis see Mongelli, 2013.
24 Interestingly, Dawson (2004: 246) has noted similar mistakes during the Asian crisis: 
‘tight	monetary	 and	fiscal	 policies	 and	 immediate,	 radical	 restructuring	 of	 financial	
markets turned out to be the wrong medicine. Fund programs did not quickly restore 
confidence,	and	exchange	rates	continued	their	decline.’	What	seems	to	have	helped	
to	 restore	growth	was	 ‘expanded	flow	of	bank	credit’	and	 ‘the	policy	of	credit	ease	
pursued by the monetary Authorities’ (p. 251). In Europe, political authorities under 
German leadership are killing the patient, while the ECB keeps him alive.
25 For econometric evidence that negative output gaps reduce long- run growth, see Col-
lignon, 2013.
26 However, the loss of deposits may destabilise banks in the region, as they become 
more dependent on liquidity borrowed in the interbank market or from the Eurosys-
tem. We cannot pursue this logic here, but is a powerful argument for a banking union 
in Europe.
27 See United Nations, 2008 and also any of the General Notes in the ECB’s Monthly 
Bulletin.
28	 This	exposition	is	based	on	Fleming	and	Giugale,	2000.	Later	we	will	separate	finan-
cial	and	non-	financial	corporations.
29	 When	firms	are	repaying	debt,	this	can	be	interpreted	as	acquiring	a	debt	claim	from	
creditors against themselves.
30 As pointed out above, the rest of the world (RoW) is the mirror image of the aggregate 
balances of the Euro Area. A positive value for RoW indicates lending by non- 
residents,	which	is	equivalent	to	a	current	account	deficit.
31 See also Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003: 175–182.
32 For a formal model of this argument see Collignon, 2002b.
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33 In most risk–return models, the trade- off curve is not linearly but exponentially 
upward sloping. See Collignon, 2002b.
34 For the theory of balance sheet recessions, see Koo, 2002.
35 See for example Collignon et al., 2013 for evidence how statements by the German 
chancellor Merkel have pushed up the risk premiums in bond markets.
36	 For	example	during	the	Asian	crisis,	the	‘sudden	stop’	of	foreign	capital	inflows	led	to	
domestic credit expansions in Thailand and Korea and drastic depreciations.
37 See also Collignon, 2002a.
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2 Unit labour costs and capital 
efficiency in the Euro Area
A new competitiveness indicator
Stefan Collignon and Piero Esposito
Introduction
Competitiveness is a controversial concept. Although Paul Krugman (1994; 
1996) has called policy- makers’ concern with competitiveness ‘a dangerous 
obsession’, the compulsion to blame Europe’s crisis on competitiveness con-
tinues. The Euro Group has discussed the issue of competitiveness divergences 
repeatedly, and the European Commission has argued that ‘over the first decade 
of the century, the EU has registered serious gaps in competitiveness and major 
macroeconomic imbalances’.1 A new surveillance and enforcement mechanism, 
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, was set up in December 2011 in order 
‘to prevent the emergence of harmful macroeconomic imbalances and correct 
the imbalances that are already in place’ (European Commission, 2012). The 
European Commission now also produces regularly a number of competitiveness 
reports. In the 2010 report it argues that ‘a smooth adjustment of intra- Euro Area 
competitiveness divergences and macroeconomic imbalances is key for the 
recovery and, more generally, for the successful and sustainable functioning of 
EMU in the long term’ (European Commission, 2010). Thus, the question of 
how to measure competitiveness is an important issue for the design of macro-
economic policies in the Euro Area.
 The literature reveals a wide variety of competitiveness notions, measures and 
applications (Buckley et al., 1988). Some studies concentrate on firms, some on 
economic sectors, many on countries. The complexities of phenomena contrib-
uting to the evaluation of competitiveness are often combined into a single index 
that assesses improvements or deteriorations in competitive positions. The Euro-
pean Commission uses a scoreboard that combines different indicators and 
observes their evolution over time. In the present work we add another indicator 
to the already long list, because we think it is particularly appropriate for assess-
ing national economies within the European monetary union, although it can also 
be used even beyond this limited field.
 A broad definition of international competitiveness frequently used in the 
literature is: ‘the degree to which [a country] can, under free and fair market 
conditions, produce goods and services which meet the test of international 
markets, while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real incomes of its 
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people over time’ (OECD, 1992 cited in Boltho, 1996: 3; Keyder et al., 2004). 
The British Aldington Report (1985: 13) wrote ‘the definition of competitiveness 
for a nation must . . . be tied to its ability to generate the resources required to 
meet its national needs’. Bennett et al. (2008: 6) take ‘Competitiveness to mean 
the success of an economy in seizing the opportunities afforded by an increas-
ingly integrated international economic environment to deliver sustained growth 
in living standards’. This definition allows them to interpret competitiveness as a 
‘production technology’, where the conditions determining exports are the 
‘input’ into improving living standards.
 In this chapter we take a different, narrower approach, but we also interpret 
competitiveness as a production function because we see competitiveness as a 
process in which input variables, such as the relative costs of labour and capital, 
relative prices, productivities and profits generate macroeconomic output data 
like exports, imports, trade balances, current accounts and foreign direct invest-
ment, all of which are relevant for sustained growth of living standards. We 
develop a new competitiveness indicator which includes the role of capital effi-
ciency and profit rates together with labour costs: the CER Competitiveness 
Index (CCI). It includes production factors, labour and capital, and it measures 
competitiveness as the ratio between unit labour costs and their equilibrium 
level, with the latter determined by the equality between a country’s profit rate 
and the average one. We then test the performance of our compound index 
against the standard measures.
 The structure of the chapter is as follows: in the next section, we will review 
the main input and output measures and highlight their characteristics and short-
comings. In the third section we introduce the role of capital efficiency and for-
mally develop the CCI. In the fourth section we will test econometrically the 
performance of the CCI while the final section presents our conclusions.
‘Input’ and ‘output’ measures of competitiveness
Input measures
The most commonly used input measures for competitiveness are indices of rel-
ative prices or costs, either in levels or rates of change. These indices imply 
certain assumptions of equilibrium. For example, the Law of One Price states 
that, abstracting from transport and transaction costs, freely traded identical 
commodities should have the same price in a common currency denomination. 
Purchasing power parity (ppp) applies this law to similar baskets of goods. 
Dynamic ppp says that nominal exchange rate variations should reflect inflation 
differential between two economies. The real effective exchange rate (REER) 
broadens this idea to a trade- weighted index of relative prices. Deviations from 
these equilibria may be caused by market imperfections, oligopolistic competi-
tion, pricing to market or by using inconsistent price indices, such as consumer 
prices, whole sale price indices or GDP deflators (Keyder et al., 2004). All 
major international economic organisations like the IMF, OECD, Bank for 
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International Settlements, central banks, etc. publish indices for trade- weighted 
relative prices and costs. The European Commission calculates REER for a 
broad group of 41 countries, two smaller groups of 36 and 24 industrial coun-
tries, the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) and the Euro Area 
countries (EA) (see ECFIN, 2012). In international economics, real effective 
exchange rates convert prices in the currency of trade partners into local cur-
rency. Given that the exchange rate is an asset price with high volatility, distor-
tions in REERs from ppp are frequent, normal and disturbing. Nevertheless, in 
a single currency area, this noise factor has been eliminated, so that relative 
prices between sectors or regions reflect demand and supply conditions.
 Because price indices often amalgamate tradable and non- tradable goods, 
while for the latter trade arbitrage will not ensure convergence to equilibrium, 
unit labour cost (ULC) indices are often preferred. Unit labour costs are defined 
as total wage remuneration per unit of output produced. Focusing on ULC in the 
manufacturing sector is considered a good proxy for relative labour costs in the 
tradable sector. Figure 2.1 shows the ULC- based REER indices for some coun-
tries. The huge fluctuations of over 50 per cent over a decade under flexible 
exchange rate regimes contrast clearly with the stability after the introduction of 
the single currency in the European Union, even after the 2008 financial crisis.
 Table 2.1 confirms that euro member states experienced a small real appreci­
ation against the most important trade partners within the European Union, and 
that this was mainly due to the weakening of the British pound and in the first 
decade, of the euro against the Swedish crown. Greece also depreciated before it 
Table 2.1  Changes in REER (in %)
Relative to EU 15 Relative to 34 industrial
1999−2007 2007−2014 1999−2007 2007−2014
Austria 0.6 1.5 4.8 −0.4
Belgium 0.8 2.5 6.1 0.4
Denmark 1.1 1.6 5.7 −1.2
Finland 1.2 1.4 8.1 −1.4
France 0.9 2.9 7.5 −0.1
Germany 1.0 2.9 7.9 −0.7
Greece −3.6 2.0 7.4 2.3
Ireland 1.4 5.0 10.2 0.5
Italy 0.8 2.4 9.1 −0.3
Luxembourg 0.7 2.1 3.0 0.9
Netherlands 0.8 2.8 5.1 0.9
Portugal 0.6 2.0 4.5 0.4
Spain 0.8 2.6 6.8 1.0
Sweden −4.2 13.3 2.5 9.5
United Kingdom −3.4 −20.2 4.9 −22.5
Euro Area 17.0 −0.0
Source: AMECO.
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Figure 2.1  Real effective exchange rates based on ULC (base year = 100) (source: 
AMECO).
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joined the Euro Area in 2001. However, against 34 industrial trade partners 
(including the 15 EU countries), the variations are much bigger, because they 
reflect the trade of partners with different currencies and different inflation rates. 
The Euro Area as a whole has appreciated against its main non- Euro partners by 
17 per cent before 2007, and has on average kept its real exchange rate stable 
since then. Thus, Europe’s competitive environment has become much more 
stable in monetary union. Instead of wasting resources on arbitrage trade caused 
by relative cost distortions, European firms could concentrate on competing for 
more efficient production processes and better output of goods and services.
 Given this plethora of competitiveness measures, why invent a new one? 
Unfortunately, none of the above- mentioned indicators is able to provide a full 
view of the causes and effects of competitiveness. Maybe the most complete 
picture is given by the World Economic Forum Competitiveness Report and the 
IMD World Competitiveness Center (WCC), which compare the competit-
iveness of 60 nations on the basis of over 300 criteria. However, while these 
surveys allow interesting overall rankings between countries, it is desirable to 
focus on variables which can be affected by policies in a more direct way.
 From this perspective, nominal unit labour costs often serve as a privileged 
variable, as they have the advantage of reflecting wage settlements relative to 
labour productivity, so that wage policy recommendations can be derived from 
their developments. In fact, unit labour costs fulfil a double role. On the one 
hand, they anchor the price level, so that following the rule of keeping average 
wage increases equal to the sum of increases in labour productivity and the 
central bank’s inflation target will maintain price stability and support monetary 
policy. On the other hand, if the inflation target is actually achieved, such rule 
will also stabilise the distribution of income between labour and all other claims. 
The operating surplus of the economy, i.e. the aggregate profit margin, which is 
the complement of the wage share in GDP, would remain constant.
 However, despite these useful functions, unit labour costs have some short-
comings as an indicator for competitiveness. First, they take account of labour 
but not of capital productivity. This can cause distortions in comparing overall 
costs and in the incentives for the accumulation of capital and labour when 
capital productivity is not constant. Second, given that unit labour cost indices 
are constructed by GDP deflator indices with arbitrary base years, it is imposs-
ible to judge what is the equilibrium level of relative costs; only movements can 
be traced by these indices.
 A typical example of such nominal ULC indicators is Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 
and not surprisingly it yields whopping cost gaps of 25 per cent between Italy 
and Germany, which would indicate a serious competitive disadvantage for Italy. 
No doubt the evolution of these indicators is interesting information, but it would 
be wrong to argue that in 1999 labour costs in Germany and Italy were in equi-
librium, say reflecting the law of one price in the labour market, and since then 
Italy has become hopelessly uncompetitive. Taking account of this criticism, de 
Grauwe (2011) has proposed to take the average for a long period 1970–2010 as 
the index base. However, this ad hoc methodology yields just as arbitrary results 
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as any other index and it has no theoretical foundation. We therefore need a dif-
ferent approach.
Output measures
In our production function approach, the output measures of competitiveness are 
aggregates reflecting the economic performance of a country. This output of 
competitiveness is usually measured in terms of exports, imports, trade balances 
or current account balances and their rates of change. Here trade balances and 
current accounts are a popular measure for competitiveness. Exports are a source 
of foreign exchange earnings, while imports may improve the quality and pro-
ductivity of local production technologies.2 If exports perform well, it is easier to 
finance the upgrading of domestic production facilities through imports. For this 
reason the trade balance is considered to be the direct outcome of a country’s 
competitiveness. With these assumptions, recent papers have investigated the 
determinants of trade flows and their balances in European economies (Guerrieri 
and Esposito, 2012, 2013; Chen et al., 2013).
 Current accounts balances are often used as what we call ‘output competit-
iveness indicators’ as they closely reflect the balance of goods and services on 
the one hand and net transfers on the other. Between countries with different cur-
rencies the importance of current accounts to measure a country’s competit-
iveness is beyond dispute as they add to foreign assets/liabilities and affect 
foreign exchange reserves with the possibility of causing currency crises as 
experienced in Europe in 1992–1993 or in Asia in 1998, but within a monetary 
union current accounts partly lose their original meaning as the problem of 
foreign exchange reserves is no longer present (Ingram, 1973; Collignon, 2013, 
see also Chapter 1). In addition, net transfers include net earnings from rents, 
interest, profits and dividends, and net transfer payments (such as pension funds 
and worker remittances) both with other EMU countries and with the rest of the 
world. These flows are not necessarily related to competitiveness although 
important studies have shown their relation to investment bubbles in Spain and 
Ireland (Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010).
 As pointed out by the structural current account approach (Buiter, 1981; Sachs, 
1981, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995), current accounts depend also on the interest 
rate, the age structure of the population, the relation between saving and invest-
ment and so on. On the latter, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) have used the sav-
ing–investment balance approach to explain the disappearance of the Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) puzzle, noting that national saving and investment in the countries 
belonging to monetary union were increasingly disconnected. The authors con-
clude that this result was the outcome of the proper functioning of the monetary 
union as capital has flown from rich to poor countries, but the emergence of huge 
imbalances during the last decade and their reduction during the recession in 
southern Europe has generated a growing literature criticising this assumption.3
 Both trade and current account balances depend on relative prices, but also on 
aggregate demand in the importing countries and this fact may distort the 
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 competitiveness measure. A better measure for competitiveness output is there-
fore the export market share of an economy in world or regional trade. A gain of 
market share implies a better trade performance than the rest of the world and 
this may reflect an improvement in competitiveness for a given country – but of 
course also a loss for the rest of the world as market share is a zero- sum game.
 While being unrelated to the exporting country’s domestic demand, market 
shares are still influenced by foreign demand factors as they can increase if 
exports are concentrated on rapidly expanding markets, in terms of either prod-
ucts or regions. This means that the geographical and sectoral specialisation as 
well as their interactions influence the levels and dynamics of market shares. For 
example in recent years, Germany has benefited from high demand for cars 
(product effect) in the Chinese market (market effect). These demand effects can 
be separated from supply- side conditions by the methodology of the constant 
market share analysis (CMS) (Richardson, 1971a, 1971b; Fagerberg and Sollie, 
1987; Milana, 1988, ECB, 2005). The residual of the total market share variation 
after deducting product and market effects yields the pure competitive supply- 
side-effect. This measure, although not directly observed is a tight measure of 
changes in a country’s competitive position.
 Another output variable of our competitiveness function is foreign direct 
investment (FDI): if a specific region is competitive it is likely to attract invest-
ment funds, which will increase economic and export growth. These capital 
inflows shift the foreign exchange constraint and may, in accordance with com-
parative advantages, improve the efficiency and productivity of the economy. In 
this sense, competitiveness would deliver sustained growth in living standards.
 The output measures of competitiveness will be used in the final section of 
this chapter in order to test the explanatory power of traditional input measures 
in comparison with the index we develop in the next section.
The CER Competitiveness Index
Competitiveness and returns to capital
When setting an equilibrium benchmark for competitiveness, it is the level in rel-
ative costs that matters. Deviations from this benchmark generate incentives for 
profitable exports, imports, investment, capital flows, etc. Nominal unit labour 
costs indicating total wage compensation per unit of output, are important, because 
wages are the largest cost factor for the economy as a whole. Equality of ULCs in 
two different economies indicates, therefore, that no savings in labour costs can be 
made by relocating production. Nevertheless, focusing on wages alone is not 
appropriate, as they are only one element in the total cost structure of an economy.
 The second most important production factor is capital. In a single market 
with a single currency, the efficient allocation of capital requires that investors 
put their money wherever it yields the highest return. There is absolutely no 
reason why, say, Italian companies should only borrow from Italian households. 
The whole purpose of economic and monetary union is precisely to create a 
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more efficient framework for the European economy that integrates goods and 
financial markets. If capital can circulate freely, relative profitability of capital 
will determine where investment is located. Thus, the proper measure of com-
petitiveness within a currency area is the relative return of a sector or region 
compared to another and not relative unit labour costs. In the Euro Area, where 
all returns are denominated by the same currency, we can use the return to the 
aggregate euro- capital stock as the benchmark, so that the above average return 
on capital is an indicator of favourable competitiveness conditions, and below 
average returns for competitive disadvantages.
 Differences in profitability have consequences for macroeconomic aggreg-
ates. The creation of the euro has improved the efficiency of European financial 
markets and removed the external budget constraint for member states and as a 
consequence, investors have reallocated their capital, firms have shifted their 
supply chain to more efficient sources and exporters have exploited new market 
opportunities. In other words, the structure of economic incentives has been pro-
foundly transformed, especially in small member states in the European south, 
where firms used to be handicapped by high interest rates before they joined the 
euro. Hence, European monetary union has changed not only the relative returns 
to national capital stocks, but also the output variables of competitiveness such 
as exports, imports, current account positions and FDI.
 Figure 2.2 shows the aggregate rates of return on national capital stocks in 
some selected member states. The Euro Area average has hardly moved in the 
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Figure 2.2  Returns to capital (source: own elaboration on AMECO).
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first decade, but it dropped notably during the crisis and has now stabilised at a 
lower level. Ireland, Italy and Portugal, and also to some extent France, have had 
above average returns before the crisis although with a tendency to deteriorate 
during monetary union. In Ireland this fall in profits was drastic after 2002, but 
the situation has turned again in 2010. While Germany and Greece used to have 
below average returns all through the 1990s and 2000s, they have nevertheless 
steadily closed the gap relative to the euro average during monetary union. After 
the labour market reforms in 2005, the German return on capital started to 
exceed the Euro Area rate and it has further improved in recent years. By con-
trast, Greece and France have suffered most from the crisis. In Spain, the return 
on capital has deteriorated significantly in monetary union until it has started to 
improve after 2010. This may indicate that the heavy net borrowing by Spanish 
corporations and households before the crisis was not driven by actual returns on 
capital, but by the irrational exuberance of the Spanish housing bubble (Croci- 
Angelini and Farina, 2012; Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010). In the USA, rates of 
return have consistently been higher than in Europe and the gap has become 
larger since the crisis. Hence, for many investors, lending to the rest of the world 
must have been more attractive than placing their funds in the Euro Area.
 Our definition of competitiveness as the ability to generate or attract sustained 
investment assigns a critical role to wages and wage bargaining, but also to pro-
ductivity of labour and capital. The macroeconomic rate of return on capital can 
be written as the product of the profit margin times capital productivity:
 (1)
Where PY is nominal GDP, wL is the nominal compensation of labour and PkK 
is the nominal value of the capital stock. We call the second term on the right- 
hand side the average capital effi ciency (ACE), which is equal to capital produc­-
tivity when the price index for capital goods Pk evolves at the same rate as the 
GDP deflator P. The expression  is either called the wage share or real unit 
labour costs, because nominal unit labour costs are , i.e. the ratio 
between nominal wages and labour productivity (λ). The profit margin is the 
complement of the wage share. The return on capital will then increase when the 
profit margin increases, because unit labour costs are reduced and/or the capital 
efficiency is improved.
 Figure 2.3 shows varied performances for profit margins and rates of return 
over half a century. Profit margins are shown on the left, returns to capital on the 
right- hand scale. When the gap between the two curves increases, capital pro-
ductivity is rising; when it shrinks, the average efficiency of capital diminishes. 
Under the Bretton Woods regime, profit rates improved in many European coun-
tries or remained stable, as in the USA. However, with the collapse of Bretton 
Woods, profits also collapsed nearly everywhere. Flexible exchange rates were 
bad for European competitiveness.
 After 1980 monetary policies became tight to bring inflation down, and neo-
liberal policies of liberalising financial and product markets drove up profit 
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Figure 2.3  Profit margins and return on capital (source: own elaboration on AMECO).
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margins and the returns to capital all over the world. Since then, performances 
have diverged. In Germany, the improvement of rates of return is usually driven 
by increases in profit margins, while capital productivity does not seem to 
change much. The labour market reforms by the Schröder government have 
given a major boost to profit margins. In Ireland, the return to capital is also 
driven by wages and not by capital efficiency. Irish profit margins have increased 
in the booming 1980s and 1990s, but then the advantage was lost after EMU 
began. Profits only finally picked up again during the crisis years. In Greece, 
profit margins rose only marginally before the crisis, but there was a long­ run 
trend of improved capital efficiency. In Portugal, capital efficiency also did not 
change, at least not until the recent crisis started to diminish capital productivity, 
but profit margins have remained flat.
 In all the other countries shown in Figure 2.3, the trends for profit margins and 
rates of return go in opposite directions because capital productivity has diminished. 
In France, Italy and Spain this loss of profitability is dramatic. Profit margins have 
remained stable in the first two economies, but in Spain even an increase in margins 
could not prevent diminishing returns, because capital productivity deteriorated so 
much. The general picture is that in countries where interest rates have come down 
after the start of the euro, rapid accumulation of capital has caused diminishing 
returns on capital, and variations in wage setting have not compensated for this 
competitive deterioration. In the north, interest rates have not changed much, so that 
lower wages and higher profit margins have increased the return to capital. In the 
US, by comparison, wage reductions have pushed profit margins up so that, by and 
large, the diminishing capital productivity has been compensated and the return on 
capital has remained stable or even improved after the crisis.
 The distinction between profit margins and returns to capital throws a new 
light on competitiveness. Labour market reforms usually aim at reducing wages, 
either by increasing labour supply or by lowering social contributions. This has 
certainly been the effect of the German Hartz IV reforms (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
Margins also have gone up in the southern crisis countries after the financial 
crisis. Yet, the main cause for the deteriorating competitiveness in the south 
during the first euro­ decade has been the rapid accumulation of capital. Dimin-
ishing returns on investment have lowered the average efficiency of capital. 
Figure 2.4 shows that before the financial crisis, the average efficiency of the 
capital stock had fallen in all southern member states except Greece. With the 
exception of Ireland, this trend has continued even through the crisis, although 
the negative trend seems to have stopped in Italy, Spain and Portugal; in Greece 
the adjustment policies imposed have destroyed and reversed the earlier positive 
trends of capital productivity, but here, too, the downward trend may finally 
have come to an end in 2013.
Theoretical foundation of the CER Competitiveness Index
If our benchmark for measuring competitiveness is the rate of return to capital, 
we can derive the equilibrium level of unit labour costs (see Collignon, 2013) as 
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Figure 2.4  Average efficiency of capital (source: own elaboration on AMECO).
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the level where, given productivity conditions, wages are just equalising the 
regional return to capital with the aggregate of the currency area. This does not 
mean that market dynamics will necessarily and always equalise the returns on 
capital, but that the equilibrium defines the standard of measurement against 
which deviations from efficiency can be assessed. Taking the Euro Area as our 
reference, the relative return on capital in different member states would indicate 
whether unit labour costs are overvalued when actual costs are above the equi-
librium level or undervalued in the opposite case. What follows is a theoretical 
derivation of the competitiveness index based on these assumptions.
 Referring back to equation (1), we get the rate of return as the product of the 
profit share and ACE
 (2)
where λ = y / L is labour productivity and the profit share σk is the complement of 
the wage share σw
 (3)
k is the average capital efficiency.
 Because of (2), the return on capital R improves when the average capital effi-
ciency and/or the profit share improve. The average efficiency of capital rises 
with the technological productivity of capital (y / K) or when prices for capital 
goods are less than the GDP deflator (P / PK < 1). The profit share rises when the 
wage share falls, which implies that real wages rise less than labour 
productivity.
 Assuming efficient markets, R should converge to the Euro Area average. 
Thus, for country A and Euroland B we have the two equilibrium returns
 (4)
or
Hence, in equilibrium the differences in wage shares must reflect the relative 
productivities of capital and the equilibrium for relative ULC is
 (5)
If actual unit labour costs are higher or lower than this theoretical equilibrium 
level, we will say that a country is over­ or undervalued relative to the so­ defined 
competitiveness standard, where the Euro Area is our reference country. The 
CER Competitive Index (CCI) for country A is then simply defined as the ratio 
of actual to equilibrium unit labour costs:
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 (6)
Combining equations (5) and (6) we can now define the CCI as function of 
ACEs, prices and ULCs for a given country and Euro Area as whole:
 (7)
The index is equal to 1 plus the percentage of overvaluation/undervaluation relat-
ively to the Euro Area average, and an increase indicates deteriorating competit-
iveness. The CCI for a given country depends positively on its ULC and negatively 
on the Euro Area cost levels (see the appendix for a detailed proof ). The additional 
feature is its negative relation with the domestic ACE while an increase in the Euro 
Area ACE diminishes the index as the latter causes the equilibrium ULC to fall.
Descriptive evidence
Figure 2.5 describes the evolution of the CER Competitiveness Index. The horizon-
tal line at value 1 indicates that the unit labour cost levels of a given country are at a 
level where the return to capital is equal to the Euro Area. The position of the index 
above the horizontal line indicates an overvalued position; below this line is an 
undervalued indication. Based on these data, not all of which are shown, northern 
member states are generally undervalued. In Finland this undervaluation goes back 
to the crisis years in the early 1990s, in the Netherlands it started around the time of 
monetary union in 1999, and in Germany it occurred with the Schröder labour 
market reforms. France has moved from undervaluation to overvaluation, Italy has 
persistently lost competitive advantages over the last two decades, but having 
started from a much undervalued position it is now close to equilibrium. In the 
crisis countries, Spain has become more and more overvalued during its property 
boom; Portugal and Ireland have also lost competitiveness, but they are still under-
valued. Cyprus has oscillated in a range below equilibrium. Most surprisingly, 
Greece had reduced its overvaluation disadvantage before the crisis, but had not yet 
reached equilibrium. Despite a draconian austerity regime, the country has experi-
enced a slight deterioration in competitiveness since the crisis erupted. The move-
ments reveal very different behaviour in unit labour costs among member states. 
Although the crisis in 2008 has had an impact on cost levels in most countries, a 
durable adjustment toward equilibrium levels can hardly be observed anywhere.
Testing the performance of the CER Competitiveness Index
Econometric strategy
In this section we test the performance of the CCI against alternative measures of 
competitiveness. We wish to know how well input variables of competitiveness, 
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Figure 2.5  The CER Competitiveness Index for selected Euro Area countries (source: 
CER elaborations on AMECO data).
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i.e. relative cost indicators, are able to explain the output of changes in the inter-
national position of Euro Area countries in terms of net exports and market pene-
tration. The latter is usually measured in terms of market shares (MKTsh), although 
in order to get a clearer measure of competitiveness we also use variables derived 
from constant market share analysis (CMS). This analysis has the advantage of 
distinguishing between demand effects due to trade specialisation in products or 
markets that expand rapidly and supply effects due to improvements in productiv-
ity and cost competitiveness. We apply the CMS methodology as developed by the 
ECB (2005) and calculate demand and supply effects for total export and for intra- 
European exports only. We then test the ability of competitiveness indicators to 
explain these components. The details of the CMS are described in Appendix 1.
 Another outputindicator of a country’s international competitiveness position 
is given by the trade balance (TB), which is the main component of the current 
account balance, a measure used by the European Commission in the scoreboard 
for identifying macroeconomic imbalances (EC, 2011). However in our view, 
the use of current accounts can be misleading as they reflect also other compon-
ents not necessarily related to the competitiveness of a country’s industry (see 
Chapter 1). We use, therefore, data for net exports and distinguish again for total 
trade and intra- EU trade.
 Hence, we estimate a model with three output or ‘revealed’ competitiveness 
indicators, calculated for total and intra- EU trade: the market share (MKTshT, 
MKTshEU), the competitiveness effect calculated from the CMS analysis (CT, 
CEU) and the trade balance (TBT, TBEU). The indicators which will be tested 
against the CCI are conventional nominal and real unit labour costs (ULCrel and 
RULCrel) as well as the real effective exchange rate (REERrel). All these indi-
cators are expressed in relative terms with the Euro Area level as the common 
denominator.
 The econometric specification includes domestic as well as world GDP in 
order to account for internal and external demand and a set of country specific 
fixed effects as in equation (11):
 (11)
where Y = MKTshT, MKTshEU, CT, CEU, TBT, TBEU and COMP = log(CCIb), 
log(ULCrel), log(RULCrel), log(REERrel).The sample includes the original 12 
Euro Area countries over the period 1999–2010.
 As to the estimation technique, we first have to test for the stationarity of data 
as well as for the presence of cross- sectional dependency (CSD). Table 2.A1 in 
the appendix shows the Pesaran (2004) test for CSD as well as the unit root test 
developed by Pesaran (2007), which is robust to the presence of CSD. The 
results indicate that all variables are non- stationary at 10 per cent while CSD is 
present in all time series except for the two trade balances and CT, and is par-
ticularly high for MKTshT and REERrel as well as GDP. This is because global 
market shares and GDP are affected by common shocks such as the global crisis 
or the competition of extra- Euro Area countries, while real exchange rates 
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reflect, as we argued in the second section, the exchange rate dynamics between 
the euro and the other main currencies, especially the US dollar.
 Given the non- stationarity and the presence of CSD, the common correlated 
coefficients (CCE) estimator developed by Pesaran (2006) is the most suitable 
tool. This estimator builds upon the mean group estimator proposed by Pesaran 
et al. (1999), which returns consistent estimates of a long- run relation even in 
presence of non- stationary variables and endogenous regressors. Endogeneity is 
addressed by using an auto- regressive distributed lags (ARDL) model while the 
improvement of the CCE is the addition of cross- sectional averages of all vari-
ables in order to control for CSD. As shown by Kapetanios et al. (2011), this 
estimator controls for a variety of structures of the common factor causing CSD, 
from a simple symmetric one to more complicate multifactor error structures.
Results
Estimation results of equation (1) for the competitiveness effect, the total market 
share change and the trade balance are reported respectively in Tables 2.2 to 2.4. 
At the bottom of each table we report the root mean square error (RMSE) as 
measure of model fitting and the Pesaran (2007) test for CSD on the estimation 
residuals. As to the latter, in the market share estimates some specifications still 
suffer from a weak CSD, but they are acceptable as the 5 per cent threshold for 
the CSD is never reached. The RMSE indicates that estimates in Tables 2.2 and 
2.4 fit the data better. This is an interesting result as it confirms the above­ 
mentioned problems with the use of market shares tout court, which amalgamate 
foreign demand and domestic supply factors. By contrast, our estimates for trade 
balances measure how much net exports improve in response to our input vari-
ables, given the importance of external and domestic demand components.
 Our results confirm the better performance of the CCI compared with ULC and 
REER indices. As we can see in Table 2.2, the CCI is the only significant com-
petitiveness indicator in explaining competitive changes of market shares. In addi-
tion, its coefficient is higher when considering intra­ European export only (column 
5), proving its better ability to reflect the dynamics of intra­ European competit-
iveness. In the latter case, other things equal, a 10 per cent reduction of the CCI 
(i.e. a competitive gain due to lower ULCs relative to equilibrium) increases the 
competitiveness effect from the CMS by 8.3 per cent. Although the explanatory 
power for total market share changes is lower, the results in table 2.3 confirm the 
ability of the CCI to explain the intra- European dynamics. According to column 5, 
a 1 per cent increase in the CCI decreases the intra- European market share by 1.2 
per cent. Finally, trade balance estimates (Table 2.4) also indicate that the CCI 
explains intra­ European flows better. Yet, while the CCI is statistically significant 
for the world trade balance, the REER is statistically more significant in spite of its 
lower coefficient. This is an expected result as REER incorporate also exchange 
rate dynamics between the Euro Area and the rest of the world.
 Summing up, we found a clear confirmation that the CCI is better suited to 
explain changes in the competitive position of European countries. The comparison 
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has shown that standard ULC and REER indices are not able to explain external 
competitiveness among European countries and the latter in particular tends to 
capture changes in the nominal exchange rate between the euro and the US$.
Conclusions
This chapter has defined competitiveness as the relative profitability of a coun-
try’s capital stock relative to the average of the Euro Area. It has derived unit 
labour cost level indicators, which indicate how much individual member states 
are over- or undervalued relatively to the average benchmark. We have then con-
firmed that this measure yields better results for explaining how input variables 
in the competitiveness process, such as unit labour costs, generate the outcome 
of traditional competitiveness dynamics, which are reflected in exports or market 
shares. Using the CER Competitive Index would therefore be a superior tool for 
policy assessments than the conventional indices used by European and inter-
national organisations. It could become particularly useful as a guide for wage- 
bargaining in the Euro Area.
Appendix 1: Methodological note on the CMS
In calculating the competitiveness effect used in the fourth section we use the 
CMS methodology developed by the ECB (2005). The basic idea of the CMS is 
to decompose the growth rate of exports (g) of a country in a given destination 
market (or in a given region) in a component obtained by applying the growth 
rate of world exports (g*) to the initial export flows and a residual component. 
The residual component represents what causes the market share change and we 
call it total effect (TE):
 (A1)
The total effect is than broken down into two components: a combined structural 
effect (CSE) and a competitiveness effect (COMP). The CSE is obtained by 
applying to each export flow the difference between the world export growth rate 
and that of the specific market:
 (A2)
where g*ij is the growth rate of total imports of product i in country j; θi,j and θ*ij 
represent the shares of product i in country j for the exporting country and world 
respectively. Further refinements of the analysis (Leamer and Stern, 1970; Rich-
ardson, 1971a, 1971b) decompose the structural effect into three terms which 
account for the geographical (market effect ME) and sectoral (commodity effect 
CE) composition of exports as well as for their interaction (MIX):
 (A3)
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The latter term is included because the geographical and sectoral distributions 
are not independent so that the sum of the first two effects does not equal the 
CSE if either Laspeyres or Paasche weights are used.
 The market effect represents the export growth obtained as weighted average 
of the growth rates of specific markets (net of world growth) with weights given 
by the initial export distribution by partner:
 (A4)
Where g*j is the growth rate of total imports of country j, θj and θ*j represent the 
geographical distribution of exports for the reference country and the world. By 
the same token, the commodity effect is the effect of total growth of each com-
modity (net of world growth) weighted by the commodity distribution:
 (A5)
The interaction effect is given by:
 (A6)
In simple words this effect represents the impact of the change in both geograph-
ical and sectoral weights. Some authors find no economic meaning for the inter-
action effect (Reymert and Schultz, 1985) while Richardson (1971b) called this 
effect ‘Second Competitiveness Effect’. For each exporting country, the standard 
competitiveness effect is given by the difference between the growth rate of 
exports of commodity i in country j and world exports of i in country j, weighted 
by the initial structure:
 (A7)
This competitiveness effect represents the difference between the growth of 
exports for a given country and world exports net of differences in relative 
specialisation.
Appendix 2: Derivatives of the CER Competitiveness Index
By manipulating equation (7), the derivates with respect to the different vari-
ables can be expressed as follows:
 if 
 (A1)
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The condition for a positive sign is always satisfied as the term on the left­ hand 
side is always positive and well above realistic differences in capital efficiency. 
The sign of derivatives with respect to ULCEA, kA and kEA is determined as shown 
in equations (A2) to (A4):
 (A2)
 (A3)
 (A4)
Which states that competitiveness always increases when the own capital effi-
ciency of average ULCs increases, but deteriorates when average ACE increases 
more than the domestic one. The effect of domestic inflation is show in 
equation (A5):
 if
 (A5)
Its effect on competitiveness is positive unless a country’s ACE is above the 
average profit rate. As the latter has been basically stable at 0.13 and ACE is 
always above 0.2 this condition, which underlines the importance of a certain 
degree of similarity between countries, is always fulfilled. Conversely, the effect 
of average inflation is always negative:
 (A6)
The explanation for these effects lies in the nominal nature of the CCE and in 
the additional effect on ACE. In standard ULCs a domestic price increase raises 
both nominal labour productivity and nominal wages, with the overall effect 
uncertain but positive, if wage inflation is higher than overall inflation. In the 
CCI we have to take into account the positive effect of prices on nominal ACE, 
which reduces the CCI, if is strong enough to counterbalance for effect of higher 
wage inflation. The overall effect will always be negative if wage inflation is not 
higher than actual inflation.
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Appendix 3: Unit root and cross- sectional dependence tests
Table 2.A1  Results of the Pesaran (2007) unit root test and Pesaran (2004) test for cross-
sectional dependency
Unit root Cross sectional 
dependence
Cross correlation 
CT 2.8 0.6 0.02
CEU 0.1 −1.8* −0.06
MKTshT −1.4 26.8*** 0.86
MKTshEU −1.6* −2.6** −0.08
TBT −1.0 1.3 0.04
TBEU 0.6 −1.0 −0.03
log(CCI) −0.3 −2.3** −0.07
log(ULCrel) 1.6 3.0*** 0.09
log(RULCrel) −0.4 −0.4 −0.01
log(REERrel) −2.2* 18.4*** 0.57
log(GDP) −1.0 32.7*** 0.98
Notes
* Significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.
Notes
1 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbal-
ance_procedure/index_en.htm (accessed 29 May 2013).
2 These improvements are not necessarily restricted to investment goods, but consumer 
imports may indirectly also improve competitiveness by setting quality standards 
against which local firms have to prove themselves.
3 See the introduction to the book.
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Part II
Competitiveness and 
external trade
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3 Is Germany’s model of export- led 
growth sustainable in a currency 
union?1
Ulrich Fritsche
The European monetary union is in trouble. Economically, the divergence of 
competitiveness as measured by unit labour cost came to an end by letting some 
countries in the southern cone of Europe slide into deep depressions which in 
turn produced political trouble. Germany, however, runs an economic system 
based on the principles of export- led growth which is still viable due to the fact 
that the US and some Asian economies recovered fast due to very expansionary 
monetary and fiscal stimulus. The general aim of this chapter is to give some 
answers to the question of how to cope with imbalances in the monetary union 
and the role of a former key currency country therein.
Sustainability dimensions as reference
This chapter is normative in nature. Therefore we need criteria to assess if a model 
of export- led growth is compatible with long- run aims of the European integration. 
The monetary union is not an end in itself. It aims to foster prosperity and conver-
gence of income and living conditions and to increase overall economic welfare. 
However, the problem is more complex as the economic sphere interacts with polit-
ical and social dimension of the integration process. A natural choice to evaluate the 
German export- led growth model is therefore found in the sustainability debate.
 Traditionally – see Deutscher Bundestag (1998) – the sustainability debate 
focuses on three pillars: the ecological, economic and social dimensions of 
sustainability. The classical definition of sustainability dates back to the Brundt-
land Report of 1987 (United Nations, 1987) and states (p. 2) that ‘sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. Usually, 
sustainable development could be directly linked to the satisfaction of basic 
needs, active participation and intergenerational and global justice. However 
several other notions could be added without contradicting and even supporting 
the general notion of sustainability as defined in 1987. Three of them are 
important in our context of assessing the viability of the monetary union.
1 Social risk management capabilities: The concept of social risk management 
was defined by the World Bank (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 2001). Within 
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the context of this approach, the ‘traditional’ areas of social protection as 
labour market institutions, social insurance and social safety- nets are embed-
ded into a broader framework. This broader framework is based on the stra-
tegic side on different ways to deal with risk (in the Holzmann–Jorgensen 
framework the strategies are risk coping, risk mitigating and risk preven-
tion) and on different levels of actors. A functioning social risk management 
system can be seen as an aspect of sustainable development.
2 Income and wealth distribution: The original notion of sustainability as indi-
cated by the Brundtlandt Report referred to intergenerational balance of 
interests. Income and wealth distribution aspects are therefore part of 
sustainability.
3 Political stability: The economic and political spheres are highly inter-
related. Social risk management as well as income and wealth distribution 
aspects feed back into the political sphere. The dramatic loss of confidence 
in the political class in the countries deeply involved in depression and crisis 
states endangers the European integration process dramatically. Therefore 
this dimension should be part of any analysis.
Based on such an extended ‘sustainability view’ it should be possible to answer 
the question of whether the export- led growth model of Germany is coherent (i.e. 
sustainable) with the functioning of the European monetary union as an eco-
nomic entity.
Export- led growth history
Originally, development economics was based on the idea of scarce physical capital 
which had to be financed by redirecting savings flows from industrialised countries 
into developing countries. Insufficient savings were seen as the main source of 
 bottlenecks in the development process (Fritsche, 2004) which was a main result 
of the interpretation of the Solow growth (Solow, 1956) model. Extended models 
of this type with several bottlenecks’ can be found in the neoclassical- monetarist 
(Khan et al., 1991) and the post- Keynesian (Taylor, 1991, 1993) literature. To a 
large extent, developing countries used non- market instruments (e.g. interest rate 
caps and fund channeling through state- owned institutions to foster development) 
and financial repression (Fry, 1995) to achieve investment- led growth financed 
mainly by external savings. This ‘debt- cum-development’ strategy of the 1960s and 
1970s together with global financial deregulation came at a cost – as Diaz- 
Alejandro put it once ‘Good- bye financial repression, hello financial crash’ (Diaz- 
Alejandro, 1985). The direct answer to the failure of the development strategy in 
the 1960s and 1970s was labeled the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2000 on 
the development of the term). This Washington Consensus as a development 
strategy was the answer of the IMF and the World Bank to import- substitution 
strategies and was mainly based on supply- side reforms and trade and financial lib-
eralisation measures. The financial crisis of the 1990s – mainly the Asian crisis but 
also the Russian crisis and the breakdown of the  Currency Board in Argentina – led 
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to more subtle views on development strategies (Stiglitz, 1998; Rodrik, 2008). The 
role of far- reaching financial deregulation was questioned and the focus was ori-
ented towards the development strategy of post- war Germany, Japan and other 
Asian (Tiger, Flying Goose, whatever) countries. Stiglitz (1998) created the phrase 
‘post- Washington consensus’ for the new view. Main components are the import-
ance of safeguards for the development process, institutions which promote export- 
led growth strategies, very competitive exchange rates as well as capital controls to 
avoid appreciation. In a nutshell, such a strategy calls for an active ‘beggar- thy-
neighbour’ strategy based on the undervalued real exchange rates as a driver of 
accumulation – a strategy which formed the base for the German successful devel-
opment process after the Second World War (Riese, 1978).
 There are three remarkable aspects which make the case of Germany interest-
ing as a role model:
1 The macroeconomic foundation of the development strategy: The underval-
ued currency – which in turn implies revaluation expectations under the 
assumption of functioning financial markets – can be to a large extent 
defended by central bank interventions without necessarily destroying the 
competitiveness advantage for promoting exports.
2 The microeconomic incentive compatibility: The outward- orientation of the 
export- led growth model usually leads to dynamic efficiency gains.
3 The social and political aspect: The export- led growth strategy is usually 
based and enhances/deepens a social consensus which has to be at the root 
of such a strategy. In a sense export- led growth strategy is a national experi-
ment and can only be successful if the national economic policy institutions 
play their respective role (i.e. avoid overvaluation of the currency by choos-
ing appropriate wage, monetary and fiscal policies).
However such a strategy creates repercussions in a global context and has limits 
insofar as there must be at least one big current account deficit country which 
has a stabilising role for the aggregate demand schedule. Key currency regimes 
in the past had such ‘big spenders’ – Great Britain in the gold standard era 
(Bloomfield, 1959) as well as post- war United States under the Bretton Woods 
regime performed quite well in that respect. Under the EMS regime, Germany 
was also seen as a key currency. However there was one important difference 
with regard to Germany’s role in the EMS.
Germany’s affinity to tighten the belt
This big difference between traditional key currencies and the role of Germany 
in the process of EMU creation is the fact that Germany – and the actors relevant 
for monetary, fiscal and wage policy – always kept the attitude and the beha-
viour of a developing country using the (once successful) strategy of export- led 
growth (see Chapter 4). This can be proven by analysing relative unit labour cost 
developments (Dullien and Fritsche, 2008; Dullien, 2009) and widening current 
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account imbalances over the 2000s as well as the deeply imprinted view among 
the German public that the level of wages in Germany is way too high compared 
to ‘necessary’ levels.
 Dullien and Fritsche (2008, 2009) looked carefully at the sources of unit labor 
cost and divergence before the financial crisis and compared the results to estab-
lished currency areas as the United States (federal states) or the developments of 
unit labour costs across the German Länder over time. Two results were strik-
ing: The deviations were more pronounced and more persistent. This is a well- 
established result and was also published by the European Commission (2008) 
in the report ‘EMU@10’. Such deviations could be due to several reasons (see 
Dullien and Fritsche, 2008 for a more extensive discussion) – some of them are 
summarised in Figure 3.1 below.
 The analysis of Dullien and Fritsche (2008, 2009) – published before the 
climax of the European financial and debt crisis – pointed to unwanted structural 
divergence as the main driver of the problem. However, a fact that was largely 
missing in the pre- crisis analysis and is largely missing in the analysis of the 
recent trouble in Europe (with the possible exception of Flassbeck and Spiecker, 
2010) is the fact that such a long period of lasting and widening imbalances 
became only possible because of Germany’s deeply imprinted affinity to ‘tighten 
the belt’. To some extent, this was one of the deep structural reasons for the 
long- lasting development of imbalances.
Is the region’s real exchange rate
away from its equilibrium?
Does the inflation
differential move the
real exchange rate
towards equilibrium?
Are the differences in the regional
business cycle the cause for the
inflation differential?
Useful
divergence –
no cause for
concern
Unwanted
cyclical
divergence –
potentially
harmful
Unwanted
structural
divergence –
clearly
harmful
YES
YES
YES NO
NO
NO
Figure 3.1  Classifying divergences in a monetary union (source: Dullien and 
Fritsche, 2009).
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Governance structures in the EMU
A widely discussed topic in the last years refers to the reorganisation of the gov-
ernance structure in the EMU (Dullien and Schwarzer, 2011). The proposals are 
heterogeneous in details but tend to agree on the necessity of avoiding persistent 
and large competitiveness divergence or current account imbalances. The EU 
commission tries to monitor signs of divergences more closely and much faster 
than they did before. However, one point which has not yet been tackled appro-
priately in the discussion is the deeply imprinted ‘tighten the belt’ phenomenon 
in Germany. The reason is clear – any governance structure in EMU focuses on 
the avoidance of negative development (above average inflation, high budget 
deficits, increasing current account deficits) but has dramatic weaknesses with 
regard to the ‘tighten the belt’ phenomenon. This is quite obvious because, at 
first glance, this strategy is not rational as the neoclassical standard model 
implies significant welfare losses. However as long as economic policy govern-
ance is based on welfare principles, this weakness remains embedded in policy 
institutions. A ‘beggar- my-neighbor’ policy is not punished systematically by 
rules as it makes no sense at all in the long run. At a second glance, the export- 
led-growth strategy, based on highly competitive wage negotiations and high 
productivity increases, of course makes sense from a national (i.e. German) per-
spective as long as the effective demand schedule from the rest of the world is 
stable
Export- led growth and sustainability of the currency union
If however, the narrow focus of national interest is given up and we try to 
evaluate the question if the export- led-growth strategy of Germany is in line with 
a sensible interpretation of sustainability, we will end up with other conclusions. 
Let me summarise this in the form of two theses:
Thesis 1: Sustainability of the economic development within the currency 
union calls for an end of the export- led-growth–tightening- the-belt–
beggar- thy-neighbour strategy.
This is due to two reasons. First, any adjustment of persistent imbalances in 
the currency union without lifting the restriction of a currency union (i.e. 
giving up the parity) is seriously only possible if the German economy is 
inflated to some extent (Blanchard et al., 2013). Second, giving up the obses-
sion with export- led growth (i.e. tighten your belt) is a necessary precondition 
so that imbalances like those of 1998–2008 do not occur again once the imbal-
ances are corrected.
Thesis 2: The governance structure of economic policy has to be reori-
ented towards a concept of sustainable macroeconomic development on a 
European level.
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So far, the German ‘tighten- the-belt’ strategy is not punished (not even punish-
able) within the existing governance structure of the European Union. This is 
true for two reasons. First, there is no theoretical argument why systematic 
‘tighten- the-belt’ should occur. The governance structure assumes a form of 
rationality based on the neoclassical synthesis model which has no room for such 
a behaviour. Second, and more importantly, the analysis of economic govern-
ance structures should be focused on a broader understanding of sustainability of 
development.
Note
1 The author thanks Stefan Collignon, Sebastian Dullien and, most importantly, Ingrid 
Größl for stimulating discussions. All errors are mine.
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4 Intra- European imbalances, 
competitiveness and external 
trade
A comparison between Italy and 
Germany
Piero Esposito and Paolo Guerrieri
Since late 1990s macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone increased con-
stantly and became a critical factor in causing the current debt crisis. In these 
years southern European countries experienced huge losses in competitiveness 
and persistent accumulation of large current account deficits against northern 
Europe. In addition, during the global crisis the financing of the stimulus meas-
ures caused huge budget deficits, leading public debt to unsustainable levels, 
especially in Greece after the truth about the real conditions of public finances 
was found out by the new elected government of Papandreou in 2009.
 Before the global financial crisis, little attention was paid to the increase of 
current account imbalances as they were considered the result of financial 
 integr ation and liberalisation (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002). In addition, they 
were considered an optimal outcome of private saving and investment decisions 
(Gourinchas, 2002) justifying the policy of no government intervention (Clarida, 
2007; Blanchard, 2006). A remarkable exception is given by Dullien and 
Fritsche (2009) who already in 2006 warned about the excessive ULC growth in 
Portugal, and to a lesser extent in Spain and Greece, coupled with the strong fall 
in Germany.
 Following the global financial crisis, with the explosion of current account 
deficits and public debts in some southern European states, a growing body of 
research is dealing with the causes of imbalances. While most contributions 
point to the role of real (Croci- Angelini and Farina, 2012) and financial integra-
tion as well as interest rate reductions in southern member states (Schmitz and 
von Hagen, 2011; Croci- Angelini and Farina, 2012; European Commission, 
2012; Chen et al., 2013; Schnabl and Freitag, 2012), some authors suggest that 
the excessive lending of northern states contributed to such unequal development 
(Collignon, 2013; Makin and Narayan, 2011) especially when investment is not 
aimed at increasing the productive capacity (Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010). 
Another strand of literature points to the role of wages and unit labour costs 
developments in European countries (Brancaccio, 2012; Onharan and Stockham-
mer, 2013; Collignon, 2013), in connection with the performance in external 
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trade (Guerrieri and Esposito, 2012, 2013; Chen et al., 2013). Most of these 
works conclude for the necessity of symmetric and coordinated policies at Euro-
pean level (Guerrieri and Esposito, 2012), mainly via coordinated wage setting 
processes (Brancaccio, 2012; Onharan and Stockhammer, 2013; Schnabl and 
Freitag, 2012).
 This chapter investigates the role of the external performance in explaining 
the increase in imbalances by comparing the two main export- led growth eco-
nomies in the Eurozone: Germany and Italy. More specifically, we will attempt 
to assess, on the one hand, the role of global trade integration, not only in terms 
of outsourcing, but also in terms of penetration of fast- growing markets. Follow-
ing previous works (Guerrieri and Esposito, 2012, 2013; Chen et al., 2013) we 
devote particular attention to the role of fragmentation of production with 
Central and Eastern European countries. In addition, we will focus on the inte-
gration with the Asia- Pacific region as it is the most dynamic area of the world 
in terms of growth and external performance. In a second analysis we will assess 
whether the introduction of the single currency has had a direct impact on the 
two countries’ net trade and on the widening of imbalances.
 The structure of the chapter is as follows: in the second section we will 
summarise the performance of the two countries and compare it with the evolu-
tion of cost competitiveness; in the third and fourth sections we will focus on 
external performance and stress the role of internationalisation and recomposi-
tion of trade flows as result of the increasing importance of emerging economies; 
in the fifth section we will provide an econometric test of the importance of out-
sourcing and trade integration in explaining the two countries’ net exports; the 
verification of the impact of the euro introduction is in the sixth section while the 
seventh section concludes.
Two different performances in the last decade: the role of 
cost competitiveness
During the period 2000–2010 Germany performed better among advanced eco-
nomies, with GDP growing by 2.2 per cent every year between 2004 and 2007 
and by more than 3 per cent in 2010 and 2011, the highest rate since the unifica-
tion. In addition, Germany is the only country where per capita GDP is back to 
the values reached in 2007 and where the employment dynamics are positive. 
The country managed to reduce its unemployment rate in the decade in question, 
and in 2011 it was at 6.6 per cent, well below that of United States (9 per cent). 
By contrast, Italian unemployment has increased continuously since 2008.
 This pattern is in striking contrast with the performance from the mid- 1990s 
to the early 2000s, when Germany was still paying the cost of the unification. 
Between 1999 and 2003 the country experienced a GDP growth among the 
lowest in the euro area, with an average rate of 1.2 per cent falling to 1.1 per 
cent in per capita terms (Table 4.1). During the first part of the decade 
2000–2010 Italy shared with Germany a low growth, but for the former the 
average growth over the period 2004–2007 was 1.6 per cent, more than half a 
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percentage point of difference every year. With the global financial crisis the 
divergence was further exacerbated as Italy experienced a stronger loss in the 
period 2008–2009 and a lower recovery afterward, while in 2012 the country 
was again in recession, with a negative growth of 2.2 per cent.
 The common feature between the two economies is the positive impact of net 
export on their growth dynamics over the past decades. This similarity came to 
an end in the first decade of this millennium as the two countries experienced 
different trajectories in terms of both export and trade balances. This divergence 
is clear when looking at their export performance relative to the 35 main indus-
trial countries. As shown in Figure 4.1, in volume terms Germany improved its 
relative performance by over 30 per cent between 2000 and 2012 while Italian 
exports moved in the opposite direction, with a relative reduction of 20 percent-
age points since 1995, when the beneficial effects of the 1993 devaluation started 
to vanish. Complementary information is given by the evolution of market 
shares (Figure 4.2). Both countries are on a negative trend because of the 
increasing importance of emerging economies since the end of the 1980s, but 
since 1999 the German loss has been relatively small while Italy lost approxi-
mately 50 per cent of its share.
 The differences between the two countries are even more marked when 
looking at trade and current account balances and consequently at their contri-
bution to GDP growth. In Germany the current account balance passed from 1 
per cent in 1999 to 5 per cent in 2007 thanks to a trade balance above 8 per 
cent of GDP (Figure 4.5). Even in the years from 2008 German net exports 
were high, around 6 per cent of GDP, contributing significantly to the overall 
growth. The Italian trade balance, on the contrary, passed from slightly pos-
itive values during the 1990s to increasing deficits in the following years 
(Figure 4.6). Net exports contributed negatively to the GDP growth over the 
whole decade and continued especially in 2010 and 2011 while in 2012 the 
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Figure 4.1  Index of real export (2000 = 100) relative to the main 35 industrialised coun-
tries and market shares at current prices (source: AMECO).
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trade balance turned positive, mainly because of the import reduction induced 
by the recession.
 Traditional cost competitiveness factors are considered the main determi-
nants of the external and overall performance of the two countries. Wage 
costs increased in Italy by almost 35 per cent between 1999 and 2012, twice 
as much as in Germany. At the same time the divergence in unit labour costs 
is even more marked as the gap widened between 1999 and 2012 by 25 per 
cent. No doubt such divergence in wages was favoured by the implementation 
of the reforms implemented by Gerard Schröder between 1998 and 2005, 
especially Agenda 2010, which introduced radical changes to the welfare state 
and labour market regulations. The Hartz reforms between 2003 and 2005 
introduced a higher flexibility in the German labour market, in particular con-
cerning hiring and firing procedures, and eliminated some perverse incentives 
in the structure of unemployment benefits.1 The crucial point of the reforms 
implemented in Germany was the agreement signed with the trade unions by 
which a slow wage dynamic was accepted in order to keep employment levels 
stable. This reduction led to a depreciation of the real exchange rate (Marin, 
2010b) up to the global financial crisis, boosting the German industry and its 
exports. The other side of the coin is that domestic demand stagnated over the 
same period.
 The loss of competitiveness of the Italian economy with respect to Germany 
is due not only to the marked wage dynamics but also to differences in labour 
productivity. Figure 4.2 shows that the gap between the two countries in terms 
of unit labour costs (ULC) increased by more than 25 also as result of a 13 per 
cent gap in productivity over the same period.
 Summing up, the divergence of the performances of the two countries over 
the period 2000–2010 seems to be due to the different contribution of net exports 
to GDP growth. While cost competitiveness played an important role, it cannot 
entirely account for the diverging performances. Structural and non- price factors 
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Figure 4.2  Nominal wages index (1999 = 100) and unit labour costs (source: own elabo-
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must be investigated in order to explain competitiveness differences between the 
two countries and the resulting differences in their external performance.
The different degree of internationalisation
Following the vast geo- economic and technological changes affecting the world 
economy during the first decade of the new millennium, all advanced economies 
and their firms faced new challenges and opportunities to reorganise internation-
ally their production processes through internationalisation and delocalisation 
activities. The difference in the ability to adapt to such changes can be analysed 
by looking at several indicators for Italy and Germany, all together giving a clear 
picture of the degree of internationalisation of the two countries.
 A first indicator of the influence of the international context on the economic 
performance of a country is given by its degree of openness, measured as the 
average of export and import to GDP ratios. As clearly shown in Figure 4.3, 
while in mid- 1990s, before monetary unification was completed and before the 
emergence of China as main world actor, the two countries shared a similar 
degree of openness. In contrast, in the 15 years from 1997 to 2012 a huge gap 
was generated as Germany doubled its openness (from 19 per cent to 38 per cent 
in goods and from 24 to 48 in goods and services) while Italy experienced only a 
modest increase (from 19 per cent to 23 per cent in goods and from 24 to 29 in 
goods and services).
 Looking at trade flows gives only a partial picture about the process of inter-
nationalisation. Forms of deep integration between different economic systems 
arise from the ability to penetrate foreign markets by mean of both FDI and non- 
trade agreements. Similarly, the valorisation of the territory is a prerequisite to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI; the so- called passive internationalisation). 
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The relevance of such phenomena is clear when looking at the world growth of 
FDI in the last two decades, far exceeding that of world production and trade, as 
a consequence of the deep historical changes taking place in the world economy 
in terms of both production and distribution of wealth. FDI data confirm the dif-
ference between Italy and Germany. Although, the inward FDI stock between 
2000 and 2011 increased in Italy from 10 per cent to 17 per cent, more than the 
German one (from 25 to 28 per cent) there are still huge differences in levels. If 
we look at outward FDI the difference is more marked as the Italian stock 
increased from 16 per cent to 25 per cent of GDP while the German one passed 
from 25 per cent to 40 per cent.
 Sectoral data indicate a higher concentration in the service sector in Germany 
and in high- tech manufacturing while for Italy FDI is more concentrated in tra-
ditional low- tech branches.
Globalisation and demand supply restructuring
The increase in Germany’s trade openness is the result not only of growing 
exports but also of a rise in import penetration. The success of German firms in 
international markets is the outcome of their deep internationalisation in the 
form of increasing delocalisation and fragmentation of productions in order not 
only to penetrate new markets but also to purchase inputs at lower price. Trade 
relations with the two areas most interested by internationalisation activities, i.e. 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) and Asia- Pacific, confirm the deeper efforts 
of the German economy.
 As to CEEC,2 trade integration between Germany and some Eastern European 
countries – above all Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia (CEEC4) – 
is mainly the result of a strong exchange of intermediate goods and components, 
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both at the core of the international fragmentation processes started in the second 
half of the 1990s. Thanks also to the geographical proximity of these countries 
and their endowment of low- cost skilled workers, German firms moved part of 
their production processes to CEECs. As we can see from Table 4.2, all CEEC 
and in particular CEEC4 are among the main suppliers of German firms, replac-
ing in many cases southern European countries, above all Italy. Several studies 
(Geishecker and Gorg, 2008; Geishecker et al., 2010; Hansen, 2010; Marin, 
2010a) suggest that German firms succeeded in cutting their labour costs through 
the relocalisation abroad of the production of components and processed mater-
ials. Some authors argue that such labour cost reduction is as relevant as wage 
moderation (Marin, 2010b) with the result of stronger productivity gains, up to 
above 20 per cent, for firms engaged in delocalisation activities (Hansen, 2010; 
Marin, 2010a).
 The intensity of the relocalisation to the east is a crucial factor differentiating 
the two countries. Italian firms increased their international integration, but on a 
much smaller scale, keeping both import and export capacities at modest levels. 
As we can deduce from Figure 4.7 and Table 4.3, the increase in the importance 
of CEECs as import suppliers and in general the degree of opening toward this 
area are well below the German levels and the same is true for other dynamic 
areas like China and Pacific Asia. It is true that Italy did relatively better than 
other European countries in penetrating emerging markets (see Figure 4.8) but 
given its higher dependence on manufacturing and exports this result cannot be 
considered entirely positive.
Table 4.2  Geographical composition of German trade flows (in %)
Import Export
1999 2005 2010 2011 1999 2005 2010 2011
France 10.2 8.6 7.7 7.3 11.3 10.1 9.5 9.5
Italy 7.4 5.8 5.4 5.3 7.4 6.9 6.1 5.8
GIPSI 14.7 12.0 10.7 9.9 14.2 14.3 11.6 10.6
EU15 52.9 48.8 44.2 42.3 56.2 54.7 49.2 46.9
Czech Republic 2.2 2.8 3.7 3.6 1.9 2.4 2.8 2.8
Hungary 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.5
Poland 2.0 2.7 3.5 3.6 2.4 2.8 4.0 4.1
Slovakia 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0
CEEC4 7.0 8.8 10.4 10.4 6.5 7.8 9.2 9.3
EU27 61.2 59.1 56.5 54.7 63.9 64.2 60.2 58.1
China 3.1 6.5 9.5 8.9 1.3 2.7 5.6 6.1
India 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.0
NIE 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.2
Dev. Asia 6.4 9.7 12.9 12.3 3.8 5.3 8.8 9.3
Japan 4.9 3.5 2.7 2.8 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.4
USA 8.0 6.7 5.6 5.5 9.9 8.8 6.8 7.0
Source: Own elaboration on COMTRADE.
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 German firms not only restructured their supply side but took full advantage 
of the new demand for goods and services coming from emerging markets. The 
composition of demand after the global financial crisis and in particular that of 
consumption goods is changing at a previously unreached pace thanks to the 
contribution of the new emerging economies, above all the group of BRICs 
(Brazil Russia, India and China). The ability to penetrate these markets is funda-
mental in order to compete in the new multipolar economic order. The country’s 
firms seem to have better exploited emerging markets (Figure 4.7), particularly 
in China (Tables 4.2 and 4.4). The Asian giant became the main market for 
equipment goods and for a basket of consumption goods, from cars to other 
durables, and the German market share in China passed from 2 per cent in 2000 
to above 6 per cent in 2010. It is interesting to note that this increase is the mirror 
image of the market share reduction in the USA, from 10 per cent to 6.5 per cent 
during the same period. Such developments can be better understood by looking 
at changes in the revealed comparative advantages (RCA) of the two countries.3 
According to Table 4.4, Germany increased its specialisation towards all groups 
of emerging economies in consumption and equipment goods as well as parts 
and components. For consumption goods, in particular, the RCA index became 
higher than 1 relative to China, while for capital goods and parts and compon-
ents the index is now strongly above 1 for all groups. Only for intermediate 
goods the country is despecialising, as a result probably of the feature of 
Table 4.3  Geographical composition of Italian trade flows (in %)
Import Export
1999 2005 2010 2011 1999 2005 2010 2011
France 12.6 9.9 8.7 8.3 13.1 12.2 11.6 11.5
Germany 19.2 17.1 16.0 15.6 16.6 13.1 12.9 13.1
GIPSI 6.9 6.5 6.3 6.1 10.5 11.0 8.7 7.6
EU15 61.1 52.7 47.3 45.8 57.8 52.9 47.9 46.3
Czech Republic 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.2 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.1
Hungary 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9
Poland 0.8 1.3 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.9 2.5 2.5
Slovakia 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6
CEEC4 2.3 3.6 4.9 4.8 3.3 4.2 5.1 5.1
EU27 65.3 58.6 54.6 53.1 63.1 60.3 56.3 54.9
China 2.4 4.6 7.8 7.3 0.8 1.5 2.5 2.7
India 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.2 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.9
NIE 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.4
Dev. Asia 4.4 6.6 10.3 10.0 3.5 4.3 5.7 6.0
Japan 2.5 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.3
USA 4.8 3.4 3.0 3.3 9.3 8.0 6.0 6.1
Source: own elaboration on COMTRADE.
Note 
GIPSI = Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy; NIE = Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, 
Thailand, Indonesia; Dev. Asia = China, India, NIE.
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Figure 4.5  Total trade balance and share of the Euro area, Germany (source: own elabo-
ration on COMTRADE).
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Figure 4.6  Total trade balance and share of the Euro area, Italy (source: own elaboration 
on COMTRADE).
 delocalisation activities of German firms, more specialised in machinery and 
transport equipments.
 Again, the comparison with Italy shows a marked difference. Despite the 
growth of overall internationalisation, the penetration of new emerging markets 
is relatively modest although in line with the European average (see Figure 4.8). 
The geographical specialisation of export (Table 4.3) increased only slowly in 
China, while from the import side we can observe a strong increase of both 
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CEEC and Pacific Asia while the contribution of the Euro Area is diminishing. 
This evidence is an indication of the increasing competitive pressure of emerg-
ing market exports on Italian goods (see Guerrieri and Esposito, 2013). Italian 
RCA are somehow the mirror image of the German ones. Between 1995 and 
2011 the index dropped in all cases, except for intermediate goods which, in any 
case, do not show a clear pattern. It is important to note that in 1995 the index 
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Figure 4.7  Import of intermediates from CEEC4 (% of GDP) (source: own elaboration 
on COMTRADE).
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Figure. 4.8  Export toward emerging markets (% of GDP) (source: own elaboration on 
COMTRADE).
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was almost everywhere above 1 while now the opposite is true, meaning that the 
country is not keeping pace with the other advanced European economies.
 As we already mentioned, the introduction of the single currency seems to 
have played a crucial role in the positive development of the German trade 
balance. As shown in Figure 4.5, from the end on 1990s net exports within the 
Euro area were higher than those from the rest of the world, with an increasing 
gap especially between 2001 and 2007. This result is partly due to the benefits of 
the fixed exchange rate regime on a country with a strong currency like 
Germany. In contrast, Italian export competitiveness has historically relied on 
the possibility of devaluation of the domestic currency, hence, a fixed exchange 
rate regime, dominated by the German mark, has uncovered the problems of the 
Italian production structure, causing a continuous loss in competitiveness; the 
deterioration of the Italian trade balance is due mainly to the result with the Euro 
Area (Figure 4.6) as the extra- area trade balance kept stable if slightly increasing 
until 2003; after that both components dropped to values close to zero. This dif-
ferent behaviour points to the peculiar role of the euro introduction in fostering 
the German economy at the expense of Italy and the other southern European 
countries. Empirical evidence of this assumption will be provided in the sixth 
section.
 Summarising, the external performance of the two countries appear to be a 
reflection of the ability to exploit delocalisation processes and to penetrate fast 
growing markets, with Germany strongly increasing its integration in the world 
economy and Italy unable to compete in the world market.
Fragmentation and trade integration: econometric analysis
In the previous sections we showed how Germany seems to have taken better 
advantage of the new opportunities provided from the world development from 
the end of the 1990s up to the global financial crisis. On the one hand, the supply 
side took advantage of an increased fragmentation and international division of 
labour, especially with Central and Eastern European countries, which boosted 
the competitiveness of German firms. On the other hand, the country is increas-
ing its degree of internationalisation and exploiting the new opportunities arising 
from the penetration of emerging markets, above all the Asia- Pacific area, and 
from the increased importance in the European market.
 The aim of this section is to provide empirical evidence on the different micro 
and macro- economic determinants of net exports of the two countries by using a 
panel of 14 industries (classification NACE DA- DN) over the period 1993–2010. 
In a first set of regressions we will estimate the impact of outsourcing, separating 
the effect of global sourcing from that arising specifically from the integration of 
production with the group of CEEC4. In a second set of regressions we will test 
the effect of trade opening, where we will distinguish between global trade integra-
tion and the rise of the Asia- Pacific area in total trade of the two countries. In both 
cases we will estimate two separate coefficients for the group of high- and low- 
tech industries. This division takes into account first, the different specialisation of 
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the two countries, and second, the possibility that spillovers arising from trade and 
outsourcing activities are stronger in high tech industries because of a higher con-
centration of skill biased technical change, as reported in various studies (Haskel 
and Slaughter, 2002; Esposito and Stehrer, 2009; Cavallaro et al., forthcoming). 
The two estimated equations are the following:
 (1)
 (2)
where TrBal is the ratio of export to import of industry i in time t; TradeIPCsh is 
the share of intermediates and parts and components on total trade, which should 
capture the degree of international fragmentation of production; TradeIPCshC4 
is the share of CEEC4 in total trade in intermediates and parts and components; 
Trade/GDP is the trade to GDP ratio, TradeShEM is the share of emerging eco-
nomies in total trade and, finally, Htech is a dummy indicating high- tech indus-
tries.4 Given our focus on the Asia- Pacific area we will test the impact of China 
and the group of ASEAN countries, both separately and as a single group. As to 
the control variables included in the vector x, we add in both equation cost com-
petitiveness variables summarised by the growth rate of wages and labour pro-
ductivity, and technological variables measuring respectively the capital and 
R&D intensities of each industry in the two countries. Equations (1) and (2) are 
estimated in differences – representing short- run changes – because of the non- 
stationarity of most of the variables. Due to missing data for sectoral R&D and 
investment the sample size is reduced to 224 obesrvations for Germany and 210 
for Italy. Trade data are from the UN- COMTRADE database, while data for 
GDP, wages, productivity, R&D and capital stock are from Eurostat.
 Equations (1) and (2) are estimated using the Hausman–Taylor technique 
(HT; Hausman and Taylor, 1981), which corrects a random effect estimator by 
assuming that some of the explanatory variables are correlated with the 
individual- level random effects. This form of endogeneity is addressed by instru-
menting the endogenous covariates with their deviation from the group mean. 
The advantage of the HT compared to the fixed effects (FE) estimator and its IV 
version is the possibility of estimating the impact of time invariant regressors 
like the Htech dummy.
 Estimation results of equation (1) for both countries are shown in Table 4.5 
where, starting from the control variables, we find a positive impact of labour 
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Table 4.4  Export revealed comparative advantage indexes
Consumption goods Germany Italy
1995 1999 2007 2011 1995 1999 2007 2011
CEEC 0.52 0.79 0.94 0.92 1.73 1.33 0.86 0.94
CEEC4 0.57 0.69 0.75 0.80 2.25 1.43 1.09 0.91
Balkans and Turkey 0.58 0.91 0.93 1.09 1.98 1.12 1.02 0.85
CIS 0.53 0.85 0.84 0.91 1.94 1.74 1.36 1.25
Dev. Asia 0.51 0.75 0.75 0.77 1.84 1.47 1.52 1.51
China 0.72 0.78 1.20 1.10 0.99 2.44 0.87 0.74
India 0.78 1.07 0.81 0.55 1.47 1.63 0.90 0.77
Latin America 0.46 0.63 0.83 0.89 1.68 0.92 0.72 0.66
Capital goods Germany Italy
1995 1999 2007 2011 1995 1999 2007 2011
CEEC 0.78 1.15 1.18 1.18 1.23 0.78 0.90 0.84
CEEC4 0.74 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.48 1.02 1.16 1.24
Balkans and Turkey 0.74 1.14 1.23 1.27 1.33 0.83 1.00 0.97
CIS 0.84 1.09 1.18 1.13 1.58 1.28 0.97 1.06
Dev. Asia 0.64 1.16 1.22 1.17 1.21 0.80 0.85 0.85
China 0.70 0.93 1.15 1.15 1.85 1.18 1.05 1.26
India 0.85 1.74 1.46 1.66 1.67 1.72 1.28 1.59
Latin America 0.65 1.02 1.22 1.23 1.68 1.40 1.18 1.27
Intermediate goods Germany Italy
1995 1999 2007 2011 1995 1999 2007 2011
CEEC 1.13 1.13 0.89 0.92 1.08 1.12 1.23 1.25
CEEC4 1.07 1.04 0.97 0.98 0.82 0.91 1.11 1.13
Balkans and Turkey 1.04 1.07 0.86 0.89 0.99 1.13 1.10 1.04
CIS 1.07 1.14 0.99 0.98 0.87 0.76 0.97 0.93
Dev. Asia 1.02 1.03 0.92 1.00 1.21 1.32 1.32 1.19
China 0.97 0.86 0.83 0.76 0.96 1.26 1.33 1.13
India 1.26 1.53 1.02 0.94 1.44 1.35 1.24 1.05
Latin America 1.13 1.06 0.98 1.00 0.58 0.72 0.89 0.86
Parts and components Germany Italy
1995 1999 2007 2011 1995 1999 2007 2011
CEEC 0.67 0.95 1.08 1.19 0.89 0.69 0.76 0.67
CEEC4 0.83 1.17 1.21 1.17 1.56 1.06 0.99 1.01
Balkans and Turkey 0.68 0.98 1.26 1.28 1.40 1.11 0.89 0.93
CIS 0.62 1.02 1.08 1.08 1.56 0.69 0.87 0.92
Dev. Asia 0.75 1.10 1.21 1.26 1.13 0.85 0.76 0.77
China 0.63 1.03 1.08 1.18 1.18 0.94 1.02 0.94
India 0.70 1.54 1.31 1.51 1.30 1.74 1.49 1.54
Latin America 0.73 1.09 1.16 1.11 1.39 1.04 1.03 1.17
Source: Own elaboration on COMTRADE.
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productivity but significant at 5 per cent level only for Germany, while wage 
growth is insignificant in both cases. In addition, none of the technological vari-
ables is significant, suggesting a similar impact to import and export flows. 
Turning to the outsourcing variables, the proxy for total outsourcing is not signi-
ficant while the share of CEEC4 in total outsourcing is positive and significant 
only for Germany and only for high- tech industries. In addition, the German 
trade balance is higher on average in high- tech industries while no significant 
difference is found for Italy. These results confirm the importance for Germany 
of productive integration with this group of countries and the sector bias of such 
effect.
 Turning to the impact of trade integration with the Asia- Pacific area, the 
results are reported in Table 4.6 for Germany and Table 4.7 for Italy. Starting 
with the former, we find a positive and significant impact of trade opening but 
not when trade with China alone is considered (columns 1 and 2). The integra-
tion with China has a direct negative impact on the trade balance of both 
Table 4.5  Effect of outsourcing with CEEC4 on net exports
Dependent variable: Δlog(export)−Δlog(import)
Germany Italy
Δ(TradeIPCSh_C4) −0.002 −0.023 −0.024 0.089 0.118 0.106
[0.027] [0.029] [0.029] [0.116] [0.118] [0.118]
Δ(TradeIPCSh_
C4)*Htech
0.169** 0.216** 0.207** −0.075 −0.14 −0.145
[0.059] [0.067] [0.067] [0.193] [0.196] [0.196]
Δ(TradeIPC/Trade) 1.229 1.16 1.284 −0.536 −0.74 −0.527
[0.913] [1.093] [1.090] [1.120] [1.253] [1.260]
Htech 0.051** 0.055** 0.055** 0.024 0.052 0.051
[0.021] [0.024] [0.024] [0.039] [0.038] [0.038]
Δlog(LabProd) 0.139** 0.132** 0.488* 0.452
[0.055] [0.056] [0.274] [0.276]
Δlog(Wage) 0.276 0.301 0.296 0.305
[0.306] [0.308] [0.197] [0.197]
Δ(GFKF/GDP) −0.027 −0.023
[0.040] [0.025]
Δ(R&D/GDP) −0.009 0.272
[0.010] [0.218]
Constant −0.009 0.02 −0.154** −0.009 0.207** 0.064
[0.058] [0.060] [0.053] [0.063] [0.075] [0.066]
N 266 224 224 238 210 210
chi2 58.3 63.5 64.9 32.4 39.6 42.1
Notes
*  Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; significant at 1% level. Trade/GDP = trade 
intensity; TradeIPCsh_C4 = share of CEEC4 in total trade in intermediates, parts and components; 
Htech = dummy for high tech industries; R&D = Research and Development expenditure; GFKF 
= gross fixed capital formation; LabProd = labour productivity; estimation technique: Hausman–
Taylor Estimator.
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low- and high- tech industries, while the share of trade with the group of ASEAN 
countries accelerates the trade balance’s growth in all industries, while when 
aggregating the two groups their impact turns insignificant. This apparent contra-
diction can be explained by the fact that ASEAN countries are strongly integ-
rated with China by exporting to the country components and processed goods. 
These products will be assembled and exported to Western markets, leading to a 
deterioration of the German trade balance which will be accounted by China and 
by the increase of export from ASEAN to China. In this way, the ASEAN– 
Germany flows will include only the demand for capital and consumption goods 
of the former.
 The results for Italy (Table 4.6) return a different picture. The degree of open-
ness (Trade/GDP) is in general negative, indicating that import growth domi-
nates export growth, while there is no generalised effect of trade integration with 
China or ASEAN when analysed separately. On the contrary, when analysed as 
single group (columns 5 and 6) the share of trade with the Asia- Pacific region is 
Table 4.6  Effect of trade integration with the Asia-Pacific area for Germany
Dependent variable: Δlog(export)-Δlog(import)
China Asean Asean+China
Δ(TradeSh_EM) −0.116** −0.101** 0.194** 0.202** −0.058 −0.036
[0.043] [0.043] [0.087] [0.087] [0.055] [0.055]
Δ(TradeSh_ 
  EM)*Htech
0.144 0.098 −0.149 −0.17 0.073 0.029
[0.219] [0.217] [0.148] [0.149] [0.187] [0.187]
Δ(Trade/GDP) −0.001 0.007 0.021** 0.024*** 0.029** 0.040**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.007] [0.007] [0.014] [0.014]
Htech 0.008 0.006 0.04 0.038 0.067 0.064
[0.051] [0.050] [0.035] [0.035] [0.072] [0.071]
Δlog(LabProd) 0.343** 0.343** 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.789*** 0.786***
[0.128] [0.127] [0.092] [0.092] [0.186] [0.184]
Δlog(Wage) 1.087* 1.289** 0.771* 0.820* 2.442** 2.718**
[0.640] [0.639] [0.441] [0.444] [0.911] [0.911]
Δ(GFKF/GDP) 0.01 −0.044 −0.031
[0.084] [0.059] [0.120]
Δ(R&D/GDP) −0.055** −0.017 −0.076**
[0.023] [0.016] [0.033]
Constant 0.046 −0.175 0.453*** 0.460*** −0.072 −0.1
[0.105] [0.107] [0.086] [0.086] [0.155] [0.161]
N 224 224 224 224 224 224
chi2 49.8 56.5 69.2 70.9 49.7 55.8
Notes
*  Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; significant at 1% level. Trade/GDP = trade 
intensity; TradeSh_EM = share of trade with emerging economies on total trade; Htech = dummy 
for high tech industries; R&D = Research and Development expenditure; GFKF = gross fixed 
capital formation; LabProd = labour productivity; estimation technique: Hausman–Taylor 
Estimator.
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strongly negative in high- tech industries, suggesting that Italy is suffering the 
competition of Asian countries (see Chen et al., 2013, Esposito and Guerrieri, 
2013) much more than Germany and especially in industries where the loss of 
competitiveness over time has been more marked.
 Summing up, the econometric analysis provides clear evidence in favour of 
the importance of trade openness, outsourcing with CEECs and integration 
with emerging markets in explaining the different external performance of the 
two countries. Additionally, there is strong evidence that the sectoral dimen-
sion of such effects matters, leading to a further divergence between the two 
countries.
The euro effect and trade balances
The aim of this section is to provide an econometric test of the assumption that 
the introduction of the single currency favoured German net exports at the 
expense of most of the other members of the Eurozone. Many studies focused on 
Table 4.7  Effect of trade integration with the Asia-Pacific area for Italy
Dependent variable: Δlog(export)-Δlog(import)
China Asean China+Asean
Δ(TradeSh_EM) 0.064 0.063 0.003 −0.005 0.05 0.039
[0.137] [0.137] [0.158] [0.157] [0.168] [0.168]
Δ(TradeSh_ 
  EM)*Htech
0.300 0.314 0.146 0.123 −1.020*** −1.063***
[0.381] [0.384] [0.190] [0.189] [0.277] [0.278]
Δ(Trade/GDP) −0.154*** −0.155*** 0.021* 0.019* −0.158*** −0.163***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.011] [0.011] [0.025] [0.025]
Htech 0.245** 0.247** 0.014 0.017 0.266** 0.271**
[0.100] [0.101] [0.051] [0.051] [0.119] [0.119]
Δlog(LabProd) 0.34 0.392 0.498 0.608 1.243 1.48
[0.735] [0.745] [0.459] [0.461] [1.041] [1.051]
Δlog(Wage) −0.871 −0.877 −0.444 −0.46 −2.382** −2.453**
[0.549] [0.551] [0.322] [0.321] [0.745] [0.746]
Δ(GFKF/GDP) 0.023 0.079* 0.147
[0.064] [0.042] [0.095]
Δ(R&D/GDP) −0.3 −0.053 −0.187
[0.551] [0.361] [0.812]
Constant 0.121 0.158 0.967*** 0.063 1.263*** −0.533**
[0.172] [0.190] [0.107] [0.114] [0.227] [0.246]
N 210 210 210 210 210 210
chi2 134 133 120 125 116 119
Notes
*  Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; significant at 1% level. Trade/GDP = trade 
intensity; TradeSh_EM = share of trade with emerging economies on total trade; Htech = dummy 
for high tech industries; R&D = research and development expenditure; GFKF = gross fixed 
capital formation; LabProd = labour productivity; estimation technique: Hausman–Taylor 
Estimator.
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the determinants of current account balances in the Eurozone (Arghyrou and 
Chortareas, 2008; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002; Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010). 
Among them, Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008) analysed individual countries 
and found a strong and positive effect of external demand for Germany but not 
for Italy. Other works investigated the export performance of European coun-
tries, Danninger and Joutz (2007) in particular found that cost competitiveness 
and the penetration of fast- growing markets are the keys of the success of 
German exports. For Italy, a study by the International Monetary Fund (2008) 
investigated the causes of market share losses and found that technological rigid-
ities, together with the sectoral and geographical specialisation in slow- growing 
markets, are the main determinants of the disappointing performance of Italian 
exports.
 In our analysis we use bilateral trade flows of the two countries with all part-
ners as it is typically done with gravity models of trade. Such models are par-
ticularly suitable for the analysis of the impact of some policy and institutional 
changes and have been extensively used in order to test the effect of trade agree-
ments on bilateral trade flows.
 In the standard version of the gravity equation bilateral trade flows are a func-
tion of the economic mass, given by the product of the GDPs of each pair, the 
bilateral exchange rate and the distance between the two countries. We modify 
the basic equation in order to adapt it to the estimates of trade balances and to 
the analysis of a single country against all its trading partners. The final equation 
is as follows:
 (3)
where the growth rate of the trade balance (TrBal) with partner j in time t is 
expressed as a function of the partner’s GDP growth, the growth rate of the bilat-
eral exchange rate, the geographical distance, a dummy indicating whether the 
two countries are neighbours and a set of partner- and time- specific fixed effects. 
The euro effect is captured by the dummy Euro, which equals 1 if the partner, in 
a specific moment in time, is a member of the Eurozone. A positive and signi-
ficant coefficient for this dummy indicates that the introduction of the euro 
caused a one- time increase in the average trade balance. We do not include the 
effect of own GDP as it is partner invariant and collinear with the time dummies 
λt. The sample includes 81 destination countries, accounting for more than 90 
per cent of total trade, over the period 1992–2010. All data are from CEPII, trade 
data as well as GDP and exchange rates are from the CEPII- Chelem database 
while data for geographical distances and contiguity are from the CEPII- 
Distances database. Equation (3) is estimated using the fixed effects (FE) and 
random effect (RE) estimators where the choice of the best estimator is made by 
mean of the Hausman test. In addition, in order to control for the potential endo-
geneity of GDP and the exchange rate, we replicate the estimates using the 
Hausman- Taylor estimator (HT).
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Table 4.8  Estimates of the euro effect on the German trade balance
Dependent variable: Δlog(exportj,t) − Δlog(importk,t)
FE FE RE RE HT HT 
Δlog(GDPj,t) 0.989** 1.011** 0.813** 0.821** 0.969*** 0.990***
[0.479] [0.486] [0.403] [0.411] [0.230] [0.232]
Δlog(EXRj,t) −0.359** −0.362** −0.321** −0.321** −0.360*** −0.362***
[0.123] [0.121] [0.123] [0.123] [0.034] [0.034]
Log(Distance) −0.006 −0.006 −0.007 −0.005
[0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.010]
Contiguity −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.009
[0.033] [0.033] [0.041] [0.041]
Euro 0.101*** 0.010 0.100**
[0.024] [0.015] [0.050]
N 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450
R2w 0.142 0.145 0.142 0.142
Hausman 7.31 11.99
Notes
*  Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; significant at 1% level. GDPj,t = partner’s GDP; 
EXRi,t = bilateral exchange rate; Distance = geographical distance; Contiguity = dummy for coun-
tries having common borders; Euro = dummy for countries adopting the euro.
Table 4.9  Estimates of the euro effect on the Italian trade balance
Dependent variable: Δlog(Exportj,t) − Δlog(Importk,t)
FE FE RE RE HT HT
Δlog(GDPj,t) 1.661** 1.679** 1.368** 1.370** 1.655*** 1.670***
[0.694] [0.702] [0.591] [0.598] [0.268] [0.268]
Δlog(EXRj,t) −0.259** −0.261** −0.232** −0.231** −0.258*** −0.260***
[0.080] [0.080] [0.078] [0.078] [0.039] [0.039]
Log(Distance) −0.01 −0.01 −0.011 −0.009
[0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.011]
Contiguity −0.044 −0.045 −0.046 −0.048
[0.031] [0.031] [0.048] [0.048]
Euro 0.082** 0.003 0.069
[0.028] [0.014] [0.057]
N 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444
R2w 0.166 0.168 0.165 0.166
Hausman 11.55 14.49
Notes
*  Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; significant at 1% level. GDPj,t = partner’s GDP; 
EXRi,t = bilateral exchange rate; Distance = geographical distance; Contiguity = dummy for coun-
tries having common borders; Euro = dummy for countries adopting the euro.
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 Estimation results are reported in Table 4.8 for Germany and in Table 4.9 
for Italy. For both countries, the effect of the partners’ GDP and the exchange 
rate is always significant and of the expected sign. We find a higher demand 
elasticity for the Italian trade balance, on average around 1.6 against a value 
slightly below 1 for Germany. On the contrary, the reactivity of the trade 
balance to accelerations or decelerations of the exchange rate is lower for Italy 
(0.25 against 0.35 for Germany). Both geographical distance and the contigu-
ity dummy are never significant, probably because they affect imports and 
exports in a similar way, while important differences arise when looking at the 
euro effect. For Germany, this effect is positive and significant in the FE and 
HT cases. Although the Hausman test is in favour of the RE estimator, given 
the presence of endogeneity we must assume that HT estimates are more reli-
able, which confirms the significance of the euro effect on the German trade 
balance. As to Italy, although the FE estimates return a significant coefficient, 
the above conclusion implies that the effect for Italy, although positive, is 
insignificant.
 In conclusion, the econometric analysis confirms our assumption of an exoge-
nous benefit of the creation of the single currency area for German net exports. 
On the contrary such effect is not present for Italy.
Conclusions
Among the many explanations for the increase of macroeconomic imbalances in 
the Euro Area, in this paper we investigated the role of external trade in explain-
ing difference between the two biggest manufacturing poles of the area: 
Germany and Italy. More specifically, we were interested in the geographical 
recomposition of trade flows, which took place in the last 15 years, as a con-
sequence of the emergence of new actors in world trade. While the German 
economy massively increased its trade opening, the intensity of outward FDI and 
the share of emerging markets in trade flows, this process took place on a much 
lower scale for Italian firms. The slow speed of adjustment of Italian trade flows 
caused a loss in comparative advantages toward emerging markets vis- à-vis the 
rest of Western Europe, especially in consumption and equipment goods, while 
an opposite pattern is observed for Germany. In addition, the German economy 
seems to have benefited from the introduction of the single currency at the 
expense of the other Euro Area members.
 Our econometric results confirm the descriptive evidence. In particular we 
found that German’s high- tech industries strongly benefited from the productive 
integration with the most advanced group of Central and Eastern Europe (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) while for Italy this effect is neutral. As 
to trade integration with the Asia- Pacific area we found that Italian high- tech 
industries are strongly penalised in terms of net exports while for Germany there 
is no significant effect. As to the traditional cost competitiveness variables, in 
Germany productivity growth and a slow wage dynamics have fostered net 
exports while for Italy the wage dynamic has caused a reduction of sectoral trade 
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balances. Finally, we found that the creation of the single currency has benefited 
German net exports while not affecting Italian ones.
 In terms of policy implications we should conclude that the German model 
should be used as a blueprint for other European countries, but only when con-
sidering outsourcing relations and the penetration of emerging markets as the 
beneficial effect of the euro introduction cannot either be replicated or applied to 
all countries at the same time as it is a zero- sum game. This means that a rebal-
ancing of the external position of the member countries will necessarily pass 
through the reduction of the German surplus. In this context, coordinated and 
symmetrical policy measures must be taken at European level while national 
policies should focus on improving the external competitiveness.
Notes
1 A study by Farh and Sunde (2009) found that such reforms accelerated job creation 
significantly and consequently reduced the length of unemployment, especially in 
manufacturing.
2 On the delocalisation of German and Italian firms see Baldone et al. (2007) and Helg 
and Tajoli (2005), while for German outsourcing to Eastern Europe see Geishecker 
(2006) and Marin (2006). For studies on other countries see among the others Egger 
and Egger (2001, 2005); Egger et al. (2001); Egger et al. (2007); Esposito and Stehrer 
(2012).
3 RCA are described using the Balassa Index (1965) in comparison with the advanced 
European economies.
4 High- tech industries are mechanics, electronics, transport equipment, chemicals, coke 
and petroleum and printing/reproduction of recorded media.
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Part III
The German model of 
labour market reforms
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5 How promising is wage restraint 
for a large economy?
The example of Germany before and 
during the current crises
Torsten Niechoj
Introduction
The Euro Area is still suffering from two crises. The first is the ‘Great Reces-
sion’ following the financial market crisis. This financial crisis originated in the 
USA but became a global phenomenon and spread from the financial markets to 
the real economy. It hit many economies hard, especially the Euro Area. In 2009, 
OECD GDP fell by 3.6 per cent and Euro Area GDP declined by 4.4 per cent 
(data from http://stats.oecd.org). As a follow- up to this crisis, a second crisis has 
developed, the so- called sovereign debt crisis of the Euro Area. After the finan-
cial market crisis, both the financially unstable banking system and the economic 
downturn required massive state interventions. The governments went consider-
ably into deficit in order to stabilise the banking system and the economy. This 
together with national failures of the past and the specific institutional constella-
tion of the Euro Area paved the way for rising debt- to-GDP ratios in all coun-
tries of the Euro Area (Horn, Joebges, Niechoj et al., 2009; Joebges and Niechoj, 
2010).
 The political reaction to this second crisis is well known (Niechoj and van 
Treeck, 2011; Ederer, 2012). Austerity measures are employed in nearly all 
countries of the Euro Area. The European Central Bank is purchasing govern-
ment bonds in order to stabilise the market. Moreover, the institutional frame-
work has been modified: a European stability mechanism to provide credits for 
governments in dire straits has been established, the Stability and Growth Pact 
has been reviewed and amended by a macroeconomic imbalances procedure and 
further changes to guarantee sound public finances and a reduction of European 
current account imbalances, and a fiscal compact to prevent further debt crises 
has been introduced.
 Both the sovereign debt crisis itself and the seeming cure of it, the austerity 
measures, led to a prolongation of the partly stagnant, partly recessive develop-
ment in Europe after the financial market crisis.
 During the two crises, some export- oriented countries performed relatively well 
in comparison to the rest of the Euro Area. In this chapter, I will focus on Germany 
which is one of these countries and, having the largest economy in Europe, 
strongly influences – only due its mere economic power – the development of the 
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Euro Area. The main characteristics of its growth model are export orientation 
and stable industrial relations, which guaranteed low strike intensity and 
moderate wage developments in the past. It seems that this model is a successful 
one other countries should follow. In Germany, employment increased after 
2009, German government bonds are in great demand and since 2011 public def-
icits have fallen below the 3 per cent criterion of the European Stability and 
Growth Pact: a situation other countries like Spain or Portugal, not to mention 
Greece, can only dream of.
 Recommending Germany as best practice for the Euro Area requires at least 
three qualifications: First, that Germany itself benefited from its growth model; 
second, that there are no negative side- effects on other European countries; and 
third, that this model can be generalised and successfully adapted by all Euro-
pean countries. Otherwise, copying the German model in other countries would 
not increase prosperity in the adopting country, it would deepen the crisis in the 
Euro Area instead of helping to overcome it and an implementation of the 
German model would conflict with institutions and conditions in the country in 
question. As will be shown, the validity of all these three prerequisites is doubt-
ful. To substantiate this, the next section starts with an overview of the economic 
development of the German economy since the start of the monetary union. 
Then, the German growth model is explained and put in context, i.e. the institu-
tional setting of the Euro Area. A further section reviews successes and failures 
of the German model and discusses the effect on other European countries, espe-
cially the emergence of intra- European current account imbalances. Against this 
background, an assessment of the policy approach of the German government is 
provided in a subsequent section. The last section concludes.
The growth model of Germany in context
A look back on the performance of Germany´s economy after 2009, the year of 
the Great Recession following the turbulences on the financial markets, shows a 
remarkably good performance up to now (see Table 5.1). Elsewhere, negative 
growth, rising unemployment, long periods of current account deficits and high 
public deficits are widespread. In Germany, real GDP growth is in the black 
again since 2010 and Germany has already reached the pre- crisis level of real 
GDP in 2010. Unemployment rates are not rising. On the contrary, they are 
declining and employment has been increasing in Germany despite the crises. 
Moreover, current accounts have been in surplus since 2002 and since 2011 
public deficits are below the 3 per cent level, prescribed by the European 
Stability and Growth Pact.
 In 2009, however, the fall in real GDP was tremendous, absolutely and relat-
ively to other countries. For Germany, with −5.1 per cent the fall in GDP was 
the largest since the Second World War. It was also more pronounced than in 
other countries and regions. OECD GDP decreased by 3.6 per cent, the GDP of 
the USA shrank by 3.1 per cent and the French growth rate, the second- largest 
economy in Europe next to Germany, also by 3.1 per cent (all data from http://
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stats.oecd.org). But the impact of this plunge of German GDP on other economic 
indicators was moderate. The unemployment rate increased only slightly in 
2009. Similarly, the effect on current accounts was minimal. Public deficits 
increased for a period of two years but returned to a low level afterwards.
 If we compare the year 2009 with the years before and concentrate on the 
indicators unemployment, current accounts and public deficits it seems as if the 
economic crisis of 2009 had no extraordinary impact, a remarkable result. What 
also strikes the eye is the development of unemployment and current accounts 
since the start of the monetary union. Up to the mid- 2000s unemployment was 
on the rise but then fell by 5.8 percentage points between the peak in 2005 and 
2012.
 This performance of the German economy is based on a specific growth 
model.1 Since the 1950s, the (West-)German economy has been characterised by 
export- led growth which was not fostered by a currency depreciation due to 
exchange rate manipulations but by a depreciation based on a stable price level 
and higher productivity increases compared to other countries (Herr, 1994). 
Stable price level and productivity were guaranteed by the German central bank 
and German industrial relations, a cooperative approach of trade unions and 
employers resulting in moderate nominal wage increases, a low strike intensity, 
a tradition of constant technical improvements and high- quality production 
(Streeck, 1991). As a consequence, German export goods have been very price 
competitive through the years, which is reflected in trade balance and current 
account surpluses in most of the years. Such a constellation of current account 
surpluses is a relatively comfortable one. It implies a positive net investment 
position and increasing foreign reserves. However, current account surpluses 
Table 5.1  German economic situation at the dawn of 2013
Real GDP 
growth rate
Harmonised 
unemployment 
rate
Current 
accounts (in % 
of GDP)
Public deficit
1999 1.9 8.6 −1.3 −1.6
2000 3.1 8.0 −1.8 1.1
2001 1.5 7.9 −0.2 −3.1
2002 0.0 8.7 2.0 −3.8
2003 −0.4 9.8 1.9 −4.2
2004 1.2 10.5 4.7 −3.8
2005 0.7 11.3 5.1 −3.3
2006 3.7 10.3 6.5 −1.6
2007 3.3 8.7 7.5 0.2
2008 1.1 7.5 6.2 −0.1
2009 −5.1 7.8 6.0 −3.1
2010 4.2 7.1 6.1 −4.1
2011 3.0 5.9 5.6 −0.8
2012 0.7 5.5 6.3 0.1
Source: Eurostat (AMECO); European Commission, 2013.
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might attract (financial) investors and lead to a conversion of foreign currencies 
into the own currency by producers in Germany, and thus increase the demand 
for the home currency. In other words, they lead to a nominal appreciation of the 
currency in a system of (relative) flexible exchange rates. Then, such a constella-
tion requires a permanent moderation of wages and/or efforts to increase produc-
tivity in order to keep the country’s position as a forerunner in price 
competitiveness.
 Since the beginning of the 2000s, reforms of the labour market in Germany 
and the establishment of the monetary union have modified this model (Cesaratto 
and Stirati, 2010; Niechoj et al., 2011; Lucarelli, 2011; Priewe, 2012: 349–350). 
In the years 2002 and 2003 the so- called Hartz reforms were designed by a com-
mission led by Peter Hartz, at that time member of the board of the large German 
car producer Volkswagen, for the social democratic- led government of Chancel-
lor Gerhard Schröder. They became effective in 2003 to 2005 and constituted a 
paradigm shift in labour market policies towards an activation approach and the 
establishment of a low- paid sector, impacting on productivity increases and 
wage developments. The second important modification is a consequence of the 
establishment of a common currency and monetary policy in 1999. Within the 
Euro Area, exchanges rates no longer exist. Therefore, nominal depreciations or 
appreciations are obsolete now. Changes in prices may affect price competit-
iveness and exports directly, without being dampened by adjusting exchange 
rates any more. Differences in real interest rates, due to different inflation rates 
amid a common nominal interest rate policy, have an impact on investment and 
lead to growth differentials. On the one hand, low real interest rates foster invest-
ment, consumption and imports but also inflation when the economy starts to 
overheat. On the other hand, high real interest rates dampen investment, con-
sumption, imports and inflation. As a result of both factors, the impact of the 
German growth model is even more pronounced now, within the setting of the 
monetary union, than before. Real wage increases are dampened and foster 
increases in price competitiveness which are not filtered through adjustments of 
the exchange rate anymore. Sluggish growth of wages restricts imports and 
represses domestic demand and thus investment. German investors are looking 
for borrowers abroad and exporters of other countries face problems to export to 
Germany.
 Moreover, interdependencies between the German way of stimulating growth 
and other traditions became clearer against the framework of the Euro Area. 
Two contrary but mutually dependent models and some middle cases can be 
identified. A group of countries followed the German example of export- led 
growth, namely the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Belgium. In a second 
group of countries – Spain, Greece and Portugal – growth was based on con-
sumption and investment, partly financed by foreign credits. Therefore, these 
countries can be classified as a group of domestic demand- led growth. Other 
countries show characteristics of both models, especially France and Italy. As 
Table 5.2 shows, this simple typology corresponds to specific import and export 
patterns. For countries of the first group it holds that exports are in surplus in 
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nearly all years since the establishment of the Euro Area. In countries with 
domestic demand- led growth, imports exceed exports continually. The trade 
balance of Italy and France is roughly balanced over the whole period. A special 
case is Ireland which is an export- led country with trade balance surpluses but 
current account deficits caused by profit transfers from Ireland to other 
countries.
 What is important here is the mutual dependency of these two groups. Export 
surpluses of one country group necessitate the capacity of the second group to 
import. Sufficient exports to finance imports do not exist in the case of the 
second group. Thus, a different source of financial means is necessary. Countries 
with export surpluses have to provide credits to finance the import surplus of the 
deficit countries.
Successes and failures of the German model
Within this modified setting of the Euro Area, wage developments are a good 
starting point to explain the tremendous export successes of Germany (see also 
Niechoj et al., 2011 and Stein et al., 2012 for an in- depth discussion of wage 
developments within the Euro Area). Wages are both incomes and an important 
component of prices. As important determinants of private consumption and thus 
domestic demand as well as price competitiveness they have had a distinct influ-
ence on the growth performance of the German economy in the last years.
 As Table 5.3 shows, the increase in German wages has been below all other 
members of the Euro Area since the start of the monetary union, depicted in the 
table.2 Moreover, Germany is the only country below the average, in other 
words, this economy has reduced the average significantly. Greece and Ireland, 
Table 5.2  Average of surpluses and deficits of the trade balance in billion euro per year 
for two periods and number of years with a surplus (+) and a deficit (−)
Export surpluses or deficits on 
average per year
Years with positive and negative 
trade balance
1999−2007 2008−2012 1999−2007 2008−2012
Germany 85.8 136.2 +9 +5
Netherlands 32.7 44.7 +9 +5
Austria 8.5 12.4 +9 +5
Finland 10.3 1.7 +9 +4, −1
Belgium 12.1 5.6 +9 +4, −1
France 5.1 −50.3 +6, −3 −5
Italy 6.8 −23.5 +6, −3 −5
Greece −20.5 −21.3 −9 −5
Spain −33.0 −25.3 −9 −5
Portugal −12.9 −10.0 −9 −5
Ireland 18.4 28.5 +9 +5
Source: Eurostat; own calculations.
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however, have raised the average significantly. Although the economic downturn 
of 2009 and the following austerity measures had a dampening effect, both coun-
tries still exceed the average drastically.
 But what are the consequences of such a diverging development? In countries 
with high wage increases, rising incomes have contributed positively to private 
consumption and have fostered a demand- driven extension of investment and 
imports. In countries with low wage increases, private consumption and invest-
ment remained weak. This is one side of the coin. But wages also influence 
export chances. Wage increases correlate with price increases, if the mark- up is 
given and rises in wages are not compensated by increases in labour productiv-
ity. If wage increases are higher in one country compared to the other member 
states of the monetary union then this country has to face a loss in price com-
petitiveness vis- à-vis the rest of the Euro Area.
 To control for changes in labour productivity, Table 5.4 depicts nominal unit 
labour costs which take both wage and productivity developments into account. 
Both for industry, the sector that is the main export- oriented sector in the Euro 
Area, and for the total economy, nominal unit labour costs show a similar 
picture compared to the development of the compensation of employees only. 
Again Germany has remarkably low increases of nominal unit labour costs in 
case of the total economy; in industry nominal unit labour costs have even 
decreased. Productivity increases play a role but the main driver for gaining in 
price competitiveness against the other member states is wage restraint; produc-
tivity increases in Germany are roughly in line with the average of the Euro 
Area, which holds for both industry and the total economy. Within the last 
decade, the pattern of productivity has changed and wage moderation has 
become more important when gaining cost advantages against foreign coun-
tries. Export- oriented firms can use lower- paid temporary agency workers and 
Table 5.3  Compensation of employees in the Euro Area, per hour, total economy, 
2000q1 = 100
2000q1 2007q1 2008q1 2009q1 2010q1 2011q1 2012q3
Euro Area (EU17) 100.0 128.0 134.5 135.5 135.9 139.3 142.0
Germany 100.0 106.7 110.3 111.9 113.5 118.7 125.1
Netherlands 100.0 132.0 140.5 143.8 143.2 147.2 148.1
Belgium 100.0 129.8 137.4 140.4 141.5 148.2 155.7
Austria 100.0 122.6 128.0 131.6 133.2 138.2 147.2
Finland 100.0 137.0 148.1 149.9 148.2 155.4 163.9
France 100.0 131.2 136.2 136.9 139.3 143.7 148.6
Italy 100.0 134.0 141.1 141.4 141.8 143.5 143.1
Greece 100.0 172.6 190.2 191.9 192.3 171.6 n/a
Spain 100.0 162.2 177.5 173.7 168.8 167.9 158.3
Portugal 100.0 132.9 138.6 140.5 141.4 140.6 142.0
Ireland 100.0 194.1 204.1 200.8 178.5 173.4 178.3
Source: Eurostat; own calculations.
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industry- related services, not subject to the collective agreements of the export 
sectors.
 There is, however, a remarkable surge in nominal unit labour costs in 2009. 
Here, labour productivity played an important role. This jump reflects a tempor-
ary fall in labour productivity. In 2009, GDP declined but employment was rel-
atively stable. Labour was hoarded, i.e. surpluses in working time accounts were 
reduced and short- time work schemes introduced. With the increase in GDP in 
2010 labour productivity returned to normal levels.
 Besides divergences in private consumption and price competitiveness, dif-
ferent wage developments also contributed to diverging inflation rates and thus 
Table 5.4  Nominal unit labour costs in the Euro Area, 2000q1 = 100
(a) per person, total economy
2000q1 2007q1 2008q1 2009q1 2010q1 2011q1 2012q3
Euro Area (EU 17) 100.0 110.76 113.87 121.13 120.41 120.33 122.94
Germany 100.0 98.00 98.37 106.98 105.80 105.49 109.11
Netherlands 100.0 114.95 117.30 125.01 124.30 125.31 128.98
Belgium 100.0 111.74 115.55 123.17 121.72 123.99 130.65
Austria 100.0 104.70 106.33 114.70 115.29 114.81 120.78
Finland 100.0 109.13 114.69 128.39 126.88 126.65 133.70
France 100.0 114.86 117.34 123.38 124.49 125.44 129.43
Italy 100.0 118.32 123.73 131.78 130.93 131.03 133.06
Greece 100.0 122.55 131.20 134.46 138.78 131.55 n/a
Spain 100.0 124.78 132.49 134.32 132.59 130.82 125.64
Portugal 100.0 120.08 124.37 131.21 129.07 128.04 122.96
Ireland 100.0 125.67 135.13 140.94 128.47 123.99 124.16
(b) per hour, industry*
2000q1 2007q1 2008q1 2009q1 2010q1 2011q1 2012q3
Euro Area (EU17) 100.0 98.7 101.8 117.4 107.2 104.2 108.1
Germany 100.0 86.7 88.2 110.3 96.5 92.8 97.1
Netherlands 100.0 102.8 103.7 111.9 105.3 105.2 106.2
Belgium 100.0 104.0 105.6 114.3 109.4 108.1 114.9
Austria 100.0 93.2 93.4 109.7 105.0 98.7 100.3
Finland 100.0 82.8 85.1 106.7 96.0 95.5 99.0
France 100.0 99.5 103.2 114.6 109.0 109.5 115.3
Italy 100.0 115.2 119.9 139.2 129.4 127.8 132.0
Greece 100.0 139.7 155.6 161.0 173.9 159.6 n/a
Spain 100.0 119.1 130.3 130.5 122.8 113.8 116.9
Portugal n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Ireland 100.0 88.2 94.1 84.2 68.0 62.4 n/a
Source: Eurostat; own calculations.
Notes
*  Belgium, Greece: per person; Portugal: total economy; industry defined as economic activities B 
(mining and quarrying), C (manufacturing) D (electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply) 
and E (water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation) of NACE Rev. 2.
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to different real interest rates and to GDP growth differentials. Why? Because in 
the Euro Area the European Central Bank (ECB) sets a single nominal interest 
rate for all member states. It cannot address country- specific price increases. If 
wages develop differently and then inflation diverges among the member states, 
the single nominal interest rate translates into different real interest rates for the 
economies and thus different environments for financing investments and for 
consumer credits (see Table 5.5). Although the real interest rate is only one 
factor among others that influences consumption and investment decisions, 
ceteris paribus it holds that a reduction of the real interest rate results in a higher 
demand for credits for consumption and investment and thus private consump-
tion and investment.
 For Germany, the real interest rate was the highest on average for the period 
1999–2012 and in 13 of 14 years above the average. The high costs of credits are 
reflected in low investment and private consumption. Furthermore, they fostered 
a run in financial assets, lending to countries with a more promising investment 
environment, like for example Spain, and a concentration of investment on the 
export sector. In countries with low real interest rates domestic demand was 
further amplified besides the direct effect of rising wage incomes. It resulted in 
high GDP growth rates but massive problems developed also. The housing 
bubble in Spain is a prime example for this.
 Still, the question whether Germany profited from its export- led growth 
model or not is unresolved. On the one hand, wage restraint impacts positively 
on price competitiveness and increases the contribution of exports on growth. 
On the other hand, it impacts negatively on domestic demand.
 What the development of GDP, depicted in Figure 5.1, shows is that growth 
was poor for the whole period since the start of the Euro Area and it was up to 
2012 below the average of the Euro Area. Until 2009, Germany, together with 
Portugal and Italy, were the low performers within the Euro Area. It has 
changed, however, with the Great Recession. Germany performed relatively well 
after 2009 in respect to GDP growth.
 Employment as a second main indicator of success or failure of a growth 
model also shows a segmented development for Germany (see Figure 5.2). Until 
the Great Recession, employment performed worse than the average of the Euro 
Area. Now, after the recession, it has caught up and is now close to the average. 
Often, the labour market reforms (Hartz reforms) in the first half of the 2000s 
are held responsible for this successful increase of employment and reduction of 
unemployment. The reforms established a low- paid sector and increased the 
pressure on all unemployed to accept a job, even if qualification and compensa-
tion do not match. Concrete measures covered: the merger of unemployment 
assistance and social assistance to means- tested benefits (Arbeitslosengeld II) 
and the limitation of unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld I) to one year, 
which together reduced the reservation wage; the introduction of mini and midi 
jobs with fixed upper limits for income and no or reduced social contributions; 
so- called ‘1-euro jobs’ were offered, i.e. employment opportunities outside the 
normal labour market; criteria of job acceptance were amended in such a way 
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(a) Export-oriented countries.
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(b) The middle cases: Italy and France.
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that after a while recipients of benefits have to accept jobs below their level of 
qualification; temporary agency work was facilitated as well as fixed- term 
employment. It has to be noted that in Germany, contrary to other countries, a 
minimum wage that could introduce a lower limit to declining wages does not 
exist.
 However, this explanation of declining unemployment based on flexibilised 
employment and reduced wages has several catches. A coincidence is not neces-
sarily a correlation. Other factors have influenced the employment development 
after 2005 (Herzog- Stein and Logeay, 2010). This year marked the end of an 
economic downturn in Germany. Increasing employment afterwards was simply 
a reflection of the following upswing. Demographic developments and a trend 
towards shorter working hours and part- time work also influence the unemploy-
ment rate: labour supply growth is muted. But the labour market reforms were 
not ineffective, they aggravated a trend of low- paid employment since the 1990s 
(Bosch et al., 2008). A lot of the newly created jobs are of low quality and pay. 
The number of working poor who receive top- up benefits by the state has 
increased. Temporary agency work is widespread nowadays. Unemployment 
rates of people aged 55 years and over are still high. So for a lot of employees 
the Hartz reforms contributed directly to job instability and low wages. More-
over, for others it triggered the fear of income losses. In such a situation, 
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(c) Demand-led and externally debt-financed countries.
Figure 5.1  Development of real GDP before and during the crisis, quarterly values, 
2000q1 = 100 (source: Eurostat; own calculations).
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employees and trade unions are willing to accept opening clauses to collective 
agreements or amendments of collective agreements that worsen working con-
ditions and payments in exchange for employment guarantees. As a result, real 
wages and voluntary payments by the employers, i.e. locally negotiated pay-
ments like holiday pay not covered by the collective agreement, declined in 
Germany for several years (Schulten, 2008). The consequence was not a rise in 
employment but sluggish domestic demand that seemingly makes it more neces-
sary to focus on price competitiveness and exports. In other words, the reform of 
labour markets under Chancellor Schröder fostered the export- led growth model 
by depressing wage claims. As mentioned above, this politically induced wage 
restraint is rooted in a long tradition and is supported by state, employers and 
employees and their organisations, and public and academic opinion as a pre-
requisite of an export- oriented economy.
 Especially the stabilisation of employment after 2009 cannot be ascribed to 
the structural reforms of the labour market. On the contrary, the conservative- 
liberal government under Chancellor Merkel prepared the ground for this ‘job 
miracle’ with a policy mix that contrasts sharply to the usual pro- market ori-
entation of these two parties. It used instruments to smooth the negative 
effects of the Great Recession more in the tradition of corporatism and 
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(c) Demand-led and externally debt-financed countries.
Figure 5.2  Development of employment in persons before and during the crisis, quar-
terly values, 2000q1 = 100 (source: Eurostat; own calculations).
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 Keynesianism than those policies which are normally applied by pro- market 
proponents:
1 The banking sector was stabilised by encompassing state guarantees and fin-
ancial support for banks. The establishment of Bad Banks was supported 
and the burden was shifted to the taxpayer. For Germany, a credit crunch 
and bank runs were successfully avoided (Horn, Joebges, Niechoj et al., 
2009).
2 Keynesian defi cit spending was introduced. Two fi scal stabilisation pro-
grammes dampened the impact of the crisis on growth and employment. 
Widely known is the car- scrapping premium as one measure among others. 
The programmes not only dampened the fall in GDP, they also helped to 
establish the expectation that this sharp decline is only temporary (Eicker- 
Wolf et al., 2009: 49–58).
3 Employees were not dismissed on a large scale. Labour was hoarded. This 
safeguarding of jobs was possible due to the specific system of industrial 
relations in Germany. Working time accounts, managed within the firms and 
backed by collective agreements, and short- time work, subsidised by the 
state, have a long tradition. Moreover, in a lot of companies working time 
accounts of employees were in surplus before the crisis. So for a limited 
time, it was possible to lower hours worked without reducing employment 
significantly (Herzog- Stein and Seifert, 2010; Herzog- Stein et al., 2010; 
Möller, 2010).
This combination of measures stabilised expectations in Germany. Expecting a 
positive future implied that consumers should not to bring down private consump-
tion, and firms should keep employees for the expected rise of sales after the crisis 
and keep the level of investment. In this situation running discussions about demo-
graphic change and shortage in labour supply supported labour hoarding. The 
success of these measures and the hope that those expectations would not be disap-
pointed hinged, however, on a quick restart of the economy. It was not planned to 
issue one fiscal stabilisation programme after another nor was labour hoarding 
considered as an option for more than a few months. Sometimes working accounts 
are deeply in minus and without orders dismissals have to follow. Also short- time 
work is nothing a firm and employees can practise endlessly. What saved the 
German economy was that a few months after the beginning of the crisis exports 
to Asia (especially China), the USA and Central and Eastern Europe started to 
increase again. In anticipation of the forthcoming upswing equipment goods were 
ordered by these countries – and in equipment Germany has a strong competitive 
advantage which is based on prices and quality. Furthermore, car exports were 
going surprisingly well. This economic downturn and the upswing afterwards also 
pronounced a shift in German export patterns from Western Europe to other 
regions that has been taking place since the mid- 1990s (Stephan and Redle, 2010). 
Since 2010, there has been a strong increase of exports to Asia and also the USA. 
In 2011 exports to the Euro Area were again roughly at the same level as in 2008 
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but since 2012 the outlook has been negative due to the austerity measures that at 
the end of 2012 affected German exports, too.
 In this situation, relying on exports has paid off. But since the introduction of 
the euro German export orientation has also led to a development of GDP 
growth below average and it implies a significant dependency on growth devel-
opments in other countries which is rather unusual for a large economy like 
Germany and reveals its dangers in the current situation of stagnation or reces-
sion in most of the economies of the Euro Area. That employment has not been 
affected more since the Great Recession and that it has even increased after-
wards can be attributed to a policy mix of fiscal expansionism and corporatist 
institutions in a specific constellation of a fast recovery of demand by important 
trading partners of the German economy, supported by a weak euro and a spe-
cific product portfolio of the German export sector.
 This is only one side of the coin and shows to what extent Germany has bene-
fited from its growth model. As the largest economy within the Euro Area, its 
development has had an impact on the other member states as well, which is the 
flipside. It has led to the situation that Germany and some other member states 
of the Euro Area face permanent current account surpluses, others permanent 
deficits. The sum of the surpluses of Germany and the Netherlands roughly cor-
responds to all the deficits of the deficit countries (see Figure 5.3). This does not 
mean that intra- trade within the Euro Area has necessarily to be balanced in the 
sense that Germany´s surplus has to be the deficit of one or several other member 
states. Surpluses or deficits are the result of trade relations with economies 
outside the Euro Area, too. But because of the almost balanced current account 
of the Euro Area with the rest of the world, deficits and surpluses within the 
Euro Area roughly correspond to each other.
 As Figure 5.3 shows, the composition of the two groups of countries – in 
deficit and in surplus – does not change much over time. Only Ireland, an 
export- led country with a collapsed banking system and profit transfers to 
other countries shows volatile behaviour here. Moreover, even the Great 
Recession has neither whirled the composition nor the trend towards accumu-
lating and persistent imbalances between the two groups. But if current 
accounts of a country are permanently in deficit, the difference between the 
imported value and the exported value plus the income balance factor has to 
be financed somehow. Thus, external debt is increasing as well as the debt 
service. The net investment position reflects this rise in current account imbal-
ances and external borrowing. Similar to the current accounts but with a dif-
ferent sign, net investment positions also diverged since the establishment of 
the monetary union. The export- led countries served as creditors and accumu-
lated more and more assets; the domestic demand- led economies accumulated 
liabilities, respectively. The net investment position of Germany broadly 
matches the sum of the net investment positions of Greece, Spain, Portugal 
and Ireland.
 What persistent current account deficits mean for a country can be studied 
in the cases of Greece, Spain and Portugal. These countries are in dire straits 
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now. They have to handle an enormous debt service, private and public, and 
they have accumulated a massive loss in price competitiveness that under-
mines exports. Austerity measures were introduced under the auspices of the 
troika that have deteriorated further production. Unemployment has risen dras-
tically. For the export- led economies this situation is, however, dangerous and 
eroding, too. Credits to the domestic demand- led countries have to be written 
down and export markets are collapsing. Both country groups are interwoven 
and not immune to problems of the correspondent group. Even the German 
economy cannot decouple itself completely from the problems of the Euro 
Area.
 Current account imbalances might not be the sole problem within the Euro 
Area; there are country specific problems and the burden of the financial market 
crisis that turned private losses into public debt (Joebges and Niechoj, 2010; 
Niechoj and van Treeck, 2011). But for a sound and enduring solution of the 
debt crisis a reduction of these imbalances is essential (Horn et al., 2010; Laski 
and Podkaminer, 2011). Without it, a further crisis is already looming that will 
call the existence of the Euro Area again in question.
Blame avoidance
Several initiatives of the German government during the sovereign debt crisis 
have demonstrated that the negative aspe cts of the export- led growth model 
have been ignored and interdependencies within the Euro Area have been under-
estimated (see for a detailed discussion Niechoj, 2012: 409–415):
200
100
0
–100
–200
300
–300
Ireland
Austria
Belgium
Germany
Netherlands
Spain
Portugal
Italy
Greece
France
Finland
19
99
20
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
20
12
Figure 5.3  Current accounts in the Euro Area (source: Eurostat AMECO).
926_05_Competitiveness Euro.indd   122 4/12/13   11:07:34
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
How promising is wage restraint?  123
• Concerning monetary policy, all German members of the ECB council after 
the financial market crisis – first Axel Weber and Jürgen Stark, now Jens 
Weidmann and Jörg Asmussen – have repeatedly emphasised their opposi-
tion to the purchase of government bonds and financing states through this 
backdoor by the ECB. Moreover, the idea of Eurobonds was rejected. A 
common responsibility is out of focus and the interdependency of the 
growth models in the Euro Area is neglected.
• Fiscally, the German government has pressed for faster and stricter fiscal 
adjustment paths within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Furthermore and along the lines of the German debt brake, Chancellor 
Merkel launched an initiative to further strengthen fiscal discipline by 
enshrining debt caps in all constitutions of the Euro Area member states. In 
March 2012, this was agreed in a treaty, the so- called fiscal compact. More-
over, it was a German idea to introduce private sector involvement in the 
case of Greece and future debt restructurings of the European stability 
mechanism and to introduce an orderly insolvency procedure for states. In 
other words, the leeway for mutual fiscal support, and especially the fiscal 
burden Germany is willing to accept, is limited.
• Structural reforms are the key to overcoming the crisis. Therefore, in the 
beginning of 2011 Angela Merkel and France’s President Sarkozy initiated 
the so- called Euro plus pact, a pact that recommends wage restraint when 
labour cost growth exceeds productivity growth. Wage indexation is sup-
posed to be abolished and labour markets are supposed to be flexibilised. 
The public sector was allocated a leading role; in other words, it should act 
as a forerunner of wage restraint.
• European imbalances are a problem; this is acknowledged. But imbalances 
are caused by a lack of competitiveness. Political reactions have to be asym-
metric, i.e. deficit countries are solely responsible for gaining in competi-
tiveness. This positioning became clear in the negotiations on the 
supplementation of the excessive deficit procedure of the Stability and 
Growth Pact by a macroeconomic imbalances procedure. Germany, for a 
long time, opposed the introduction of such an imbalances procedure. 
Finally it agreed to a wording that de facto puts most of the responsibility 
for adaptation on the deficit countries. Based on a scoreboard of indicators, 
the thresholds for sanctions are asymmetric. For example, a current account 
deficit of up to 4 per cent but a surplus of up to 6 per cent of GDP is permit-
ted; the net international investment position has only a negative threshold 
of 35 per cent, not a positive one; the increase in nominal unit labour costs 
is sanctioned above the level of 9 per cent but negative values are accept-
able for all countries, also for surplus countries.
So, from this perspective, fiscal discipline and structural reforms of the labour 
markets are essential to overcome the sovereign debt crisis and imbalances 
within the Euro Area. With the adjustment programmes of the troika of Inter-
national Monetary Fund, ECB and European Commission and the constitutional 
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amendments of the fiscal compact, the German government has achieved a lot in 
the area of fiscal policies. What is still lacking, from their perspective, is the 
solution to the competitive disadvantages of several countries, which is 
important for increasing their ability to repay their debt to Germany and other 
countries. At the beginning of 2013, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Chancellor Merkel nicely expressed her vision of competitiveness for the Euro 
Area:
What we are still lacking, however – and this is something we must work on 
in 2013 – is an answer to how, throughout the common monetary union, we 
can ensure greater coherence over the years ahead in the matter of competit-
iveness. . . . What I’m thinking of here – and this is something we’re cur-
rently discussing in the European Union – is a compact for competitiveness 
along the lines of the fiscal compact. The way this could work would be that 
countries would conclude agreements or treaties with the European Com-
mission committing them to become more competitive in areas where 
they’re lagging behind. This could often concern things like non- wage 
labour costs, unit labour costs, research spending, infrastructure and the effi-
ciency of public administration.
(Merkel, 2013)
In the same speech, she also elaborated on the German view towards European 
imbalances and clarifies the responsibilities:
[W]hen we’re criticized on account of the imbalances that still exist, it’s 
important to note the reason for these imbalances. Take unit labour costs in 
Europe: if they were to converge exactly at midpoint on the spectrum, the 
average of all European countries, Europe as a whole would no longer be 
competitive and Germany’s export industry would be finished. That can’t be 
the goal we’re striving for. So up to a point, obviously, current account sur-
pluses show that countries are scoring well on competitiveness. And that’s 
something it would be pure folly to put at risk.
(Merkel, 2013)
In other words, the country with the highest current account surplus, Germany, 
is suggested as a role model for the Euro Area. Current account surpluses – 
based on price competitiveness – are key to growth and prosperity. Germany 
does not share any responsibility for what happened to the other member states; 
the German model of export- led growth does not imply negative side- effects. 
Moreover, the country (and its taxpayers) has already taken a lot of burden on its 
shoulders by granting a huge amount of credits. Now the others have to do their 
homework to keep up with the German economy.
 In doing so, the German government is not only avoiding blame, Merkel puts 
the case for a generalisation of the German model. There are, however, at least 
two reasons why this is a cheap recommendation. First, the German model is 
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still based on well- educated employees and an industrial basis. If other countries 
lacking this would like to copy the German model they would either have to 
invest massively in the education system and in industry or they would have to 
get rid of production that is not competitive and they would also have to lower 
their wages far below the German level to gain in price competitiveness against 
the German economy. The first option is unlikely; the second is what we see in 
Greece, Spain and Portugal with all its negative consequences of poverty and 
unemployment. However, compared to Germany even massive cuts in compen-
sation of employees are not enough to foster exports sufficiently. Indeed, these 
countries now achieve a reduction of current account deficits but this is mainly 
due to restricted imports, not successful exports. It takes time to build up a com-
petitive basis. The second reason is that this model cannot be extended to all 
member states of the Euro Area. For a small economy, wage restraint is possible 
and might lead to growth and employment via export surpluses, if larger eco-
nomies tolerate trade balance deficits. In the case of a large economy, however, 
wage restraint has side- effects on growth and on other countries. It represses 
domestic demand and fuels current account imbalances, especially in an integ-
rated currency area lacking exchange rate adjustments. If all countries aimed at 
current account surpluses, following the German growth path, domestic demand 
would be further devastated by a European- wide wage restraint that might result 
in deflation and a crisis of investment. The reason for this is that price competit-
iveness is always a relative concept. If one country starts to decrease wage 
growth or wages itself and achieves price advantages, this country will expand 
exports but others will lose market share and might respond with wage restraint 
in their country. Moreover, book- keeping tells us that all member states could 
aim at surpluses vis- à-vis the other member states but not all can succeed. The 
sum of all surpluses has to correspond to the same sum of deficits elsewhere. In 
a simple simulation, Semieniuk et al., 2012 show the futility of aiming at sur-
pluses in all member states of the Euro Area. It is possible, however, that the 
Euro Area as a whole can aim at and succeed in having a surplus with the rest of 
the world. But again, this does not necessarily solve the problems of intra- 
European imbalances and it presumes that the rest of the world tolerates its 
deficit. It has to be noted that global imbalances are no negligible problem either 
although exchange rates between the Euro Area and the rest of the world serve 
as a buffer for accumulating global imbalances (Horn, Joebges and Zwiener, 
2009; Priewe, 2011).
Conclusions
At a first glance, the German economy was in a remarkably good position at the 
time of writing (the turn of 2012 to 2013) – despite the financial market crisis, 
the economic crisis afterwards and the still looming sovereign debt crisis. 
Current accounts have been in surplus since 2002, growth has been at the pre- 
crisis level since 2010, the harmonised unemployment rate was at 5.5 per cent in 
2012. Furthermore, public deficits are not only below the 3 per cent level 
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 prescribed by the European Stability and Growth pact, but nearly balanced and 
contrary to other member states of the Euro Area the interest rates of govern-
ment bonds are not rising but have been decreasing for quite a while, now stabil-
ising at a low level. It seems that, at least in comparison to most of the other 
member states of the Euro Area, Germany has overcome the heavy burdens of 
the financial market crisis as well as those of the economic crisis afterwards and 
is one of the rare solvent anchors within the turbulences of the debt crisis in the 
Euro Area.
 This, however, ignores the role wage restraint has played in Germany under 
the new rules of the monetary union. In the case of Germany, exports to the Euro 
Area were fostered by a fixed exchange rate and by low increases in wages and 
unit labour costs. As a consequence, current account imbalances in the Euro 
Area have been aggravated and private consumption and thus growth in 
Germany have been below Euro Area average. This trend was amplified by 
labour market reforms, the so- called Hartz reforms in the first half of the 2000s, 
establishing a low- paid sector in Germany.
 Wage restraint was not responsible for the stable and later on even positive 
employment development in and after 2009. What shielded employment from 
the contraction in growth and exports in the downswing of 2009 was a specific 
constellation, tripartite corporatist measures and institutions, to be more precise: 
financial support of the state for short- time work plus public investment pro-
grammes and flexible working- time accounts, introduced years before the crises 
by trade unions and employers. The following upswing in growth and employ-
ment originated in a strong demand for German exports from Asia and countries 
outside the Euro Area. Since the end of 2012, however, it has become clear that 
Germany also suffers from the desolate situation in the Euro Area.
 The policies during the crisis in 2009 might be a role model for other coun-
tries; wage restraint, however, cannot be recommended for a large economy in a 
monetary union against the background of the German experiences.
Notes
1 The term ‘model’ is used in the sense of ‘pattern’ and not ‘strategy’ in order to high-
light that there is no central actor – neither government nor business or other candid-
ates – that implements a certain strategy for the whole country. There are indeed 
several actors with strategies and interests promoting this growth model; some of them 
I name in the course of this chaper. But in the end the resulting pattern is a common 
and partly unintended effort of interacting actors, nothing a single actor has planned or 
is able to introduce.
2 The first quarter of 2000 was used as the base period and as a proxy for the beginning 
of the monetary union due to missing data for 1999 for some countries.
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6 Hartz IV and the consequences
Did the labour market reforms destroy 
the German model?
Joachim Möller
Introduction: characteristics of the German model
In a standard definition, the so- called German model is described as an ‘institu-
tionalized high wage economy combining high competitiveness in world markets 
with strong social cohesion and, in particular, low levels of inequality along a 
variety of dimension’ (Streek, 1997: 2). In a similar way, Freeman (2000) 
describes this model as ‘Rhensian Capitalism’. There are several other character-
istics that belong to the German model. These characteristics include at least five 
dimensions:
1 education and training: the dual training system, long tenure and acquisition 
of firm- specific human capital;
2 labour relations: high union coverage, co- determination and social partner-
ship, high importance of internal vs. external flexibility;
3 solidarity: moderate degrees of inequality in earnings and financial assets, a 
comprehensive social security network;
4 industrial structure: export orientation of the economy, relative strength of 
manufacturing;
5 infrastructure: efficient transport facilities, highly reliable legal system.
These elements should not be considered in isolation because they are inter-
related and form a consistent economic system. In more detail, the above dimen-
sion could be described as follows.
1 The vast majority of German workers pass through the dual training system, 
which has a long tradition. The dual system combines the acquisition of 
theoretical and practical knowledge. Young school- leavers typically choose 
a specific occupation and sign a contract with a firm (Ausbildungsvertrag). 
These school- leavers receive practical training within a firm and – typically 
for one day per week – theoretical training at a public school (Berufsschule). 
An important aspect of the dual system is that it offers corresponding train-
ing resources; for instance, the working time of experienced workers who 
are able to transfer firm- specific and general skills to the apprentices. 
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Although it cannot be excluded that under certain circumstances some firms 
might consider the apprentices as cheap labour, the firm- specific and general 
practical training also require a certain investment by the firm in the appren-
ticeship system. Typically, small firms do not hire all of their apprentices 
but take some advantage by creaming off the best apprentices. Their interest 
is to hire the elite of their apprentices whose abilities they have got to know 
very well and who acquired firm- specific human capital. Those apprentices 
who are not offered a contract after completing their apprenticeship move to 
other firms. Furthermore, there is also some poaching between firms. 
Because the curricula within the professions are codified, standard skills 
being typical of a specific profession can be expected from a worker with a 
completed apprenticeship. Hence, a certificate in a certain profession serves 
as a signal for a bundle of skills and competences.
2 Traditionally, the system of labour relations is of high importance for the 
German model. In a larger firm, a work council serves as a mediator 
between the interests of the workforce and those of the management. This 
conflict- resolving potential is particularly important for firms facing a highly 
volatile product demand (as is typical of firms with a high exposure to world 
trade). More particularly, work councils play a key role in organising 
within- firm flexibility, for instance, through the variation of working hours 
to stabilise employment.
   Moreover, work councils are important in fostering training measures and 
the implementation of high security standards. In case of necessary employ-
ment adjustments, work councils guarantee the consideration of social 
aspects in managerial decisions.
   Traditionally, the system of well- functioning labour relations in Germany 
is particularly strong in manufacturing industries. This system relies on high 
unionisation and coverage of collective bargaining.
3 During the period from the German Wirtschaftswunder in the 1950s and 
1960s to the time of reunification, the degree of earnings inequality in 
Germany was low. This was also true for skill differentials. With respect to 
measures of earnings inequality, Germany ranked somewhere in between 
the Scandinavian and the Anglo- Saxon countries. One of the reasons for his-
torically moderate skill differentials might be seen in the low- skilled bias in 
technical change being typical of the Fordian production phase that was 
dominating the industry at the time of the Wirtschaftswunder. Thus, low- 
skilled workers were in relatively high demand during this period. Since the 
1980s, the nature of technical progress fundamentally changed towards skill 
bias. Unions tried to stem these forces by bargaining for a fixed component 
in wage increases (Sockelbeträge) from which the lowest- income groups 
profit more than proportionally. However, unemployment of low- skilled 
workers has become an increasingly severe problem since the late 1980s.
   From the time of Bismarck in the late nineteenth century, the German model 
relied on a comparatively generous social network. This network holds true for 
health insurance, pension schemes and, particularly, for unemployment 
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 insurance. For the latter, relatively high replacement ratios and long periods of 
entitlement for insurance benefits were typical.
4 Among the OECD countries, Germany has one of the highest shares of 
manufacturing employment. In the past, this industry structure was con-
sidered an ambiguous characteristic. On the one hand, Germany was blamed 
for being a laggard with respect to structural change. For instance, immedi-
ately before the Great Recession of 2009, Berry Eichengreen warned that 
Germany might experience the same fate as Italy or other countries that 
were losing ground. ‘[What happened to Italy] as China moved up the tech-
nology ladder into the production of more sophisticated consumer goods 
will happen to Germany as China moves into the production of more soph-
isticated producer goods’ (Eichengreen, 2007: 2). However, manufacturing 
has always been one of the industries where Germany has had a comparative 
advantage. Moreover, these industries are known as being highly productive 
and innovative. Interestingly, many observers today see an advantage in a 
relatively high share of manufacturing in production and employment. 
Therefore, it appears that the former drawback is increasingly turning into 
an advantage, particularly since the financial crisis, which has cast some 
doubts on the sustainability of a mainly service- driven growth in advanced 
countries (see Möller, forthcoming). In the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
Germany, with its seemingly outdated industry structure, performed surpris-
ingly well; whereas countries with a weak industrial basis are still suffering.
5 The division of labour is particularly important in modern manufacturing. 
Just- in-time or just- in-sequence delivery of parts in the production chain 
calls for high standards of logistics and an outstanding transportation 
system. Additionally, a sophisticated system of a highly fragmented produc-
tion process that comes along with higher economic integration and modern 
manufacturing production in various branches (Hummels et al., 2001) 
requires efficient legal structures for creating confidence in a production 
network.
The rationale behind the Hartz IV reforms
In retrospect, the German model has increasingly moved towards a crisis since 
the mid- 1970s. Since then, mass unemployment became an increasingly men-
acing phenomenon. In parallel with a striking ratchet effect in the unemployment 
figures since the first oil price crisis, systemic unemployment was steadily rising. 
After each recession, the core of unemployed individuals was substantially 
higher than before. This phenomenon can be described as a result of significant 
hysteresis effects due to, for instance, depreciation of human capital through 
periods of long- term unemployment and other mechanisms.
 From the early 1990s onwards, an additional challenge related to the high fin-
ancial burden caused by German reunification became increasingly relevant. 
Huge transfers to the East put public and private budgets under pressure. As a 
result, the German economy was plagued with low growth and low job creation 
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rates. Furthermore, the deep structural crisis of the East German economy led to 
extremely high unemployment rates in almost all regions of the new Länder. 
Labour market institutions were not flexible enough to cope with the huge 
burden of adjustment after the reunification in the post- socialist economy, which 
from one day to the next was exposed to the world economy without being able 
to devalue its currency to regain competitiveness. In the late 1990s, there were 
some additional negative effects for the German economy immediately after the 
introduction of the euro. Capital flows were redirected to formerly high interest 
countries within the Eurozone, which was detrimental to home investment.
 Hence, at that time, the German economy was in a critical phase, and it 
appeared to be not only a laggard in structural change but also the paradigm of 
Eurosclerosis. Consequently, The Economist (1999) blamed Germany as the 
‘sick man of the euro’. Increasingly, a situation developed that called for a 
drastic reform. The result was the political program Agenda 2010 that Michael 
Burda dubbed the ‘Teutonic turnaround’. Chancellor Schröder, in his famous 
speech from March 2003, argued that if Germany refrained from modernising its 
labour market institutions, it would be modernised through the brute forces of 
the global markets leaving barely room for a social protection net (see Deutsche 
Bundestag, 2003). Hence, according to his position, the far- reaching labour 
market reforms were necessary to keep the German model alive. Here, the funda-
mental question arises whether the deep structural changes that came along with 
the reforms sacrificed basic ingredients of the German model. Did the reforms 
throw the baby out with the bathwater? To assess the situation adequately, we 
will first describe the reforms and their effects.
 The key elements of Agenda 2010 aimed to reform labour market institutions. 
The so- called Hartz reforms were implemented in different steps between 2003 
and 2005. The fundamental concept for improving the functioning of the labour 
market and reducing the number of the unemployed can be characterised as ‘sup-
porting and demanding’. The reform adopted a stick and carrot approach. On the 
‘carrot’ side, there were several instruments for facilitating the integration of the 
unemployed; for instance, support for training measures, wage subsidies and 
improved conditions for the placement of workers into new jobs. Concrete ele-
ments on the ‘stick’ side were somewhat lowering job protection standards, 
reducing the maximum period for the entitlement of unemployment insurance 
benefits, tightening of job acceptance regulations for the unemployed as well as 
deregulation for temporary work agencies. Perhaps the most substantial change 
was the merger of unemployment assistance and welfare (Hartz IV). The impli-
cation was that, after 12 months of receiving unemployment benefit, a worker 
would have to fall back into the basic welfare system. In contrast to the insur-
ance system, basic welfare provides means- tested benefits only. Compared to the 
pre- reform situation, the new institutional setting meant a substantial deteriora-
tion of a worker’s position. Three important aspects have to be mentioned in this 
context. First, workers are status oriented. The new institutional system, 
however, implies the possibility of a deep fall in social status after only one year 
of unemployment, creating a credible threat. Second, compared to the pre- reform 
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situation, the position of the long- term unemployed significantly deteriorated 
because social offices could access the benefit recipients’ private assets. Third, 
the criteria under which workers had to accept a job offer were sharpened.
 Taken together, these three reform elements created high pressure on the 
unemployed to find a new job quickly. This reform undoubtedly led to changes 
in behaviour. Particularly, effects on the reservation wage of the unemployed, on 
search intensity and on the willingness of job- seekers to make concessions could 
be expected. Moreover, it is rather likely that the bargaining power of workers in 
general was affected by these profound changes in the institutional environment.
 A further element of the reform was a redefinition of the criteria for persons 
being available to the labour market. Welfare recipients were considered to be 
available in the labour market if they were able to work for at least three hours a 
day. As a perhaps unintended by- product of this change, there was a 0.5 million 
increase in registered unemployment. As a consequence, officially counted 
unemployment peaked at more than five million immediately after the reform 
was implemented.
Reform effects
General effects
It cannot be doubted that the German labour market reforms were a drastic cure. 
Although not all parts of the reforms were well designed, strong positive effects 
on the labour market became rapidly visible. The German economy experienced 
an extraordinary boom period in the three years following the reform. From 
2004:Q4 to 2008:Q2, the growth of real production was 9.4 per cent in the 
aggregate economy and 18.8 per cent in manufacturing. From 2005 to the eve of 
the world recession by the end of 2008, unemployment fell from its peak level of 
more than five million to less than three million. At the same time, the negative 
ratchet effect disappeared: For the first time since the 1960s, the unemployment 
rate at the beginning of the economic downturn (2008:Q3) was lower than at the 
beginning of the previous recession. Moreover, as indicated by Möller (2010) 
among others, the functioning of the labour market significantly improved as 
indicated by a marked inward shift of the Beveridge curve, as shown in Figure 
6.1. As seen from the figure, the curve was rather stable until the 1980s. Then, 
three major outward shifts of the curve occurred, with the latest shift being an 
artificial one due to the aforementioned redefinition of labour market availability 
in 2005. As a striking demonstration of the reform effect, the curve started to 
move steadily inwards after the reforms, particularly from the mid- 2006 
onwards.
 The turnaround of systemic unemployment is documented in Figure 6.2. The 
figure shows the development of unemployment in West Germany since the 
1950s. The fat curve connects the peaks and troughs of the unemployment series. 
As seen, the recession in the 1960s did not lead to an increase in systemic unem-
ployment; i.e. the troughs before and after the recession were at approximately 
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the same level. With the OPEC I crisis in the mid- 1970s, the situation changed 
markedly. Since that time, the level of the unemployment lows increased from 
recession to recession, pointing to the existence of hysteresis effects. In the post- 
reform period after 2005, one can observe that for the first time since the 1960s, 
the trend was reversed.
 Additionally, Figure 6.3 shows that long- term unemployment decreased 
markedly after the labour market reforms. Note that the steepness of the decline 
is remarkable given the previous development of the series (in East and West 
Germany). Because long- term unemployment is an important determinant of 
systemic unemployment, the decline corroborates the view that the labour 
market reforms led to a significant improvement of the labour market perform-
ance in Germany.
Specific reform effects
As a matter of fact, wage increases in the aftermath of the reform were rather 
moderate, and workers were more likely to accept unfavourable job conditions. 
Figure 6.4 provides an impression of the changes in the behaviour of applicants 
from the view of employers. It turns out that in the post- reform years 2005 and 
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Figure 6.1  The Beveridge curve 1950: M1 to 2009: M3: registered unemployed vs. reg-
istered vacancies (source: German National Bank, statistics; data seasonally 
adjusted).
926_06_Competitiveness Euro.indd   134 4/12/13   11:07:37
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
3,500
0
19
58
–0
1
19
56
–0
1
19
54
–0
1
19
52
–0
1
19
50
–0
1
19
60
–0
1
19
68
–0
1
19
66
–0
1
19
64
–0
1
19
62
–0
1
19
70
–0
1
19
78
–0
1
19
76
–0
1
19
74
–0
1
19
72
–0
1
19
80
–0
1
19
88
–0
1
19
86
–0
1
19
84
–0
1
19
82
–0
1
19
90
–0
1
19
98
–0
1
19
96
–0
1
19
94
–0
1
19
92
–0
1
20
10
–0
1
20
08
–0
1
20
06
–0
1
20
04
–0
1
20
02
–0
1
20
00
–0
1
20
12
–0
1
Figure 6.2  Peaks and troughs in unemployment 1950–2009 (unemployed persons, West 
Germany only. Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank).
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Figure 6.3  Long-run unemployment rate in East and West Germany 1998–2009 (source: 
Statistics Federal Employment Agency; values for 2005 cannot be interpreted 
because of a structural change).
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Figure 6.4  Increase or decrease in the willingness of job-seekers to accept unfavourable 
aspects of job characteristics (source: IAB job vacancy survey, see Kettner 
and Vogler-Ludwig, 2010).
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Figure 6.5  Increase or decrease in the willingness of the incumbent workforce to accept 
unfavourable aspects of job characteristics (source: IAB job vacancy survey, 
see Kettner and Vogler-Ludwig, 2010).
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2006, the overall willingness to accomplish low- skilled tasks and accept lower 
wages or special working conditions has significantly increased. The changes are 
particularly strong immediately after the reforms in 2005. As shown in Figure 
6.5, the changes in the behaviour of the incumbent workforce are at least as 
strong as the effects on job- seekers. In the view of employers, this change is 
remarkable with respect to higher effort and more flexibility such as the willing-
ness to accept changes in working hours and – albeit to a lower extent – even 
lower wages. Again, the effects are particularly strong in 2005, immediately 
after the reforms. Note that the net changes in the willingness to accept lower 
wages are significant in the year 2005 but not in 2006.
Drawbacks of the reform
Although the German labour market performance clearly improved through 
Agenda 2010, the labour market reforms came at some significant costs. There is 
some indication that labour market segmentation and wage inequality have 
increased. These phenomena are well described. For instance, there is a marked 
decrease in the share of ‘normal’ contracts in total employment (see Table 6.1).1 
The share of normal working contracts has become particularly low for young 
workers.
 Wage inequality has risen substantially in the top as well as in the bottom tail 
of the wage distribution. Moreover, some groups of workers suffer from less job 
stability. Overall, precarious employment has clearly risen.
 Critics of the reform have also stressed that the right balance between ‘sup-
porting’ and ‘demanding’ has not been found. The strategy is biased towards the 
stick whereas the carrot plays a minor role. Furthermore, the instruments of 
active labour market policy – at least in the starting phase of the agenda – do not 
fit individual needs adequately.
 The share of low- wage earners has increased markedly, both for total employ-
ment and for subsamples divided by region (East/West) or gender. Figure 6.6 
shows that the share of low- pay workers has increased at least since the 
Table 6.1  Share of normal employment contracts in total employment by age and skill 
group (%)
Age 1991 1999 2007
15−24 56.2 35.9 28.1
24−49 75.0 70.4 63.9
50−64 73.9 69.4 65.3
Skill level
low 54.9 46.9 34.0
intermediate 77.0 71.0 64.8
high 75.7 71.9 67.5
Source: IAB.
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Figure 6.6  Share of low-pay workers in total employment 1975–2008. Low pay is 
defined as below two-thirds of median earnings; full-time male workers age 
25 to 55 only (source: own calculations with SIAB data, see Dorner et al., 
2010).
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 mid- 1990s. For total employment and male workers, the trend towards a higher 
share of low- pay employment has accelerated since 2005.
 Parallel to the increasing shares of low- pay employment, wage inequality has 
increased as well. The phenomenon is visible not only in the lower tail but also 
in the upper tail of the distribution. Figure 6.7 shows that the trend towards 
higher wage dispersion had already started in the mid- 1990s, i.e. long before the 
labour market reforms. The log decile ratios InD5 – InD2 and InD8 – InD5 essen-
tially moved in parallel for most of the observation period. Interestingly, the 
increase in wage inequality in the lower tail of the distribution surpassed that of 
the upper tail in the aftermath of the labour market reforms.
 Figure 6.8 depicts the development of an index of real earnings for full- time 
male workers in West Germany by three skill levels (low- skilled, workers with 
vocational training and university graduates). Ultimately, until the time of the 
reunification (1991), the real wages of all skill groups were increasing. In the 
first half of the 1990s, real wages for all groups were stagnating. Since the mid- 
1990s, however, the development of real earnings has clearly diverged among 
the skill groups. Whereas workers with a university degree experienced sharp 
increases in their real earnings, the earnings of the low- skilled declined, particu-
larly after 2005. For one and a half decades, the real earnings of the intermediate 
skill group more or less stagnated after 1990 but then decreased as well. Hence, 
sizeable groups of workers suffered losses in real earnings particularly in the 
years after the labour market reforms. With stagnating or even declining real 
earnings for the majority of workers, unit labour costs have fallen considerably. 
As a result, the competitiveness of the German industry increased markedly 
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 vis- à-vis other countries within and outside the Eurozone. This higher competit-
iveness led to an unprecedented increase in real exports, partly at the cost of the 
neighbouring countries in the Eurozone.
Germany during the Great Recession
It is interesting to see how the post- reform German labour market responded to 
the sharp decline in external demand during the Great Recession 2009. As an 
export- oriented economy, the country was hit by the collapse of orders for 
exporters more than other advanced countries. Relative to the trend, the German 
GDP dropped by approximately 6.5 per cent. Quite remarkably, there was no 
corresponding decrease in employment. The unemployment rate remained 
almost stable. Not without reason, this unusual response was called the German 
labour market miracle. Ultimately, an unprecedented level of within- firm flex-
ibility was the main explanatory factor (see Möller, 2010). In the first place, it 
was the flexible response of working hours that led firms to keep their workforce 
stable. Through subsidies of the Federal Employment Agency (the so- called 
Kurzarbeitergeld), the financial burdens to firms and workers were held down. 
Because the crisis was perceived by firms as a short- lived demand crisis, labour 
hoarding turned out to be a reasonable strategy. Social partnership was a main 
prerequisite for managing this high within- firm flexibility. For example, work 
councils played a major role in communicating the various measures for keeping 
employment stable between workers and management. From a worker’s per-
spective, keeping their job was in their best interest because of the threat of 
falling from unemployment insurance payments into means- tested social assist-
ance after only one year of unemployment. Because in earlier recessions, mass 
layoffs were not unusual and, if anything, employment protection was weakened 
in the last decade, one can argue that employment protection regulations were 
not the main reason for firms keeping their workforce stable. It is much more 
plausible that the labour hoarding behaviour observed under the given circum-
stances was voluntarily.
Conclusions: did labour market reforms destroy the German 
model?
Given the evidence presented above, the answer is a ‘No, but . . .’. Some key ele-
ments of the German model – such as the dual training system and long tenure – 
were not affected by the reform. Some elements were strengthened, and some 
elements were weakened. Labour relations proved to be really strong during the 
crisis, and social partnership was extremely helpful for organising the high level 
of within- firm flexibility. This fact was particularly true for the export- oriented 
manufacturing firms, which through labour market reforms and a long period of 
wage moderation have reached a high level of international competitiveness. 
Hence, the export orientation based on a strong manufacturing sector was even 
strengthened by the direct and indirect effects of the reform. The main element 
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for the German model being substantially weakened through the reforms is solid-
arity. Traditionally, the German economy was run under a rather low level of 
earnings inequality. At the same time, at least the important group of trained 
workers enjoyed quite a comfortable social security network. Social security, 
however, has deeply changed. Workers are much more in danger of losing their 
social status in quite a short period of time. Given the regulatory framework after 
the reforms, workers are much more pressed to accept unfavourable working 
conditions and low- paid jobs. It comes as no surprise that wage inequality has 
increased sharply. Moreover, social permeability has also decreased over the 
years. The heritage of education (Bildungsvererbung) is of major concern for 
critics of the German system. These concerns lead to segmentation tendencies in 
the society, which are an increasingly important topic in the political debate. In 
the past, solidarity was a key element of the German model. It is possible that – 
if no counteraction measures are seized – the menace of an increasingly divided 
society would be a strong challenge to the survival of the German model. Cur-
rently, initiatives for introducing a statutory minimum wage receive growing 
support. Overall, one can argue that the deep labour market reforms in Germany 
were necessary as a painful cure to stop the harmful trend in the rise of systemic 
unemployment. However, the dark side should not be forgotten. A challenge for 
the future is mitigating the damages that an increasing amount of segmentation 
has inflicted on the German model.
Note
1 ‘Normal’ working contracts comprise full- time, permanent contracts which are eligible 
to social contributions and exclude temporary work.
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7 Hartz IV and the German model
A comment
Enrico Saltari
To the Italian reader, the chapter by Joachim Möller poses a question which is 
not easy to answer but nevertheless cannot be avoided: Why did the Hartz 
reform of the labour market succeed in reducing the unemployment rate while 
the reforms of the Italian labour market (which started at the end of the 1990s 
but, as it seems, have not yet been completed) have had the only effect of 
increasing its volatility? What is surprising is not only the drastic reduction in 
the total German unemployment (in 2005 the rate was 11.3 per cent, in 2012, 
only seven years later, it more than halved at 5.5 per cent), but the simultaneous 
fall of long- term unemployment when the Hartz labor market reform was about 
to be completed (2003–2005). In the same years (2005–2012) the Italian unem-
ployment rate increased from 7 to 11 per cent.
	 To	be	sure,	as	Möller	makes	it	clear,	the	‘flexibilisation’	of	the	German	labour	
market was not without costs for workers. On the one hand, the Hartz reform 
acted on long- term unemployment: it entailed a weakening of the welfare status 
of the long- term unemployed in such a way as to increase their willingness to 
accept job offers even at lower wages. On the other, it also acted on short- term 
employment through the liberalisation of temporary contracts and the deregula-
tion	 of	 work	 agencies.	 For	 instance,	 the	 OECD	 index	 for	 the	 strictness	 of	
employment protection legislation for temporary workers decreased from 2 
to 1.25.
 Bearing these costs produced at least two positive outcomes. As mentioned 
above, one of them is the strong reduction of long- term unemployment. This is 
an important achievement as it meant the reversal of the systemic unemployment 
which	 afflicted	Germany,	 and	 Europe,	 since	 the	 oil	 shocks	 of	 the	 1970s.	 The	
other positive effect was wage moderation which raised German competitiveness 
boosting	investment	and	exports.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Hartz	reform	also	pro-
duced	negative,	perhaps	undesired,	consequences.	Labour	market	flexibility,	as	
often happens, implied an increase in the share of temporary workers, particu-
larly among the young workers. Another side- effect of the reform was a worsen-
ing of wage inequality, i.e. a strong rise in wage dispersion.
	 All	in	all,	this	is	Möller’s	conclusion,	that	the	positive	effects	more	than	offset	
the negative ones. And, above all, even if weakened, the German model, one of 
the pillars of the German society, was not substantially undermined. These very 
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conclusions pose again the question raised at the beginning: Why did the 
German reforms of the labour market have such an outcome while in Italy they 
failed? It should be underlined that the labour market reforms carried out in both 
countries were very similar: liberalisation concerned only the legislation for tem-
porary contracts while leaving untouched the strictness of regulation for regular 
contracts and collective dismissals.
	 Even	if	difficult,	this	is	a	question	worth	trying	to	answer.	I	suggest	three	ele-
ments	of	reflection	as	ingredients	of	a	possible	answer.
 The detailed and convincing reconstruction of the recent evolution of the 
German economy after the Hartz reform offered by Möller can hardly be dis-
puted. Nor can the assessment he gives of the positive effects of the Hartz 
reform. For instance, in the years following the reform until 2008 the German 
economy	 saw	 an	 exceptional	 expansion	 of	 production	 and	 employment.	
However,	labour	market	flexibility	does	not	seem	to	work	symmetrically	in	his	
historical account. For when it comes to the reaction to the 2009 Great Reces-
sion,	a	different	explanation	of	the	German	performance	is	given.	Certainly	wage	
moderation	 induced	by	 the	Hartz	reform	helped	 the	competitiveness	of	export-	
oriented	firms,	thus	giving	support	to	employment.	Nevertheless,	the	explanation	
of employment stability during the recession is an ‘unprecedented level of 
within-	firm	flexibility’.	In	a	sense,	one	could	say	that	at	the	basis	of	the	virtuous	
performance of the labour market there was the German model, especially in the 
form	of	social	partnership	and	internal	flexibility,	rather	than	the	Hartz	reform,	
which	favoured	instead	external	flexibility.
	 This	 is	 the	first	difference	with	 respect	 to	 the	 Italian	 labour	market	 reforms	
based	almost	exclusively	upon	external	flexibility.
 Moreover, in conjunction with the decision of keeping the workforce within 
firms,	 the	 data	 also	 shows	 a	 marked	 acceleration	 in	 capital	 accumulation	 in	
Germany.	 Labour	 hoarding	 per	 se,	 especially	when	 financed	 through	 govern-
ment subsidies (by means of Kurzarbeitergeld or Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) 
is	 subject	 to	 ambiguous	 interpretation	 since	by	definition	 it	 cannot	be	 a	 long-	
term	decision.	It	may	be	seen	as	a	first	step	toward	a	future	massive	layoff.	Or,	
if the crisis is perceived as temporary, it will be accompanied or followed by a 
restructuring of the production process. Investment dynamics can be used as 
litmus paper to distinguish between the two situations. In the years immediately 
after the 2009 recession, when Germany and Italy were affected by an ana-
logous fall in gross domestic product (more than 5 per cent) and investment 
(more	 than	 11	 per	 cent),	 gross	 fixed	 capital	 formation	 rapidly	 recovered	 in	
Germany	in	2010	and	2011	(at	some	6	per	cent);	in	Italy	it	first	stagnated	and	
then declined. Although there is still no data to break down aggregate invest-
ment into its components in those years, what occurred just after the much more 
modest 2003 recession leads to the hypothesis that Germany privileged 
information	 and	 communications	 technology	 (ICT)	 investment	 at	 the	 expense	
of non- ICT investment, while the reverse happened in Italy. The evolution of 
total factor productivity in the two economies in the same years provides 
support for this supposition.
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	 Thus,	another	 relevant	factor	explaining	 the	different	 response	 to	 the	 labour	
market reforms of the two economies lies in the indirect effect it produced on the 
pace (and composition) of the accumulation process. Here, again, the German 
model may have played a major role.
 The last point worth emphasising here concerns the productive structure, 
especially	along	the	dimension	of	firm	size.	As	is	well	known,	both	economies	
are	export-	oriented	with	a	strong	manufacturing	sector.	There	is	a	big	difference,	
however,	which	 is	not	 immediately	visible	at	a	first	glance.	 If	one	 looks	at	 the	
industry composition inside the manufacturing sector, individual industries have 
a similar distribution with a prevalence for traditional productions in consump-
tion goods in Italy and more innovative ones in investment goods in Germany. 
Nevertheless, a closer view of the German manufacturing sector reveals that in 
all industries employment is concentrated in large (more than 250 persons 
engaged)	firms;	 summing	 the	employment	figures	 in	medium	 (50–249	persons	
engaged)	 and	 large	 firms	 reinforces	 this	 result	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 in	 almost	 all	
industries	more	than	50	per	cent	of	employment	is	in	these	firms.	The	reverse	is	
true in Italy: most of the employment is in micro (1–9 persons engaged) and 
small	(10–19)	firms.	In	fact,	more	than	75	per	cent	of	employment	in	the	manu-
facturing	sector	is	in	medium	to	large	firms	in	Germany	and	less	than	45	per	cent	
in Italy. In a nutshell, in Germany most of the employment is found in large 
firms,	in	Italy	in	small	firms,	independently	of	the	type	of	production.	Now	as	a	
matter	 of	 fact,	firm	 size	 is	 clearly	 a	 relevant	 factor	 in	determining	 the	kind	of	
flexibility	to	adopt	in	reducing	labour	costs.	Internal	flexibility	is	a	more	feasible	
strategy	 in	 large	firms;	 external	flexibility	 appears	 as	 the	main	 route	 for	 small	
firms.
	 To	sum	up,	I	think	that	the	extraordinary	performance	of	the	labour	market	in	
Germany	 cannot	 be	 explained	 solely	 by	 the	Hartz	 reform	without	 considering	
the political and economic background, whose essential components are the 
German model and its productive structure.
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8 German reforms as a blueprint 
for Europe?
Sebastian Dullien
Introduction: the new hype about Germany
At the latest since the onset of the euro crisis and Germany’s relatively good 
performance during the global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009, the 
federal republic is revered as a new economic role model for other industrialised 
countries. While economic growth has not been overly impressive, at the time of 
writing unemployment in Germany is lower than in any other large European 
country or in the United States and lower than it has been for more than 20 years. 
The German public budget is almost in balance and the level of public debt 
measured as a share of GDP is also lower than in any other of the large OECD 
countries. Moreover, the German economy continues to expand its exports 
briskly and runs large current account surpluses. These stable macroeconomic 
conditions have made Berlin the new centre of power when rescue measures 
during the euro crisis were discussed, as it seems that Germany is the only 
country left having adequate financial resources to pay for bail- out programmes.
 In 2012, The Economist thus ran a large piece titled ‘Modell Deutschland 
über alles’ (14 April), strongly advocating other ailing economies to follow the 
German path of labour market reforms which have been implemented under the 
term Agenda 2010 by the social democratic chancellor Gerhard Schröder from 
2003 onward. Volker Kauder, the chairman of the German ruling conservatives’ 
parliamentary group, proudly stated in 2012 that ‘all over Europe, German is 
now spoken’, implying that finally everyone was following the German policy 
approach, especially referring to Germany’s austerity stance which it had pre-
scribed itself through a constitutional amendment in 2009. This amendment pop-
ularly referred to as the Schuldenbremse (debt brake) served as a blueprint for 
Europe’s recently passed fiscal compact, which forces euro countries to limit 
their own structural deficits to 0.5 per cent of GDP.
 Even though there is little academic literature to back such a simple narrative, 
the storyline usually found in the political arena and in the popular press is 
straightforward: Burdened with an excessive welfare state and sclerotic labour 
markets, the German economy experienced a protracted economic crisis in the 
early 2000s, with which the government headed by the social democrat Gerhard 
Schröder was struggling. After narrowly winning re- election in 2002, Chancellor 
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Schröder embarked on a comprehensive reform programme (called Agenda 
2010) to overhaul the German labour market, the German social security system 
and an excessively large German public sector. The labour market became thus 
more flexible in terms of working times, redundancy payments and firing rules. 
Freed from the burden of the excessive welfare state, the German economy 
recovered from its year- long stagnation and started to outperform the rest of 
Europe again in terms of economic growth, employment creation and 
unemployment.
 Reading current comments on the German economy, it is startling how 
quickly the perception of the German model and the country’s economic fate has 
turned around. Until the middle of the past decade, both the domestic debate as 
well as the international perception had a completely different tone. In 2003, the 
Centre for European Reform labelled Germany ‘the sick man of Europe’ 
(Barysch, 2003). In the same year, the leading German economist Hans- Werner 
Sinn published a book titled Ist Deutschland nochzuretten? (‘Can Germany be 
saved?’1) with the conclusion that unless very radical reforms are implemented, 
Germany was doomed economically. The book was followed by other works, 
written by economists or leading journalists, all predicting the German demise. 
At the time of their implementation even the Schröder reforms were really seen 
as a game- changer. Hans- Werner Sinn judged them in 2007 as not being ‘a real 
breakthrough’ (Sinn, 2007: 109), and the German Council of Economic Advi-
sors repeatedly claimed that they were not far- reaching enough. Interestingly, 
the same reforms are now often proclaimed at having been crucial for the 
German economic performance since the middle of the past decade.
 This quick change in perception leads one to wonder how far the narrative of 
strengthening the German economy through decisive reforms of the Schröder 
years really is accurate. If this narrative was true, why was the recent improve-
ment in economic conditions not seen by leading German economists when the 
Agenda 2010 package was passed? In addition, if the narrative was accurate, 
how far can these reforms be copied by the rest of Europe?
 In order to answer the above questions this chapter will first describe the 
 elements of the Agenda 2010 labour market reforms and will link them to 
 Germany’s macroeconomic performance. Then, some problematic elements of 
the German performance will be pointed out and in a last step it will be asked 
what would happen if all countries in Europe followed a similar path.
Elements of Germany’s Agenda 2010 reforms
In order to evaluate the German reforms’ impact one first has to distinguish what 
really has been part of the Agenda 2010 package. Some of the elements regu-
larly attributed to the social democrats’ economic reforms in Germany have just 
not been present in the legislative reform packages of the Schröder government.2 
The weight of other elements of the reform package has been exaggerated, pos-
sibly due to a lack of understanding of the specificities of the German labour 
market. German labour market institutions have been changing endogenously 
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over the past two decades, without government intervention, but through mar-
ginal changes in collectively bargained wage contracts (Carlin and Soskice, 
2009). This process has been much more gradual and must not be confused with 
the changes brought about by the Schröder reforms.
 The Schröder reform package of the years 2003 to 2005 contained the follow-
ing elements:
• It merged the old unemployment assistance with the general social welfare 
system. Prior to the crisis, the unemployment assistance had been paid to 
unemployed people who had exhausted the duration of their unemployment 
insurance benefits, while social welfare had been paid to those which had no 
prior claim on unemployment insurance benefits. While the unemployment 
assistance was set as a proportion of past wages, the social welfare was paid 
to whoever did not have sufficient income or wealth to cover his or her sub-
sistence. While the social welfare was means- tested, unemployment assist-
ance was not. The social welfare was a complicated system of lump- sum 
payments for food and other items of daily use plus payments for rent and 
occasional payment for special needs, such as new furniture or winter 
clothes, depending on individual need. One special feature of the social 
welfare was that any earnings of the individuals were directly subtracted 
from the transfer payments, making especially part- time work for those in 
the system very unattractive.
• The reforms did four things to this system: They first abolished any refer-
ence between past income and payments received after individual unem-
ployment insurance payments had run out (usually after 12 months) and 
replaced them with a lump- sum payment called Arbeitslosengeld II plus a 
rent subsidy. Second, they merged all payments for special needs into one 
single monthly lump- sum payment. Third, they made the payments in the 
system means- tested, forcing individuals with substantive savings to tap into 
them before claiming public benefits. Fourth, they allowed persons receiv-
ing Arbeitslosengeld II to work and to keep a certain share of their wages, 
turning the system effectively into a low- wage subsidy.
• It reformed the German labour office and active labour market policies. 
Within the package, the organisational structure of the German labour 
offices was completely overhauled and the office was renamed Arbeitsagen-
tur (labour agency). While prior to the reforms municipalities were in 
charge of looking after those receiving social welfare and the old labour 
office was responsible for placement and payments to those receiving unem-
ployment assistance, after the reforms all recipients of Arbeitslosengeld II 
were placed under the responsibility of the labour agency.
• It liberalised market access to certain professions. Prior to the reforms, 
market entry in a large number of professions in Germany was strictly 
regu lated, so that only those who had worked for a certain time in estab-
lished companies and were able to provide documentation of training were 
allowed for example to open a business laying parquet or tiled floors. For 
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53 professions this requirement was scrapped, yet not for the heavily regu-
lated white- collar professions, such as legal services, pharmacies or tax 
consultants.
• It liberalised the market for temporary work agencies. The Schröder reforms 
relaxed the rules for temporary work agencies. This sector was heavily regu-
lated prior to the reform. Rules for limiting the time of employment in a 
temporary work agency were scrapped, and a number of other restrictions 
were relaxed.
• It marginally reformed the provisions for firing. The reforms basically 
restored the company size threshold level for which dismissal provisions are 
effective. It was raised from five to 10 employees, that is to a level which 
had already been in place before 1998. Also, some recent court rulings were 
put into the letters of the law, especially introducing the dismissed employ-
ee’s legal right for a defined severance payment, which previously had to be 
fought for in the courts. In general, it is agreed by experts in labour law that 
these changes did not have large material effects.3
• It lowered social security contributions for marginal jobs. A reduced but 
progressive rate of social security contributions was introduced for employ-
ees earning between €400.01 and €800 per month.
In addition, although not officially part of the Agenda 2010 reforms, austerity 
budgets were passed by the Schröder government with the aim of bringing the 
German public deficits back in line with the Stability and Growth Pact’s provi-
sion of limiting the government deficit to 3 per cent of GDP.
 Note, however, what the Schröder reforms did not do: They did not touch the 
German system of collective wage bargaining. They did not change the rules on 
working times. They did not make hiring and firing fundamentally easier. They 
also did not introduce the famous working time accounts and the compensation 
for short working hours which helped Germany through the crisis of 2008–2009. 
These rules all remained virtually untouched by the Schröder government’s 
legislation.4
 This conclusion might be surprising, given the predominant narrative of the 
German reforms, but it is backed by economic research. The OECD for example 
compiles a widely regarded index for employment protection.5 According to this 
index, employment protection for regular work contracts actually became more 
strict in 2004 (exactly the opposite of what one would expect in case of labour 
market deregulation) and has not changed since. The index for the protection of 
temporary jobs dropped somewhat, but compared to prior changes and changes 
in other countries in other reform periods, this drop seems marginal (see Figure 
8.1). Going into the subcomponents of the synthetic employment protection 
indicator, one can see that the fall in the index is entirely due to the changes in 
regulations on temporary work agencies, while dismissal rules for regular con-
tracts were actually tightened.
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Macroeconomic elements of the German success
The lauded German success has manifested itself in the past years in good export 
performance of German companies: While many other European countries lost 
market shares in world export markets, Germany was able to defend market 
shares or even increase them. In addition, Germany has been able to turn around 
its current account from a deficit of 1.7 per cent of GDP in 2000 to a whopping 
surplus of 7.4 per cent of GDP in 2007 and was able to maintain its surplus at 
above 5 per cent of GDP in 2012 (IMF, 2012).6
 In Germany, there has been an ongoing debate on the underlying reasons for 
this development. Two elements are usually noted: First, the German manufac-
turing sector with its specific specialisation has been especially well positioned 
to benefit from the ascent of large emerging markets such as China, Brazil or 
Russia. As Germany is exporting mainly capital equipment, industrial chemicals 
and (up- market) cars, the investment surge in the emerging markets and the 
emergence of a large middle class craving for luxury goods has pushed up 
demand for German products abroad. Especially since the onset of the euro 
crisis, this has also been credited in the public debate to the high quality of 
German products, German talent and the high standards of German stock of 
knowledge.
 Second, an element often quoted and strongly debated among academics has 
been the increased price competitiveness of German companies, especially 
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Figure 8.1  Employment protection in Germany, OECD indicators (1 = least strict; 
6 = most strict) (source: OECD).
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 compared to other Euro Area countries. Measured in nominal unit labour costs, 
Germany has improved its price competitiveness relative to the rest of the Euro 
Area by more than 10 per cent (see Figure 8.2). Relative to some countries in the 
euro periphery such as Spain or Italy, the improvement has been a whopping 25 
per cent. As can be seen when looking at the two elements of unit labour costs, 
which are nominal wages and productivity growth, this increase in competit-
iveness did not stem from overly large increases in productivity (in fact, growth 
in labour productivity in Germany was significantly lower in the 2000s than it 
had been earlier – see Figure 8.3), but from nominal wage restraint.
 In Germany, there has been a controversial debate about how far this wage 
restraint has been at the heart of the country’s large and persistent current 
account surpluses. While some authors claim that the significant improvement of 
the German companies’ price had a decisive impact on the current account posi-
tion (Dullien et al., 2009 or Priewe, 2013), others point to weak aggregate 
demand, especially in investment (European Commission, 2012) or to capital 
flows as determinants of overall current account balances (Erber, 2012).
 In fact, there are some very plausible reasons that in addition to the improve-
ment in price competitiveness, other factors also had an important influence in 
explaining strong export growth and the large improvement in the current 
account position. First, export growth has almost certainly also been influenced 
by Germany’s unique geographical position between a high- income, highly 
integrated European market (the old EU member states) and poorer new EU 
member states, which have joined the single market only in 2004 and sub-
sequently experienced an especially strong increase in their import demand, from 
which Germany could benefit.
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Figure 8.2  Nominal unit labour costs. Eurozone = 100 (source: AMECO database).
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 Moreover, there are crucial indications that the high current account surpluses 
stem at least as much from weak domestic demand as from superior price com-
petitiveness. Just by accounting logic, weak domestic absorption leads to higher 
net savings of the German economy and hence larger current account surpluses. 
While the weakness of German consumption has often been mentioned (and can 
be traced as a side- effect of the wage restraint), the persistent weakness in 
domestic investment has been less well publicised. In fact, as can be seen in 
Figure 8.4, Germany’s fixed asset formation as a share of GDP has underper-
formed the rest of the Euro Area from the year 2000 onwards. While it has 
sometimes been argued that this weak performance is related to lacking profit-
ability of the German corporate sector and hence shows the need for more wage 
restraint (Sachverständigenrat, 2002: 329; Sachverständigenrat, 2010: 103), this 
view is actually not very plausible given other data, especially on the profit-
ability of German companies or the wage share, which all point to very good 
profit situations.
 If one looks in contrast into the details of the statistics on gross fixed capital 
formation, two elements stick out. First, public investment in Germany has been 
extremely weak. Net investment of the general government fell further from an 
already weak 0.4 per cent of GDP in 1995 and actually turned negative in 2003, 
the year when the Schröder reforms were passed. Only with the onset of the 
economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009 (and the passage of large stimulus 
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Austria 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Luxembourg 
France 
Germany 
Euro Area* 
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Italy 
Figure 8.3  Average annual productivity growth 1999–2010, in % (source: AMECO 
database).
Note
* Without Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia.
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packages which included significant public investment) did this component turn 
positive again. Yet until the onset of the euro crisis (which depressed public 
investment in the crisis countries as they were forced to cut public expenditure), 
German public investment lagged significantly behind that of other European 
countries. Second, investment in housing has been extremely weak until the 
beginning of the Great Recession of 2008–2009. As has been discussed in 
Dullien and Schieritz (2011), this development can also be traced back to eco-
nomic policy as subsidies for individual home construction have been repeat-
edly reduced over the past years and finally scrapped in 2006. Hence, one can 
conclude that the current account surplus has been caused to a significant extent 
by tight fiscal policies.
 However, the combination of austerity and wage restraint has not only 
helped to improve export performance and the current account position. It has 
also had some important negative economic and social side- effects. The most 
striking one is the rather low productivity growth. German labour productivity 
not only grew more slowly in the years 1999–2010 than in the past, but it also 
underperformed most other Euro Area countries (see Figure 8.3), as well as the 
USA. Modern growth theory would predict that countries can improve their 
productivity either by catching up to the technological frontier and hence 
adapting technology, organisation and management methods from further 
advanced economies or – especially if they are already close to the technolo-
gical frontier – by investing in human capital and research and development. 
Given that Germany is already rather close to the technological frontier, the 
latter is especially relevant for this country. However, in European compari-
son, spending on education and research and development combined is only 
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Figure 8.4  Gross fixed investment, total economy, in % of GDP (source: AMECO 
database).
926_08_Competitiveness Euro.indd   153 4/12/13   11:07:43
154  S. Dullien
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
mediocre (see Figure 8.5). Especially spending on education in Germany is 
rather meagre, with Germany in a similar league as countries such as Italy and 
Spain and only slightly in front of Slovakia and Greece, all countries with a 
long- reported underinvestment in education.
 Finally, over the past decade, Germany has developed one of the largest low- 
wage sectors in Europe. In 2008, almost seven million Germans or almost 20 per 
cent of all employees worked for low wages, defined as wages below €9 per 
hour (Kalina and Weinkopf, 2010). The lower two quintiles saw their real wages 
fall between 2000 to 2006 (Dullien et al., 2009).
 Even though the German wage bargaining system has not been touched by 
the reforms, it can be argued that this growth in the low- wage sector is at least 
partly a result of the Schröder labour market reforms. German unions and 
employers have always taken the labour market situation in different segments 
into account when negotiating wages; moreover, important parts of low- wage 
industries have not been covered under the collective- bargaining contracts since 
the early 1990s. Hence, it can be argued that in this segment of the market a 
simple neoclassical supply- and-demand analysis can be applied to wage setting 
(albeit with a delayed adjustment towards equilibrium as existing nominal wages 
are usually sticky). The impact of the reforms on this labour market segment was 
two- fold: First, they have increased supply of low- wage workers as pressure has 
been put on workers to take up an employment even if the job did not adequately 
match their qualifications. Second, the reforms have lowered the reservation 
wage as the new rules allowed welfare to top up low wage earning, effectively 
introducing a de facto low- wage subsidy. This has further increased supply in 
the labour market which has led to a fall of real wages in the low- wage sector. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Figure 8.5  Spending on education 2006, in % of GDP (source: OECD).
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Figure 8.6 shows this process in a simple supply and demand diagram of the 
low- wage sector: The supply curve is shifted to the right, lowering the real wage 
for all low- qualified workers, while at the same time the number of hours worked 
in this sector is increased.
What if everyone followed the German approach?
As mentioned before, especially in the euro crisis from 2010 onwards, other 
European countries have often been told to follow the German model and pass 
similar reforms to Germany’s. However, that Germany has been doing well is 
not a sufficient condition for making it a blueprint for everyone. To remain in 
the German tradition of thought, we can put this argument into the language of 
the famous philosopher Immanuel Kant (1785/1993: 30) whose categorical 
imperative states: ‘Act only according to the maxim whereby you can, at the 
same time, will that it should become a universal law.’
 So, how well do Germany’s reforms fare by these standards? What would 
happen if all countries in Europe followed the German approach?
 For the rather low investment both in research and development as well as 
education, the answer is pretty straightforward. According to a large share of the 
broad body of literature of the new growth theory, technological progress is 
closely linked to spending on research and development as well as education.7 
Moreover, technological progress usually has positive spillover effects to the 
countries with which an innovating country is trading (Keller, 2004). Translated 
to Europe, this means that following the German pattern of low spending on 
S
D
w/p1
w/p
w/p2
S Reform
NN 1 N 2
In the neoclassical model, 
reforms lower wages for all 
low-wage employees!
Figure 8.6  Supply and demand diagram for low-wage sector (source: own 
elaboration).
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research and development and education would mean a much lower rate of 
technological progress and hence lower long term growth rates than would be 
otherwise possible. Against the background of the admittedly now largely 
defunct Lisbon Agenda, this means moving further away from the idea of 
making Europe the technologically most advanced region in the world.
 The second important element of the German model has been nominal (and 
consequently real) wage moderation. Here again, the important question is what 
would happen if every country in Europe would follow this approach. The 
answer to this question depends crucially on the economic paradigm one adheres 
to. In approaches based on the standard neoclassical textbook models, such as 
the neoclassical synthesis or AS–AD model, a fall in nominal wages usually 
leads to higher output, as it brings the actual real wage closer in line with the 
equilibrium real wage compatible with full employment. The fall in nominal 
wages would hence shift the AS- curve to the right as shown in Figure 8.7.
 According to what contributions such as Coricelli et al. (2006) or Soskice and 
Iversen (2000) claim, a fall in nominal wages might also increase aggregate 
demand. The implicit logic here is that lower nominal wages lead to lower prices. 
With a fixed nominal money stock, these lower prices translate to higher real 
money holdings (M/P) and through the Keynes effect or the Pigou effect to higher 
investment demand or higher consumption demand and hence to overall higher 
aggregate demand and higher output.8 If one follows this interpretation, falling 
nominal and real wages and consequently a falling price level in the European 
monetary union as a whole would be beneficial, leading to higher output.
 The problem with this approach, however, is that a broad body of literature 
questions whether the nominal money stock can be seen as exogenously fixed 
AS
AD
P
P2
P1
AS reform
YY 1 Y 2
Figure 8.7  Impact of wage restraint on output and prices in the AS–AD model 
(source: own elaboration).
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and as net wealth of the private sector. As Dullien (2004) shows, if money is 
mostly endogenous inside money, falling prices in a closed economy do not 
increase aggregate demand. Instead, in situations of fragile banking systems 
(which one can well argue is the case in Europe at the moment), falling prices 
lead to debt deflation which creates problems in the financial system, leading to 
less credit supply and hence less aggregate demand.
 If only one country in a monetary union follows such a deflationary policy, this 
counter- argument against wage deflation is less important. Here, a deflationary 
wage policy might well increase aggregate demand for the country’s products as 
the country gains market shares from its trading partners (a typical beggar- thy-
neighbour policy of real devaluation), compensating for weak domestic demand.
This is exactly what Germany has done according to its critics since the middle of 
the past decade.However, if such a deflationary wage policy were followed by all 
European countries, the negative effect on aggregate demand might dominate. 
Hence, employment effects from nominal wage restraints can be expected to be 
much less beneficial for the Euro Area as a whole than for Germany alone.
Conclusions
To summarise, the evidence presented here hints that the German success in 
terms of its large current account surplus, low unemployment rate and accept-
able economic growth stems from a combination of nominal wage restraint, sup-
ported by labour market reforms which have brought down the reservation wage 
and have put downward pressure on wages, and severe spending restraints both 
on public investment as well as on research and development and education. On 
the whole, this cannot serve as a blueprint for Europe. Some of the elements of 
the German model have negative externalities on its partners in Europe, some 
others depress economic growth at home. The nominal wage restraint bears ele-
ments of a beggar- thy-neighbour policy which could even turn into a negative- 
sum game if followed by all European countries. The reluctance to spend on 
research and development and education lowers potential growth rates not only 
in Germany, but through the existence of spill- over effects also in the rest of 
Europe as the overall technological progress slows. This effect would be ampli-
fied if everyone acted similarly. Finally, the weak spending on public infrastruc-
ture lowers the potential for productivity increases at home.
 Rather than trying to copy the German approach as a whole, European leaders 
should carefully examine which of the elements of German reforms might actu-
ally increase productivity, output and employment without detrimental effects on 
the partners or on long- term growth.
Notes
1 An updated translation was published under exactly this title as late as 2007, not long 
before the subprime crisis hit and completely turned around the perception of the 
German economy. See Sinn (2007).
2 For example, the short- work compensation, which has been deemed as being central to 
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Germany’s labour market performance in the Great Recession of 2008–2009 had 
already been introduced in the 1950s and has been expanded as part of the stimulus 
package of 2009.
3 See Nägele (2003).
4 One should mention here that during the first Schröder years (1998–2002) a number of 
tax reforms had been pushed through. For example, the top marginal tax rate had been 
cut, sales of cross- holdings of corporations and banks had been made easier (and 
cheaper) and corporate tax rates had been lowered. However, these reforms were not 
part of the Agenda 2010 package and did not have large effects on the labour market.
5 The OECD has a separate website with data and explanations for this indicator which 
can be found at www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotec-
tion.htm.
6 Of course, large current account surpluses are highly problematic as they endanger the 
stability of the global and European economy. However, as these surpluses are generally 
perceived in the public debate as ‘successes’, they will be treated as such in this paper.
7 Standard references include Romer (1990), Grossmann and Helpman (1991) and 
Aghion and Howitt (1992).
8 For a more detailed description of these underlying assumptions and a criticism from 
an endogenous- money perspective, see Dullien (2004).
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Part IV
Regional development
The Italian Mezzogiorno and former East 
Germany
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9 Fiscal federalism
What lessons can Italy learn from 
Germany?
Kristina van Deuverden
Introduction
Government structures vary broadly among countries. While some countries 
show a more unitary structure others are widely decentralised. In Germany, for 
historical reasons, the federal character of political and administrative relations 
is pronounced. Consequently a highly independent and powerful position of the 
federal states, the Länder, is intended by the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). However, 
the constitution also always aimed for establishing nationwide uniform living 
conditions. In the proper sense both objectives generate an inherent target con-
flict. On the one hand the diversity of regions is pronounced. On the other hand 
uniform standards are desired. The conflict manifests itself within a type of com-
petitive federalism. While Basic Law assigns formal autonomy to the Länder, 
their scope to act is limited. An increasing number of federal laws predominate 
the expenditure side while the tax setting power of the Länder – which had 
always been limited – has been reduced during the last six decades.
 Unsurprisingly, the German federal arrangements have ever been a complex 
system. But the high number of realignments resulted in an even more complicated 
and sophisticated set of rules. This paper reviews the assignment of powers to gov-
ernmental levels by Basic Law and lines out the major regulations of the fiscal 
equalisation schemes. In fact, the system exhibits a notable number of shortcom-
ings. Besides, new challenges will become more and more pressing within the next 
years. The Solidarpakt, which constitutes special grants to the new Länder, will 
end in 2019 and the German debt brake will be completed in 2020. Finally, the 
Federal financial equalisation system itself has to be realigned until 2020 because 
the standard act is limited in time. Focusing on the German experience, at least, 
the question will be whether there are any lessons that can be drawn.
Fiscal federalism in Germany
Fiscal federalism covers a variety of aspects. Constitutional law considerations and 
political decisions whether to centralise or decentralise structures as well as the 
assignment of fiscal relations between governmental levels play an important role. 
When the theory of fiscal federalism was developed the major interest focused on 
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the efficient assignment of functions, expenditure and revenue to governmental 
levels (e.g. Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972).Basically this theoretical approach 
assumed a benevolent (federal) government and, thus, concentrated on the discus-
sion as to which level functions should be executed at for a most efficient, fair and 
equal result of public activity. From this point of view a more or less centralised 
system (of functions, expenditure and revenue) where the federal level exhibits the 
competences in the main part and bears the interest of the sublevels in mind which 
in turn cooperate with the federal level would be an efficient federal system. Prob-
ably, this approach would result in more or less equalised levels of public spending.
 In the next years several trends in fiscal theory started to emphasise aspects of 
self- interests. From this point of view politicians first and foremost want to be re- 
elected. Thus, their decisions would always try to mirror the preferences of their 
(median) voters. If these preferences vary over regions, various levels of public 
goods or heterogeneous life- conditions will be an optimal result of fiscal policy 
(Tiebout, 1956). From this point of view an efficient outcome requires that each 
level of government is responsible for its own functions and, thus, its own expend-
iture. Consequently, each level should be free to dispose of its own revenue 
sources. Allowing for the self- interests of politicians and, thus, governmental 
levels and regions, means that governance is no longer assumed to be benevolent. 
Single levels now compete against each other. In a world where selfish behaviour 
of governmental institutions cannot be excluded, a prerequisite for an efficient 
outcome is the principle of fiscal equivalence. The region which decides on 
expenditure should be congruent with the region that finances it (Olson, 1969).
 There have been recent and sophisticated developments in fiscal federalism 
theory since then but finally these two basic approaches still mark the range for 
evaluating existing systems. Unsurprisingly, existing systems will in general not 
purely follow the one or the other principle. Also the German type of federalism 
never mirrored a pure type of fiscal federalism. Moreover, it has been practised 
over six decades and faded even more. Today, the system runs a variety of short-
comings and there is evidence for the need of reforms.
Distribution of power and functions between the Federation and the 
Länder
The German federal financial equalisation system (FFES) had been implemented 
in 1950 but heavily modified by the reform of 1969. The fundamental regula-
tions are constituted in the Basic Law. The German state is organised as a federal 
republic with the federation (Bund) on one hand and 16 federal states (Länder) 
on the other. Due to historical reasons the Länder constitute an independent and 
powerful level.1 This is reflected in Article 30 of the German Constitution:
The exercise of governmental powers and the discharge of governmental 
functions is incumbent on the Länder insofar as this Basic Law does not 
otherwise prescribe or permit.
(German Constitution)
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With other words: if the Basic Law does not explicitly designate the federation 
as the level in charge, the responsibility falls on the Länder which therefore are 
endowed with all basic power. This regulation should insure that the federation 
only acts on matters that are in the interest of the country as a whole as e.g. a 
uniform legal framework or countrywide decisions on public expenditure that is 
supposed to have spillover effects. Thus, German constitutional law basically 
assigns an essential role to the Länder. Consequently, a decentralised state struc-
ture and a competitive type of federalism should be implemented. This, in fact, 
is only partly the case.
 Articles 71, 72, 73 and 105 of the German Constitution specify in which areas 
the federation is assigned exclusive power and in which the federation is 
endowed with some concurrent legislative power. In the first case the Länder 
may not act unless a federal law explicitly gives them permission; in the second 
case the Länder may operate unless the Bund has taken action – when this 
happens federal rules are decisive. In fact, the German Constitution establishes a 
cooperative federalism that should prevent and allow for the heterogeneity of 
regions. Basic Law intended to endow the Länder with the highest possible 
degree of power but to ensure the functioning of the system, some freedom to 
act had to be given to the federation. In this way, the capability to act despite of 
possible – and, as time goes by, probable – fundamental changes in the political, 
social and economic environment should be ensured.
 However, despite the pronounced role of the states, German Basic Law 
always aimed to attain a close convergence of living conditions (Lenk, 2008). 
This objective proved to be a general clause: whenever questions of inequalities 
in living conditions have been referred to, federal action has been justified.2 
Within more than 60 years – the Constitution was enacted in 1949 – the federa-
tion widely exercised its concurrent legislative power. As a consequence, today 
the scope of action left to the states is more than ever limited and over the years 
an increasing number of federal laws have tightened more and more the financial 
funds of the Länder.3
Expenditure
The allotment of functions widely predetermines the structure of expenditure. 
On the level of the Länder three types of expenditure items can be distinguished 
(Federal Ministry of Finance, 2011). The first is mainly connected to regional 
decisions. For example, education was assumed to depend basically on regional 
priorities. Spending on education has, therefore, to be financed by the Länder 
(universities) or the municipalities (schools).4 The second type of spending item 
is connected to a major task of Länder duties. The states have to execute federal 
legislation and to bear the costs of administration. A large part of spending on 
the Länder level is tied by this kind of expenditure. Third, there are so- called 
joint tasks that are estimated to be in a countrywide interest. These joint tasks 
are commonly financed by the federation and the particular Land. Federal 
expenditure on these items is shown in Table 9.1.5
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Table 9.1  Overview of federation/Länder joint financing arrangements
Federal budget in € billiona
2008 2009
Actual figure Target 
Joint tasks (Article 91a of the Basic Law) 1.4 1.4
Breakdown:
Regional economic structure 0.7 0.7
Agrarian structure and coastal preservation 0.7 0.7
Cooperation on education programmes (Article 91b 
of the Basic Law)
0.06 0.04
Cooperation on research promotion (Article 91b of 
the Basic Law)
4.7 5.3
Breakdown:
Major research facilities 1.6 1.9
Other research facilities 0.4 0.5
Other research promotion 2.7 2.9
Laws providing for money grants (Article 104a 
paragraph (3) of the Basic Law)
12.5 12.5
Breakdown:
Federal student aid 1.2 1.4
Housing benefit 0.8 0.6
Parental benefit (including wind-down financing of the 
previous childraising allowance)
4.8 4.4
Advance on child maintenance to single parents 0.3 0.3
Federation’s contribution to housing and heating benefits 3.9 3.7
Other 1.6 2.1
Financial assistance (Article 104a paragraph (4) of 
the old version of the Basic Lawb and Article 104b 
paragraph (4) of the new version of the Basic Law)
1.4 0.8
Breakdown:
Urban development 0.5 0.4
Investment programme for all-day schools 0.6 0.0
Other financial assistance 0.3 0.4
Sum 20.1 20.0
Source: German Federal Ministry of Finance, 2011: 15.
Notes
a Differences through rounding.
b  Wind-down financing. Note: Joint financing does not include the tied payments that the federation 
makes to the Länder under Article 13 of the Concomitant Act on the Federalism Reform to com-
pensate for federal funding that was discontinued with effect from 2007. The funding had been for 
municipal transport infrastructure financing, the promotion of housing construction, university 
construction and education planning. Also not included in joint financing is the financial assistance 
that is to be paid from a special federal fund to expand childcare for infants from 2008 to 2013. 
The fund was created by the federation in the 2007 fiscal year with a total volume of €2.15 billion.
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 The second and the third type of expenditure are barely in the responsibility 
of the Länder. The largest part of expenditure is determined by federal regula-
tions. From this point of view there should be evidence that per capita expendi-
ture of the Länder converges over time. De facto spending diverges widely 
(Figure 9.1). First of all, there is a fundamental difference between the city states 
and the territorial states;6 the level of expenditure in the city states is notably 
higher. This is partly generated by the geographical situation. As a result of the 
limited suburban hinterland these Länder not only provide public goods to their 
own citizens but also to the citizens of their neighbouring territorial states. 
Second, there is still a difference between the old and the new Länder. Although 
this distinction has been much more remarkable in the 1990s of the last century 
the new Länder still spend a notably higher share per capita.7
Power to legislate on taxation and the distribution of tax revenue
The distribution of responsibilities and powers among the levels is closely fol-
lowed by expenditure. It is obvious that revenue is in the main interest of gov-
ernments. The distribution of tax revenue and, thus, the distribution of power on 
tax legislation belong to the most pressing subjects. There are two pure systems 
for distributing tax revenue (Oates, 1972). On the one hand each level of govern-
ment can have available and decide on its own tax resources. This would be an 
adequate way to allocate responsibilities if the financial equalisation system 
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Figure 9.1  Per capita expenditure of Länder (Länder budgets only) (source: German 
Ministry of Finance and own calculations; applicable law of 2010: 
preliminary).
Note
BB = Brandenburg; BE = Berlin; BW = Baden-Württemberg; BY = Bavaria; HE = Hesse; HH = 
Hamburg; MV = Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania; NI = Lower Saxony; NW = North Rhine-West-
phalia; RP = Rhineland-Palatinate; SH = Schleswig-Holstein; SL = Saarland; SN = Saxony; ST = 
Saxony-Anhalt; TH = Thuringia.
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168  K. van Deuverden
implemented was of the decentralised type. On the other hand a joint system 
where tax revenue accrues to the central level would be the appropriate finance 
system if there was a centralised state structure with a benevolent federal level 
that bankrolls the states with grants.
 The system implemented in Germany is – again – a mixed one. For some 
taxes revenue is assigned to a specific level while there are joint taxes which 
accrue to multiple levels. Tax competences are concentrated at the central level. 
Since the fundamental reform of Basic Law in 1969 the Länder have nearly no 
scope to decide autonomously on tax affairs.8 Tax bases as well as tariffs are 
uniform. Even though changes in taxes which affect the Länder budgets need to 
pass the Bundesrat the initiative for amendments has to be taken by the federa-
tion. Furthermore, decisions of the Bundesrat depend on the majority situation in 
the federation as well as in parliament itself and often represent the result of 
complex bargaining processes. At least since 2007 the Länder have the right to 
ascertain the tax rate of the real property transfer tax but this tax generates only a 
small fraction of tax revenue.9 Table 9.2 shows which taxes accrue to which 
level.
 Obviously the minor share of revenue arises by taxes that accrue to a single 
level of government. The major share of tax revenue is collected in the form of 
joint taxes – in 2010 63 per cent of total tax revenue originated from this source. 
The participation rates on these taxes are defined by law and have been relatively 
constant over time, even though there have been few changes due to structural 
considerations.10 However, the German Constitution declares that each level of 
government is equally entitled to be adequately supplied with revenue in order to 
execute its functions. Thus, there has to be an instrument to adjust financial 
needs and cash receipts. These adjustments are performed by alterations of the 
participation rate in value added tax (VAT) revenue which has been changed 
several times. The participation rates in 2010 are shown in Table 9.3.
 In general the regional distribution of cash revenue of joint taxes will for 
some reasons, i.e. the administration of taxes, diverge from the regional distribu-
tion of tax incidence. While wages tax is collected at the place of employment, it 
should burden the wage- earner and, thus, cash should accrue at the place of 
residence. While cash receipts of the final withholding tax on income and capital 
gains are allotted in accordance with the banking system, the incidence should 
be borne by the shareholder and, thus, should arise at the place of residence. 
While corporate tax is paid at the location of the headquarters, it should be col-
lected at the place where the business operates. Consequently, revenue of joint 
taxes is apportioned with respect to the regional distribution of incidence. Also 
VAT revenue does not occur in accordance with final private consumption. This 
is because the tax is collected during the manufacturing process and, thus, it is 
the regional distribution of value added on certain production stages that deter-
mines its regional revenue. Hence, VAT has also to be allotted which is done 
with respect to population.11
 After the apportionment of tax revenue, the financial power (measured by 
revenue per capita) is very heterogeneously distributed among the Länder 
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Table 9.2  Tax revenue in the years 1995, 2000 and 2010 (in billion euro)
1995 2000 2010
Taxes accruing to the federation
Mineral oil duty 33.18 37.83 39.84
Electricity duty − 3.36 6.17
Tobacco duty 10.53 11.44 13.49
Insurance duty 7.21 7.24 10.28
Motor vehicle tax − − 8.49
Surtax/solidarity charge 13.43 11.84 11.71
Other taxes accruing to the federationa 28.54 29.42 42.75
Sum 92.89 101.13 132.74
as per cent of total tax revenue 22.2 22.1 25.4
Taxes accruing to the Länder
Capital tax 4.02 0.43 0.00
Inheritance tax 1.81 2.98 4.40
Real property transfer tax 3.10 5.08 5.29
Motor vehicle tax 7.06 7.01 −
Betting and lottery tax 1.42 1.80 1.41
Fire protection tax 0.39 0.29 0.33
Beer duty 0.91 0.84 0.71
Sum 18.71 18.44 12.15
as per cent of total tax revenue 4.5 4.0 2.3
Taxes accruing to the municipalities
Trade tax 21.55 27.03 35.80
Class A and B real property tax 7.03 8.85 11.31
Real property transfer tax 0.15 0.16 −
Other municipal taxes 0.58 0.62 0.75
Sum 29.31 36.66 47.87
as per cent of total tax revenue 7.0 8.0 9.2
Joint taxes
Wages tax 144.54 135.73 127.90
Assessed income tax 7.16 12.70 31.18
Non-assessed income tax 8.65 13.51 12.98
Interest income deduction/fixed withholding tax 6.55 7.33 8.71
Corporation tax 9.27 24.84 12.04
Value added tax 101.49 107.14 136.46
Sum 277.66 301.26 329.27
as per cent of total tax revenue 66.3 65.8 63.1
Total tax revenue 418,6 457,49 522,0
Source: German Federal Ministry of Finance, own calculations.
Note
a  Spirits duty, sparkling wine duty, intermediate products duty, coffee duty, standard-rate import 
duties, other taxes accruing to the federation.
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(Figure 9.2). Obviously there are again three categories of Länder. The old 
Länder Hessen, Bavaria and Baden- Württemberg and in some years North 
Rhine- Westphalia collect taxes that were above average. The new Länder are 
still today far below this average but Brandenburg performs better. Within the 
city states the tax capability of Hamburg is outstanding. Starting at this initial 
situation substantial revenue shifts follow.
Table 9.3  Participation rates in revenue of joint taxes in 2010
Federation Länder Municipalities
Wages tax 42.5 42.5 15.0
Assessed income tax 42.5 42.5 15.0
Final withholding tax 44.0 44.0 12.0
Non-assessed taxes on earnings 50.0 50.0
Corporate tax 50.0 50.0 −
VATa 53.9 44.1 approx. 2.0
Source: German Federal Ministry of Finance.
Notes
a  First of all 4.45 per cent of VAT accrues to the federation which transfers this amount to unem-
ployment insurance, second 5.05 per cent is transmitted in the same way to the pension system and 
approximately 2 per cent is transferred to the municipalities. The remaining VAT revenue is 
shared between the federation and the Länder.
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Figure 9.2  Cash tax revenue in the years 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 per capita before 
allotment of VAT as percentage of the average of the Länder (source: German 
Ministry of Finance and own calculations; applicable law of 2010: 
preliminary).
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Fiscal federalism  171
The German federal financial equalisation system
The FFES haS been implemented in 1950. Since then there have been several 
reforms, because those Länder that are contributing started numerous initiatives 
to change regulations.12 This chapter will mainly focus on current arrangements 
agreed in 2005 which will be in force until 2019.
Pre- sharing of VAT
After tax revenue (inclusive of 75 per cent of VAT) has been allotted to the fed-
eration and the Länder as well as among the Länder by roughly reproducing the 
distribution of local tax incidence the pre- step of the FFES follows. On this step 
the remaining 25 per cent of VAT that accrues to the Länder as a whole is 
 realigned between them. Länder that are faced with tax receipts per capita below 
average receive supplementary revenue fractions. By this redistribution ‘exceed-
ingly high differences’ between tax revenue should be lessened (§7 Standard 
Act). The additional VAT shares are calculated by a linear- progressive schedule. 
Afterwards the gap between the single Land’s tax revenue per capita and the 
average of the Länder is closed by 60 to 95 per cent. At this pre- stage a tax 
volume of more than €10 billion or a narrow 6 per cent of overall tax revenue of 
the Länder has been reallocated in 2010.
 Figure 9.3 gives an impression of the extent of redistribution on the pre- stage. 
While VAT should be (strictly) allotted on a per capita basis the Länder parti-
cipate in revenue by different magnitude. Länder with low per capita tax revenue 
– as the new Länder – received more than 180 per cent at the top.
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Figure 9.3  Per capita VAT revenue distribution in the Länder in the years 1995, 2000, 
2005 and 2010 (as a percentage of the average) (source: German Ministry of 
Finance and own calculations; applicable law of 2010: preliminary)).
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Financial equalisation among the Länder
Horizontal equalisation among the Länder is based on two fiscal indicators: the 
financial capacity index and the equalisation index. The financial capacity index 
should represent the ‘real’ financial power of a Land. It is generated by adding 
up the tax revenue of the Land (after the distribution of VAT) and 64 per cent of 
the tax revenue of their municipalities’ joint tax share while 64 per cent of the 
municipal trade tax apportionment is deducted.13 The equalisation index is 
the sum of two indicators. The first is the average tax revenue per capita of the 
Länder as a whole.14 The second considers the municipal tax revenue weighted 
by the inhabitants of the Land.15 The composed indicator of average tax revenue 
is taken as an indicator for the ‘real’ financial needs of a Land.
 The financial capacity indexes of the Länder calculated in this way are shown 
in Figure 9.4. Despite of the volume of €10 billion that had already been redis-
tributed at the pre- step of the FFES, financial capacity still diverges between the 
Länder by more than 20 percentage points at the top.
 By now, the FFES in a proper sense follows. If the financial capacity indi-
cator exceeds the equalisation index the Land will have to contribute to the 
equalisation system otherwise it will receive a grant. A linear- progressive tax 
schedule is used. Shortages below 75 per cent of the average are completely 
equalised. From 75 per cent to 80 per cent there is a compensation of 75 per 
cent. Between 80 per cent and 93 per cent shortfalls are adjusted by decreasing 
grants between 75 per cent and 70 per cent. Missing amounts from 93 per cent to 
100 per cent of the average are topped up between 70 per cent and 44 per cent. 
Contributions are calculated by a mirror- inverted scheme. By this complex pro-
ceeding seven billion euros have been redistributed in 2010.
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Figure 9.4  Financial capacity after sharing VAT between the Länder in the years 1995, 
2000, 2005, 2010 (source: German Ministry of Finance and own calculations; 
applicable law of 2010: preliminary).
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Fiscal federalism  173
 After this step a high degree of inter- state equalisation is realised. This is 
shown by Figure 9.5. The capacity indexes differ by less than 10 percentage 
points. Since 1950 the number of contributing states reduced while the volume 
of transfers between the Länder increased significantly. During the decades 
regional disparities proved to be relatively persistent and the weak states were 
not really successful in catching up. With the integration of the new Länder in 
the FFES the circle of beneficent Länder expanded while the number of contrib-
uting states shrank to four (Figure 9.6).16
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Figure 9.5  Financial capacity before the application of financial equalisation between the 
Länder in the years 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 (source: German Ministry of 
Finance and own calculations; applicable law of 2010: preliminary).
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Figure 9.6  Number of receiving and contributing Länder in the FFES (source: German 
Ministry of Finance and own calculations; applicable law of 2010: 
preliminary).
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Supplementary federal grants
At a third step, an appreciable volume of funds is transferred from the federation 
to several Länder. These supplementary federal grants (SFG, Bundesergänzung-
szuweisungen) are connected to special attributes. Currently there are four types 
of grant.17 First of all, there are SFG for shortfalls. These are directed to the 
financially weak Länder which do still not attain 99.5 per cent of the equalisation 
index. These shortages are closed to a degree of 77.5 per cent. This kind of SFG 
approximately has a volume of €3 billion. Second, there are special need SFGs 
for the Länder that are faced with high administrative costs due to their small 
size (10 of the 16 Länder are acknowledged to be small). Third, there are special 
grants for the new Länder which bear the cost of the German partition period. 
This burden has been acknowledged to be in the countrywide interest and a new 
kind of SFG was established in 1995 (SFG on German unification).18 Finally, 
there are special need supplementary grants for structural unemployment. These 
grants have been implemented in 2005 and are directed to the new Länder 
(except Berlin). Their amount is limited to one billion euros per year.
 After this third stage the FFES is completed and the financial capacity of the 
Länder has significantly converged. As is shown in Figure 9.7 each single state 
finally achieves a financial capability in a range between 97.5 per cent (Berlin) 
and 105.5 per cent (Bavaria, Hesse). The last step of the FFES especially bene-
fits the new Länder and, finally, they achieve 98.5 per cent of the financial capa-
bility index. However, with the realignment rules in force until 2005 the degree 
of equalisation has even been higher. A financially weak state attained at least 
99.5 per cent of average while the capability of the financially stronger states 
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Figure 9.7  Financial capacity after the application of supplementary federal grants in the 
years 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 (source: German Ministry of Finance and own 
calculations; applicable law of 2010: preliminary).
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fluctuated over the cycle. Hence, in a cyclical downturn the difference between 
the weakest and the strongest Land could decline to less than 5 percentage 
points.
Excursus: the integration of the new Länder
After unification it soon became obvious that integration of the new Länder into 
the existing transfer scheme would be likely to overstrain the old ones. The tax 
power of the new Länder was on such a low level that the old Länder, even the 
financially weak ones, would have had to afford high transfers. Thus, the federa-
tion and the states agreed on a transition period in which the FFES between the 
old Länder remained unchanged. Instead a fund had been raised, the German 
Unity Fund (Fonds Deutsche Einheit) which has been partly financed by the old 
Länder, partly by the Bund and partly by borrowing (Table 9.4). At the end of 
1994 financial transfers of €82.2 billion had been financed by the fund, 40 per 
cent of these transfers where paid to the municipalities. At this time the fund had 
accumulated debt amounting to €49.1 billion. Until 2005 the Bund and the old 
Länder amortised this debt in annual rates. Then the Bund took over the liabil-
ities and the amortisation rates until 2019, while the states (inclusive the new 
ones) relinquished on a fix sum of VAT revenue. At the end of 2019 the residual 
debt will be divided between the Bund and the old Länder.
 The German Unity Fund was limited until the end of 1994. Since 1995 the 
new Länder have beem integrated in the FFES. However, as revenue in the new 
Länder still was a fraction of the receipts in the old states, the Länder felt unable 
to cope with the needed transfer volume. Bearing the burden of 40 years of 
German separation was considered to be a matter of national interest and the so- 
called Solidarpakt was established. The federation waived seven points of VAT 
revenue in favour of the Länder. They, on their part, agreed on additional amor-
tisation payments of €1.1 billion to the German Unity Fund. Beyond this, SFGs 
justified by the German unification were established (see above).
 However, the old Länder again felt overstrained by the integration of the new 
ones in the existing redistribution system. Thus, in 2005 the FFES was reformed 
again. While the degree of equalisation was slightly lowered, the Solidarpakt II 
Table: 9.4  Transfer payments within the German Unity Fund (in million euro)
Payment to Source of finance
New Länder Berlin Federation Old Länder Berlin Borrowing
1990 10,431 817 1,023 0 0 10,226
1991 16,595 1,300 1,533 494 18 15,850
1992 16,074 1,259 3,758 1,259 45 12,271
1993 16,671 1,329 8,090 2,141 100 7,669
1994 16,371 1,320 9,938 4,867 329 2,556
Source: Blum et al., 2009.
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was enacted to support the new states. From 2005 to 2019 €105 billion are paid 
to the new Länder in terms of SFG. These transfer payments decrease on a 
diminishing scale, from €10.6 billion in 2005 to €2.1 billion in 2019.
Performance of public finance on the Länder level
Budget balances and debt levels
There is a high degree of revenue equalisation in Germany and there is also a 
high share of expenditure that is determined by federal- wide laws or by joint 
tasks. Assuming that the enforcement of political projects usually depends on 
public funding, the dilemma becomes obvious. The capability of the Länder to 
act is limited – although Basic Law explicitly assigns them to represent a 
powerful level. States which want to shape political, social or economical para-
meters on their own will regularly rely on the only escape: borrowing.
 Moreover, there is evidence that it can be rational for a state to increase its 
debt. In general, territorial authorities like other debtors have to keep in mind 
that their credit costs will increase if their debt increases. Furthermore, there is 
always the danger of bankruptcy. However, the German Länder experienced 
other circumstances. In 1992 the federal court decided that the federation as well 
as the Länder were responsible for each other. As a result of this judgement the 
federation had to afford SFGs for budget consolidation to the suing states – 
Bremen and the Saarland.19 On the whole, the German states face soft credit con-
ditions.20 The situation constitutes a classical free- rider problem and the setting 
notably bears the danger of escalating debt.
 To prevent increasing debt levels some kind of a golden rule was in force on 
the federal level until 2010. The Länder experienced similar fiscal rules – 
whether in their constitutions or in their budget codes. Strictly speaking these 
rules required net borrowing not to exceed gross fixed investment unless the eco-
nomic equilibrium was endangered. Obviously, these rules have two weak points 
(Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Geamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, 
2007). On the one hand, net fixed investment would be a adequate reference 
point for a golden rule. On the other hand, the exemption was too vague and had 
been exercised many times.
 In fact, there has been notable deficit spending. This is illustrated by Figure 
9.8. First of all, budgets are clearly determined by cyclical developments mainly 
because a large part of tax revenue accrues to income taxes that fluctuate over 
the cycle. Beyond this, there are obviously strong differences between the states. 
The new Länder show a slightly homogenous group of weak states that were 
permanently depending on credit financed expenditure. Until the new Länder 
were included in the federal financial equalisation system net lending even 
played a larger role than for the old Länder. However, after 20 years of unifica-
tion some tendencies appear. While after 2005 Saxony and Mecklenburg Pomer-
ania were able to realise a surplus in most years, the other states still experience 
deficits.
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Fiscal federalism  177
 The city states as well as the old Länder constitute a more mixed group. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s the city of Bremen and the Saarland 
received additional SFGs with respect to budget consolidation. These grants 
proved not to be adequate to enhance the financial situation basically. Even 
today both states show the largest deficits. Bayern, the only Land that had 
managed to change its position from a receiving to a contributing state, marks 
the opposite and shows a surplus in most years. In contrast, the state with the 
highest financial capacity, Hesse, realised a deficit in each fiscal year since 
1995.
 A reflection of these budget deficits is the development of debt. While in 1991 
the new Länder started without debt they soon caught up. At present their debt 
level per capita is above average (Figure 9.9). The only exemption is Saxony 
where policy has clearly been oriented on sound public finances. The city states 
realise debt levels that are notably higher than in the territorial states. Bremen 
particularly, the Land which received additional SFGs until 2004, experienced 
the highest increase of debt. The old territorial states are again a mixed group. 
The Saarland, as the counterpart to Bremen concerning additional SFG, is the 
Land in which debt per capita accumulated most. Remarkably, financially strong 
states like Hesse or Baden- Württemberg show nearly the same level of debt per 
capita as Mecklenburg- Western Pomerania.
 Altogether, debt per capita on the Länder level amounted to €2,957 in 1994. 
Until 2010 debt per capita rose to €7,341. In relation to gross national product 
the debt of the states increased from 14 to 24 per cent. Bearing in mind that the 
German Länder have almost no scope of action concerning their tax revenue and 
that there is only a limited degree of freedom for expenditure this performance is 
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Figure 9.8  Budget balances per capita in the years 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 (only Länder 
budgets) (source: German Ministry of Finance and own calculations; applic-
able law of 2010: preliminary).
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more severe than it seems. The Länder will have to readjust their budgets mark-
edly – also because new challenges are at the front door.
New challenges: end of the Solidarpakt, revision of the FFES 
and the German debt brake
Obviously, fiscal federalism in Germany is a highly complex and technical 
system of relations and exhibits some shortcomings. The apportionment of func-
tions and legislative powers – especially when the legislation and execution of 
taxes are considered – had not been as well constituted as would have been 
desirable from a scientific point of view. As a result of competitive federalism, 
competences centralised more and more at the federal level. This, in turn implies 
that an increasing number of federal laws require a majority in the federal parlia-
ment as well as in the Bundesrat which becomes a problem when the federal 
government in Berlin and the majority of the Länder belong to different coalition 
parties.21 The federal government depends more and more on consent among the 
Länder while the capacity of the Länder for independent action is limited. A pos-
sible inability to act alone is a reason to enhance the attempts to disentangle 
federal relations.
 In 2003 a commission on federalism was established with the mandate to 
realign those relations. The commission worked for nearly two years but did not 
manage to arrive at a common agreement. Nevertheless, after the federal election 
in 2005 some of the agenda items were picked up in the coalition treaty. 
However, especially with respect to fiscal relations there were only very limited 
consequences. In 2007 the second commission on federalism was implemented. 
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Figure 9.9  Debt per capita in the years 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2009 (only Länder 
budgets) (source: German Federal Statistics Office (Destatis), own 
calculations).
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In 2009 this commission drew its conclusions, leaving a broad and far- reaching 
concept to politicians.22 As a result the federation adopted the German debt 
brake. Until 2016 the structural deficit of the federal budget has to be reduced to 
at least 0.35 per cent of GDP. During a transition period that started in 2011 the 
structural deficit has to be limited in equal steps. The Länder are required to 
abolish structural deficits until 2020 completely.23 With regard to operating the 
debt brake on the level of the Länder there are various outstanding questions 
(van Deuverden and Freye, 2010). In any case, the interdiction of borrowing will 
reduce the remaining autonomy of the Länder evidently. On the one hand, the 
influence of the federation can be assumed to increase as Länder become more 
dependent. On the other hand, it may also become more difficult for the federa-
tion to find the affirmation of both houses if Länder identify denial followed by a 
bargaining process as a suitable strategy. Anyway, the German debt brake will 
limit policy options. However, the commission has not been successful in disen-
tangling fiscal relations among different levels. Thus, the distribution of compe-
tences and the distribution of functions will further coincide to a lesser degree 
than would be suitable. Strengthening the principle of fiscal equivalence could 
be a useful parameter in the FFES.24
 However, the FFES itself will have to be realigned because the Standards 
Act, by which the details of the proceeding are administered, is limited in time 
until the same year. Negotiations will be determined by two factors. First, the 
contributing Länder have become more and more unwilling to share tax revenue. 
Second, the demographic development will issue a challenge to public budgets. 
While the new Länder have already suffered a high loss of population since uni-
fication which – in turn – has reinforced a severe consolidation process in these 
states, the western part will increasingly be faced with demographic challenges 
in the near future. In the next years the old Länder have to undertake similar 
efforts to adjust public activity and probably their willingness to pay will 
diminish more and more.
 Finally, the new Länder will lose the SFG on German unification. These 
grants were established when the new Länder were integrated in the FFES and 
aimed at cushioning the consequences of 40 years of planned economy. Since 
2005 the funds have begun to run out on a diminishing scale until 2019. This 
kind of grant still plays an important role for the new Länder; in 2010 they raised 
the financial capacity of the new Länder by 4.5 percentage points. Any follow-
 up facilities are not likely. Moreover, tax revenue per capita will probably 
remain a fraction of that collected in the old states. Thus, for the new Länder the 
inter- state tax realignment will become even more essential than today. Consid-
ering these challenges it is absolutely predictable that political debates will 
aggravate the second half of this decade.
Are there any lessons Italy can learn from Germany?
The German FFES is often held up as an example for the equalisation of differ-
ences within a federal state. However, despite undeniable good attempts there 
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are severe shortcomings of the system. First of all, the apportionment of func-
tions and legislative powers – especially the legislation and execution of taxes – 
is not as thorough as it should have been. The system as it is shaped does not 
prevent single states taking free- rider positions, it does not keep the Länder from 
accumulating debt while their financial scope to realign budgets is limited, and it 
does not help to preserve or sustain sustainable public finance. Thus, a first 
lesson could be: Define the system carefully.
 The German FFES is a very complex system. Before the redistribution of 
revenue starts a considerable volume of tax revenue has to be allotted to the states 
and cash tax receipts are heightened or curtailed by several amendments. The 
FFES itself consists of several steps. Moreover, the proper distribution among the 
states follows a complex procedure. From a political point of view a transparent 
proceeding would be preferable. Thus, a second lesson could be: Like fiscal rules, 
a financial equalisation system should be clearly defined and easy to understand. 
Otherwise,the public will not be able to control political agreements.
 Besides, German recent history gives rise to the assertion that the lower the 
disparities of regions should be, the higher the degree of equalisation is, which 
the revenue sharing scheme can attain without rejection. Even before unification 
disparities in Germany have been high. After unification there has been a trans-
itional period but when the new Länder were integrated in the FFES, disparities 
were still marked. Convergence became a long process and even today produc-
tivity in the new Länder is 80 per cent compared to productivity in the old 
Länder. However, tax revenue converged to a much lesser degree. In 2008 tax 
revenue in the new Länder was only 52.5 per cent compared to tax receipts in 
the old Länder while productivity had increased to nearly 79 per cent (van Deu-
verden, 2010). In Germany tax revenue is highly determined by progressive 
income taxes. Such a tariff not only burdens individuals with respect to their 
ability to pay; the same holds true for regions.25 Thus, the tax system that has 
been tailored for a high industrial country can only provide a lower level of 
revenue in a transitional economy and still does today.
 In the old Länder, especially in those that have to contribute to the transfer 
scheme, there was serious resistance to the integration of the new Länder in 1995 
and controversial discussions arose. Thus, the federation decided to intervene 
particularly also because there was the political understanding that the level of 
expenditure should be considerable higher in the new Länder. Forty years of 
socialism left a rotten infrastructure behind that had to be rebuilt. Thus, the role 
of the SFG was enlarged drastically. But again this does not prevent further 
debates. Hence, the possible level of equalisation heavily depends on the eco-
nomic disparities between states. If these are large, the system – or rather the 
contributing states – will soon feel overburdened. Thus, either the degree of 
equalisation will have to be reduced or the federation will have to engage itself. 
The smaller the number of donating states relative to receiving regions, the 
quicker the willingness to pay will fade. Thus, the third lesson is simple: Do not 
overburden the willingness of single states. Finally a last lesson is obvious: The 
higher the degree of equalisation, the lower the disparities between regions.
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Notes
 1 While other European countries experienced an age of national states in the nineteenth 
century, the German- speaking states constituted the German Confederation which had 
been a more or less loose association of independent states. When the German Empire 
was constituted in the late nineteenth century the states retained a powerful position 
and when the Federal Republic of Germany was built in 1948 the constitution again 
emphasised the independent position of the Länder.
 2 Before the integration of the new Länder the constitution not only required the equali-
sation but requested the ensuring of the homogeneity of living conditions in all 
regions (Article 125 Basic Law).
 3 Even though legal changes that impinge the Länder budgets need to pass the states 
chamber (Bundesrat), a single state may face difficulties preserving its interests. Deci-
sions of the Bundesrat depend on majority situations in parliament itself as well as in 
the federation and often represent the result of complex bargaining processes.
 4 This allotment became a problem when the federation wanted to expand childcare 
services. While this item is the responsibility of the municipalities, direct grants from 
the federation to the municipalities are not allowed by Basic Law.
 5 The co- financing share of the Länder varies with the joint task and over time.
 6 This chapter focuses on the relations between the federation and the Länder. Financial 
relations between the Länder and its municipalities vary widely and, thus expenditure 
does. Hence, comparing expenditure of both would show a higher degree of equalisa-
tion notably between the states and the city states. This has to be taken into account 
when only the Länder are compared. Nevertheless, the general discussion in this 
chapter would not be changed substantially.
 7 This is financed by supplementary federal grants to lessen the consequences of 
German separation.
 8 The power of tax legislation at the municipal level is also limited but the scope to act 
is slightly larger. The municipalities can determine the collection rate of trade tax as 
well as the real property taxes by fixing a multiplier that is applied on the countrywide 
uniform tax law and they can raise small local taxes.
 9 This has been an implication of the Federal Commission (Föderalismuskommission) 
which was established in 2003. The commission had the mandate to realign fiscal 
relations in Germany. Its findings were incorporated into the coalition treaty in 2005 
(Koalitionsvertrag, 2005).
10 For example, in 1980 the share of the municipalities’ participation in income tax 
revenue was enlarged by 1 percentage point because the municipal payroll tax had 
been abolished. In 1998, when the municipal trade tax on capital was abolished, the 
municipalities were instead entitled to a share of VAT revenue. On the other hand 
they had to transfer a share of the trade tax to the federation and the Länder.
11 This holds true for at least 75 per cent of the VAT share of the Länder. The remaining 
25 per cent of the Länder’s VAT revenue is used on the pre- stage of the federal finan-
cial equalisation system to give a top- up to those Länder that have the lowest per 
capita tax receipts (excluding the VAT share).
12 Even the federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) had been called in 
some cases by one or more of the Länder.
13 In addition, the extraction levy under mining law and the compensation for the motor 
vehicle tax are added. If an increase in the tax revenue of a Land (exclusive of VAT) 
exceeds 12 per cent above average the excess is deducted.
14 Next to the additions and deductions mentioned for the calculation of the financial 
capacity index, the tax revenue is again corrected by generalising real property 
transfer tax to a countrywide average. In addition, the inhabitants of the city states 
Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg are weighted at 135 per cent.
15 For the average municipal tax revenue, the population of Mecklenburg- Western 
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Pomerania is weighted at 105 per cent, the Land of Brandenburg at 103 per cent and 
the Land of Saxony- Anhalt at 102 per cent.
16 In early 2011 it even appeared for some time as if the number of contributing Länder 
has finally been reduced to three.
17 There have also been SFGs for the administration cost of harbours as well as supple-
mentary special federal grants for budget consolidation in the Saarland and in Bremen. 
Those two Länder had been successful in complaining that the FFES was not con-
stitutional and in 1992 the federal court decided that, due to the federal principle, the 
federation as well as the Länder are responsible for each other. However, in 2006 a 
similar legal action undertaken by Berlin failed. There have also been transitional sup-
plementary federal grants for the old Länder after the integration of the new Länder 
into the FFES.
18 When the new Länder were integrated in the FFES the old Länder feared they would 
be overburdened. Hence, there had been several realignments (see below).
19 In 2006 the court partly abandoned this perception when it refused a similar suit by 
the state of Berlin. However, the judgement had been justified by denying the exist-
ence of a budget crisis.
20 Moreover, there have never been large spreads compared to the interest rates the fed-
eration had to pay. However, this has changed since mid- 2011. While federal bonds 
issued in November 2011 offered a return of 0.8 per cent, credit costs were notably 
higher for the states.
21 E.g. in the 1990s when former chancellor Kohl was confronted with a majority of 
governing coalitions lead by the opppostion party, essential decisions were hardly 
possible for nearly a decade.
22 For details: Deutscher Bundestag, Bundesrat (2010).
23 Five Länder (Berlin, Bremen, Saarland, Saxony- Anhalt and Schleswig- Holstein) 
received additional grants during the transition period from the federation. In turn, 
they agreed on a transition period in which they reduce their structural deficits at 
equal ratios until 2020.
24 If a single Land is burdened with the cost while the federation or the Länder as a 
whole benefit, the result is suboptimal. For example, in Germany the burden of the 
administration of taxes is taken by the states. As additional tax revenue has to be 
shared in the FFES it may be rational to forego some tax receipts because the addi-
tional administration costs are higher than the part of the revenue that remains within 
the state. The federation has tried to establish a federal agency for tax administration 
since years but has not been successful yet.
25 Moreover, some taxes as interest income deduction or the inheritance tax depend on 
assets and for their accumulation time is an essential factor. In the western part, 40 
years of freedom and economic miracle cannot be caught up easily.
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10 Economic development in East 
Germany since German 
unification
Results, shortcomings and implications 
for economic policy
Gerhard Heimpold and Mirko Titze
Introduction
When the Berlin Wall came down, the lack of competitiveness of East Germa-
ny’s economy became obvious overnight. This lack found its expression in the 
form of a considerable gap in terms of productivity when compared to the 
western part of Germany. In the first half of the 1990s, productivity increased 
rapidly. But the speed of convergence has decreased considerably since 1995. 
Economists have tried to explain East Germany’s slowdown in terms of pro-
ductivity by highlighting macroeconomic reasons, in particular the extra-
ordinary wage increases of the 1990s, the disincentives stemming from large 
fiscal transfers from West to East, and the lack of infrastructure (e.g. Sinn and 
Westermann, 2000: especially 12–22). In Sinn and Westermann’s view, these 
fiscal transfers led to a kind of ‘Dutch disease’ in East Germany which pre-
vented the export- oriented industries from becoming competitive (Sinn and 
Westermann, 2000: 21–24). However, in the meantime, the shortcomings men-
tioned above disappeared, or lost some of their former importance. The unit 
labour cost of the East German manufacturing sector fell, and is now lower 
than those in West Germany (Blum et al., 2010: 13, 77). Infrastructure has 
been modernised through public investment (IWH et al., 2011: 6ff., 89). Trans-
fers still occur, but large- scale job creation schemes (German abbreviation: 
ABM) and schemes for sending employees into early retirement and for 
retraining workers have been considerably reduced or stopped altogether. 
Because the earlier limitations have become less important, it is to be assumed 
that there must be other shortcomings of a primarily structural nature which 
have exacerbated the stagnation in productivity. Against this background, this 
chapter will focus on the structural shortcomings of East Germany’s economy, 
since an understanding of these may contribute to a better idea of what is 
behind East Germany’s decelerated catch- up in productivity. The chapter 
presents research findings elaborated on at the Halle Institute for Economic 
Research (IWH), which has analysed economic development in East Germany 
empirically since the early 1990s. Before identifying these structural shortcom-
ings a brief look at recent theoretical concepts of new growth theory and new 
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economic geography is necessary because these go some way towards explain-
ing why regions do not necessarily converge.
Regional convergence and divergence from the perspective of 
regional economics
The public might regard the limited progress made by East Germany in catching 
up as unsatisfactory. However, regional economic theories show that regions do 
not necessarily converge. Instead, they may show a divergent development, or 
former disparities may persist. From a theoretical viewpoint, growth can be 
enhanced by a quantitative increase of resources (especially capital, labour, 
natural resources), by qualitative improvements in the respective production 
factors as well as by combining them more efficiently, based on technological 
progress (e.g. Cezanne, 2005: 499ff.). Depending on the factors considered, 
regional development theories predict either convergence or divergence (for an 
overview see, e.g. Maier and Tödtling, 1996: 37–168). Neoclassical growth and 
trade theories predict convergence, based on diminishing returns of capital use 
or on exchange of goods or mobility of production factors (Maier and Tödtling, 
1996: 61–83). Endogenous growth theories explain why regions do not neces-
sarily converge. They indicate that externalities, if they are of a spatially limited 
dimension and if initial conditions regarding human capital, research and devel-
opment (R&D) or infrastructure differ between regions, may lead to increasing 
disparities. A self- driven positive or negative development may take place (for 
an overview on the implications of new growth theories for spatial development: 
see Bröcker, 1994: 29–50). Nonetheless, the theories mentioned do not exclude 
catching up; it may also be possible through technological ‘leapfrogging’ (Brezis 
et al., 1993).
 Another strand of regional economics, the new economic geography (NEG), 
explains that under certain circumstances the distribution of economic activity 
across space predicts a path- dependent growth of existing spatial agglomera-
tions. Centres may gain by attracting production factors at the expense of the 
periphery. Hence, in this case centripetal forces work. Nonetheless, these theo-
ries do not exclude centrifugal tendencies at the expense of existing agglomera-
tions. Whether centrifugal or centripetal forces prevail depends on the 
relationship between agglomeration forces on the one hand and transportation 
costs on the other (Krugman, 1991/1993, 2009).
 In the following section an overview of economic results and the factors 
behind them is provided; with respect to these underlying factors the focus is 
placed, apart from capital endowment, on structural characteristics which reveal 
the potential to reap benefits from internal and external economies of scale, 
research and development and innovation.
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East Germany’s economic performance 20 years after 
German unification
Economic results
After German unification, the productivity gap between the eastern and the 
western parts of the country became the indicator which reflected, in a very con-
densed manner, the weak performance of East Germany’s economy. East Ger-
many’s productivity was only 45 per cent (Berlin excluded: 35 per cent) 
compared to West Germany in 1991. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
has shown a considerable increase since 1991. East German productivity reached 
79 per cent (Berlin excluded 75 per cent) of the West German level in 2010 
(Figure 10.1).
 However, the rapid catch- up in terms of productivity took place mainly in the 
first half of the 1990s. Catching up slowed down in the second half of the decade 
and it stagnated – more or less – in the 2000s.
 This lower productivity corresponds with backwardness in terms of export 
intensity. When the centrally planned economy collapsed, the former state- 
owned companies lost their traditional market areas in the COMECON coun-
tries. They were forced to seek new sales opportunities which required increasing 
their competitiveness. The latter was undermined by an extreme increase in 
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Figure 10.1  Relative productivity in East Germany (West Germany = 100 per cent) pro-
ductivity = gross domestic product (unadjusted prices) per employee (source: 
Regional Accounts VGRdL, 2013, authors’ calculations).
Note
Classification of economic activities: WZ, 2008.
926_10_Competitiveness Euro.indd   186 4/12/13   11:07:51
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Economic development in East Germany  187
 production costs, induced by a de facto revaluation when the Deutschmark was 
introduced, and a rapid wage increase in the early 1990s which far exceeded pro-
ductivity growth. As a consequence, competitiveness decreased. The export 
intensity, i.e. the proportion of export turnover in total turnover of the East 
German manufacturing sector (mining and quarrying industries included) was 
less than half (12.8 per cent) of the West German export intensity (27.4 per cent) 
in 1991 (authors’ calculations based on Statistisches Bundesamt, 1992: 28f.). It 
grew to 31.8 per cent, representing 69.2 per cent of the West German value, in 
2010. Although some progress in terms of export activity has been achieved 
since 1991, the West German manufacturing sector has not slowed down over 
this period. Its export share was 46 per cent in 2010 (authors’ calculations based 
on Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011: table Länder-2).1
 Empirical studies have attempted to establish why regions and enterprises are 
different in terms of export activity. A study by Zeddies reveals that structural 
shortcomings can explain the lower export intensity of East Germany. This study 
pointed to the small firm size and the relatively low proportion of the manufac-
turing sector in total gross value added as reasons for a lower export intensity 
(Zeddies, 2009: 241). Schultz, who used the IAB Establishment Panel (IAB- 
Betriebspanel), identified the following factors which have an impact on export 
intensity: economies of scale, specialisation, wages and embeddedness in MNE 
structures (Schultz, 2010: 163).
Shortcomings underlying economic results
When the centrally planned economy collapsed in East Germany, the obsolete 
capital stock formed the most obvious weakness underlying the productivity gap. 
Under the centrally planned economy, modernisation of fixed assets in enter-
prises and in infrastructure had been widely neglected. In 1989, 54 per cent of 
the machinery in the East German manufacturing sector was worn out (Deut-
scher Bundestag, 1998: 67). The obsolete capital stock had required huge efforts 
of repair and maintenance, including a corresponding proportion of the work-
force. Moreover, this obsolete machinery and equipment had led to considerable 
environmental damage, causing massive pollution of air, soil and water. When 
the Wall came down, the inadequate capital stock was a significant legacy of the 
communist past, and there was a pressing need for replacing the old- fashioned 
with modern fixed assets. Against this background, economic policy supported 
the modernisation of fixed assets in the enterprise sector in East Germany by 
investment grants, special depreciation allowances and loan and guarantee pro-
grammes. In addition, considerable efforts were made to modernise the infra-
structure. As a result, provision of fixed assets has been considerably improved 
(Figure 10.2).
 This stock of fixed assets is currently above the national average in the pro-
duction sectors. However, taking all sectors together, there has been little pro-
gress in the 2000s, and a gap of 15 percentage points has persisted since 2006. 
The previous dynamism in terms of investment has tapered off.
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 As mentioned above, regional economic theories reveal that internal and 
external economies of scale play an important role when it comes to the question 
of why regions surge ahead or lag behind. With respect to internal economies of 
scale, enterprises in East Germany have disadvantages. The East German 
economy consisted of large industrial trusts (Kombinate) at the end of the 1980s, 
but these were uncompetitive. Under the centrally planned economy, the estab-
lishment of these large units was a consequence of a scarcity of resources and 
the lack of hard currency. Thus, the question of ‘Make or buy?’ was usually 
answered in favour of ‘Make’. This kind of division of labour, following the 
autarky principle, became obsolete after German unification. The privatisation of 
the large industrial trusts as entire units was not possible and they were split up 
in the course of this process. In addition, numerous new firms were founded in 
East Germany after German unification. The booming start- up activities were 
faced with a backlog in demand because the small business sector had been mar-
ginalised in the communist past. It is in the very nature of start- ups that they are 
rather small and fragile in the early years of existence, and firm growth takes 
time. As a result of privatisation and start- up activities, a very fragmented, small-
­scale­ firm­ landscape has emerged in the eastern part of Germany. Taking the 
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Relative gross fixed assets per employee, all sectors
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Relative gross fixed assets per employee, West Germany, Berlin excluded
Investment rate West Germany
Investment rate East Germany including Berlin
Figure 10.2  Relative gross fixed assets per employee in East Germany (replacement 
prices) and investment rate in East and West Germany (sources: Regional 
Accounts VGRdL, 2010, 2011a, 2011c, authors’ calculations).
Note
East Germany including Berlin; Investment rate = share of gross fixed asset investments in GDP 
(unadjusted prices); classification of economic activities: WZ, 2003. Production sectors include: 
mining, quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water supply, construction.
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average turnover per company in East Germany as a proxy for firm size, it is 
currently (2010) only half of the West Germany value (Figure 10.3).
 The small firm size in East Germany can, at least partly, explain the produc-
tivity gap. This is due to a capacity unequal to achieving economies of scale. 
Moreover, small firms can be expected to possess less market power compared 
to larger ones, a phenomenon which finds its expression in different scopes for 
price setting.
 Conversely, there is a lack of large enterprises, especially large enterprises 
with their own research and development (R&D) activities. This shortage of 
large firms concerns not only the sheer number of firms. In addition, East Ger-
many’s proportion in total employment is lower than in the western part of the 
country (Bechmann et al., 2010: 11). This lack of large enterprises coincides 
with the small number of headquarters in East Germany. The list of the top 500 
companies in Germany in 2011 reveals that only 30 have their domicile in East 
Germany, and 17 of these are in Berlin (authors’ calculations based on Die 
Welt, n.d.). The absence of headquarters is partly a consequence of the develop-
ment after World War II when the headquarters of numerous German com-
panies moved to the western part of the country. In part, the shortage of 
headquarters is also a result of privatisation in the early 1990s. Companies from 
West Germany or from abroad were often interested only in buying the pure 
production unit. This lack of headquarters has an impact on the per capita 
income (Blum, 2007: 187–194) and the prevalence of small firms also affects 
the capacity for R&D.
0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Thuringia
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
Saxony
Brandenburg
East Germany including Berlin
Saxony-Anhalt
Berlin
Rhineland-Palatinate
Schleswig-Holstein
Bavaria
Germany
Hesse
Lower Saxony
Saarland
West Germany
North Rhein-Westfalia
Baden-Württemberg
Bremen
Hamburg
Million euro
Figure 10.3  Average firm size in terms of turnover, 2010. Turnover per unit liable to 
turnover tax (prepayment notice) (source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013b, 
authors’ calculations).
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 There is a gap in terms of R&D input measured by R&D expenditure in East 
Germany (Figure 10.4). The figure indicates that, other than Berlin and Saxony, 
East German states show a lag in terms of R&D expenditure. In Saxony in par-
ticular, R&D expenditure has experienced a considerable increase since 1999 which 
was greater than the average development in Germany (Sächsisches Staatsministe-
rium für Wissenschaft und Kunst, 2013: 110). As a result, Saxony’s proportion in 
2010 was above the national average (2.9 per cent vs. 2.8) (Figure 10.4).
 Another particular feature of R&D is the large proportion of universities and 
of the state (non- university) sector in total expenditure. This proportion is greater 
than the proportion of the enterprise sector, whereas the opposite is the case in 
the leading West German states (Figure 10.4). Strengths in public R&D and 
weaknesses in R&D in the enterprise sector require intensive intra- and inter- 
regional knowledge transfer and cooperation. The case of Saxony reflects some 
progress: the science- industry cooperation among partners located in Saxony has 
increased significantly since 2005 (Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wissen-
schaft und Kunst [ed.] 2013: 181). The gap in terms of R&D input results not 
only from the prevalence of small firms, as shown above. Another reason con-
cerns the lower proportion of research- intensive manufacturing industries in East 
Germany in comparison to West Germany (Günther et al., 2010: 6f.). On the 
other hand, East Germany’s specialisation in labour- intensive industries is above 
average (Heimpold, 2009: 431).
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Figure 10.4  Share of R&D expenditure in GDP by sector in 2010 (%) (source: Statis-
tisches Bundesamt 2013a based on: Federal Statistical Office, Stifterverband, 
Wissenschaftsstatistik, Essen, Regional Accounts VGRdL).
Note
The original data comprise two decimal places; to keep the figures readable they were reduced to one 
decimal place. GDP data as of August 2012.
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 Surprisingly, when considering innovation output, the East–West gap dis-
appears. With respect to the proportion of East and West German enterprises 
introducing new products and services to the market (survey results by IAB 
Establisment Panel) there are no shortcomings in East Germany. The proportion 
of firms introducing new products or services is even greater in East Germany 
than in West Germany (Crimmann et al., 2010: 395). At first glance, this sounds 
paradoxical, taking into account the low R&D input. However, having numerous 
East German subsidiaries in mind which have their parent companies in West 
Germany or western Europe, this pattern seems plausible. Obviously, East 
German subsidiaries can introduce innovations based on technology transfer pro-
vided by their parent companies (Günther et al., 2010: 19 and the source cited 
there). In this respect, intra- company technology transfer may compensate, at 
least partly, for the disadvantages of a branch plant economy which shows a lack 
of own R&D activities, as is the case in East Germany.
 External economies of scale in the form of urbanisation and localisation 
effects are also important when it comes to an explanation of spatial disparities. 
One might have the expectation that urban agglomerations would play a pioneer-
ing role in catching up economically as a result of the benefits of the diversified 
industries located in urban regions (Jacobs, 1969). Surprisingly, this is not the 
case in East Germany as far as their contribution to closing the productivity gap 
is concerned. Making a comparison between the productivity level of East 
German core cities compared to that of West German core cities, the relative dif-
ference is much greater than in rural spaces (Figure 10.5). In other words, East 
German cities do not fulfill the role of pioneers when it comes to catch- up to 
West Germany in productivity. The opposite is true; they lag further behind than 
rural regions.
 Positive spatial agglomeration effects may also emerge in the form of locali-
sation effects, i.e. spatially concentrated industries (Marshall, 1920/1962). Bene-
fits can arise from a specialised pool of labour, industry- specific suppliers and by 
intensive knowledge flows between economic players located there (Marshall, 
1920/1962: especially 222–227). Regional science and policy often uses the 
notion of ‘clusters’, made popular by M. Porter’s contributions (e.g. Porter, 
1990; 2008), when it comes to the phenomena of spatially concentrated indus-
tries. The IWH developed a quantitative method to identify the potential of clus-
tering at regional level and applied it to German regions (Titze et al. 2011). This 
method uses quantitative input–output analysis in combination with spatial con-
centration measures. The findings show that potential for clustering is a relat-
ively rare feature in East Germany when compared to West Germany. The 
proportion of districts which possess a concentration of industries is much 
smaller in the eastern part of Germany (72 per cent vs 57 per cent) (IWH et al., 
2011: 70, 116). There are only a few districts which have the potential for clus-
tering in the form of value added chains (two in East Germany – Berlin excluded 
– vs. 27 in West Germany) (IWH et al., 2011: 70, 116).
 Moreover, East Germany’s regions are poor in clusters which have an inter- 
regional dimension (Brachert et al., 2011: especially 432–434). The widespread 
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absence of clustering may be regarded as an additional reason for the persistence 
of the East–West productivity gap.
Implications for economic policy2
The question is whether and how economic policy can contribute to mitigating 
the shortcomings highlighted above – the prevalence of small firms, the limita-
tions in R&D and export intensity, the absence of headquarters and the problems 
city regions experience in catching up economically.
 In the first years after German unification, the toolbox of economic policy 
comprised a wide range of enterprise- oriented subsidy schemes and infrastruc-
ture programmes. These met the needs of modernising the obsolete physical 
capital stock which represented the most obvious shortcoming in those early 
years. As indicated in the section above, thanks to generous investment subsidies 
and public investment in transport and other infrastructure, considerable progress 
has been made in improving the capital stock.
 To date, the obstacles remaining, especially in terms of small firm size and 
the lack of headquarters which have led to weak private R&D and low export 
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 (W
es
t G
erm
an
y =
 10
0%
)
Core cities Densely populated hinterland
Rural hinterland Rural regions
Total
Figure 10.5  Relative productivity by types of district (source: Regional Accounts 
VGRdL 2011b, The Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban 
Affairs and Spatial Development (n.d.); authors’ calculations).
Notes
Productivity = gross domestic product (unadjusted prices) per employee; classification of economic 
activities: WZ, 2003. Aggregated district classification 2008 by The Federal Institute for Research on 
Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development.
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intensity, cannot be rectified directly or in the short term by economic policy. 
Further progress in R&D and export intensity will largely depend on firm 
growth. But there is no simple cause–effect relationship between economic 
support schemes and further firm growth. Instead, ‘natural’, market- driven firm 
growth is required and this takes time. If firm growth is hampered by market 
failures, such as information asymmetries, state programmes could perhaps help 
to mitigate them. However, abolishing market failures poses a challenge which 
is a Germany- wide challenge. Firm growth which can only be achieved in the 
medium or long term will also contribute to mitigating the shortcomings in terms 
of private R&D and low export intensity.
 According to a study on East Germany prepared on behalf of the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, the sources of further firm growth are twofold: internal 
and external (IWH et al., 2011: 94). This means that firms may also grow as a 
result of mergers and thus gain increasing economies of scale. Securing com-
panies’ succession sets another challenge in the context of firm growth. This 
challenge is of particular importance given the demographic challenges, espe-
cially in the eastern part of Germany. Making skilled labour available is a rapidly 
emerging challenge both for companies and for public policy.
 Finally, this study points to the relevance of tax law, especially to taxation of 
companies. Tax law should be neutral in terms of firm size and legal form (IWH 
et al., 2011: 94). This issue goes well beyond subsidy schemes. There is an 
urgent need for an economic environment that is generally growth- friendly. The 
benefits of this, however, will be long term and not short term.
 In order to bridge the gap, particularly between current shortcomings in R&D 
and long- term changes, public research entities could transfer knowledge to small 
firms to enhance innovations here. However, the challenges of tackling shortages 
in terms of innovation in small firms exist not only in East Germany; they occur in 
structurally weak West German regions, too. Therefore, if policy regards size- 
specific innovation barriers as worth tackling by supporting public–private know-
ledge transfer, it should cover all the structurally weak regions in Germany.
 The gap in terms of headquarters mentioned above can hardly be closed in a 
direct way. Once located in a certain place, headquarters are likely to remain 
there for some time. Hence, policy efforts to attract headquarters do not appear 
to be a realistic option. Instead, establishing favourable conditions for further 
growth in firms, either internally by mobilising endogenous resources or exter-
nally through mergers is the more promising option for encouraging the ‘emer-
gence’ of headquarters. Apart from this, direct R&D support schemes can devise 
incentives for respective activities in small and medium- sized firms.
 The development of firm growth which was highlighted above as a precondi-
tion for achieving progress in terms of productivity is embedded in a regional 
environment. Thus, local development policy has an impact on the development 
of the enterprise sector. Local development policy could affect the enterprise 
sector, especially through certain regulatory measures. Therefore, economic 
aspects should be integrated in an appropriate manner in the overall urban devel-
opment strategies (IWH et al., 2011: 90).
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Notes
1 Due to different classifications of economic activities, the data on export intensity in 
1991 and in 2010 are not fully comparable. The data in 1991 are based on the SYPRO 
classification, the data in 2010 on the classification of economic activities WZ, 2008.
2 The thoughts presented in this sub- section are based mainly on IWH et al., 2011, espe-
cially 86–99.
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11 Mezzogiorno and Neue 
Bundesländer
What lessons can Germany learn from 
Italy?
Francesca Bartoli, Zeno Rotondi and  
Denni Tommasi
Introduction
South Italy1 and East Germany (hereafter respectively SI and EG) share three 
common and important features. First, they both have a persistent and large 
amount of net imports. Second, this systematic and huge deficit of the trade 
balance implies dependency on external funding, mainly based on public trans­
fers. Third, they have a persistent convergence gap compared to the rest of the 
country which is more wealthy and industrially advanced.
 Dependency on external funding from public sector is a longlasting problem 
for SI. Since the Second World War, great effort has been put into investing 
public resources in physical and human capital in the less developed South, in 
order to pursue per capita income convergence with the north. There exists a 
vast literature examining the ineffectiveness of the policies adopted.2 On the 
other hand, for Germany the issue of dependency on external funding of the 
east area is a much more recent phenomenon, but nevertheless similar to that 
of SI. After the reunification in 1990, the German government had to cope with 
a large amount of interventions regarding different spheres – political, eco­
nomic, social, demographic, cultural – and a formidable set of policies was 
introduced to this aim.3 With the available resources a number of positive and 
distinctive results were reached, at least in comparison with the SI experience 
(Oliva, 2009): the quality of infrastructures and human capital is relatively 
better in EG than in SI; the normative framework put in place by the German 
federal government is more effective in ensuring the well functioning of com­
petition and markets; contrary to SI, EG is experiencing a positive trend of 
exports since 1995, which has contributed to decreasing the dependency on 
external funding.
 Although one must recognise the considerable effort made to reintegrate the 
eastern Länder into the unified Germany, several observers highlight that a large 
part of the objectives put forward at the time of unification have been disre­
garded (Sinn and Westermann, 2001). The fast economic growth in the first 
years after reunification was followed by a phase of slow growth, insufficient to 
fill the gaps with the western regions. The low growth rates, now, seem to be 
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rooted and the persistence of regional imbalances represent an issue for the 
social and economic prospects of the area.
 Something which makes EG distinctive with respect to SI is the lower 
banking integration of the ‘Neue Bundesländer’ with the ‘Alte Bundesländer’. In 
the subsequent analysis we will examine what are the implications of this pecu­
liar feature of EG. In particular we will examine what lessons Germany can learn 
from Italy in this specific context.
 The present analysis is structured as follows: the first section introduces the 
topic; the second section examines the different patterns of dependency on exter­
nal funding of SI and EG and the role played by public transfers; the third 
section investigates the patterns of countrywide banking integration and their 
implications for the financial support to the less- developed territorial economies; 
the fourth section provides some concluding remarks.
Patterns of dependency on external funding and public 
transfers
Let us first examine in detail the evolution in the last two decades of the depend­
ency on external funding, as proxied by net imports, of SI and EG. As discussed 
in the introduction, they both have a persistent and large amount of net imports, 
which in 2006 amounted to 15 per cent of GDP in EG and 22 per cent of GDP in 
SI, which has reflected public transfers in the magnitude of 9.5 per cent of GDP 
in EG and 18 per cent of GDP in SI (Figure 11.1). In Figures 11.2–11.4 we can 
see the evolution over time of the total, foreign and interregional dependency on 
external funding for both areas.
 The total dependency on external funding is measured as the total net imports 
computed by summing foreign to interregional net imports for each area. It is a 
measure of regional overall net inflows of resources.
 As we can observe, during the 1991–2008 period the total net imports of SI 
has been stable around 20 per cent of GDP (Figure 11.2). Foreign net imports 
represent the smallest component of total net imports, although they have been 
increasing since 1998, amounting to about 3 per cent of GDP in 2008 (Figure 
11.3). While interregional net imports have been stable around 20 per cent of 
GDP (Figure 11.4).
 Concerning EG, the area started from a very high overall dependency on external 
funding, slightly above 70 per cent of GDP in 1991, but managed to rapidly 
decrease it over the period considered, halving it in 2008 compared to that of SI 
(Figure 11.2). This reduction has mainly been driven by a sharp reduction in inter­
regional net imports (Figure 11.4), although it has reached a large surplus in the 
foreign balance of trade (Figure 11.3), with net exports equal to 8 per cent of GDP 
in 2008. However, even if the decrease of net imports and the positive trend of 
exports jointly lead to a significant reduction of public transfers, in 2008 the depend­
ency on external funding has still remained around 10 per cent of GDP (Figure 11.2) 
while interregional dependency has reached a steady state value of around 20 per 
cent of GDP, which represents a common pattern with SI (Figure 11.4).
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15%
9.5%
22%
18%
East Germany South Italy
Net imports
Public transfers
Figure 11.1  Dependency on external funding in East Germany and South Italy (total net 
imports and contribution of public transfers as % of GDP, 2006) (source: our 
elaborations on estimates from Iuzzolino (2009) and Prometeia. Data on 
public transfers relative to South Italy are based on Cannari and Chiri 
(2006), whereas data relative to East Germany are based on Sinn and West­
ermann (2001). Total net imports is the sum of foreign net imports plus 
interregional net imports).
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Figure 11.2  Dependency on external funding in East Germany and South Italy (total net 
imports as % of GDP) (source: our elaborations on estimates from Prome­
teia. Data source for South Italy is ISTAT; data source for East Germany is 
Destatis).
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Figure 11.3  Foreign dependency on external funding in East Germany and South Italy 
(foreign net imports as % of GDP) (source: our elaborations on estimates 
from Prometeia. Data source for South Italy is ISTAT; data source for East 
Germany is Destatis).
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
80
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
99
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
20
08
East Germany          South Italy
0
Figure 11.4  Interregional dependency on external funding in East Germany and South 
Italy (net imports for each area from the residual area of the country as % of 
GDP) (source: our elaborations on estimates from Prometeia. Data source 
for South Italy is ISTAT; data source for East Germany is Destatis).
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 Why should we be concerned about high dependency on external funding in 
the regional context? In order to answer this question we can recall, for instance, 
two alternative analytical frameworks which examine the problems arising in 
this context.
 A first theoretical scheme, put forward by Sinn and Westermann (2001) to 
explain the EG situation, is the so­ called ‘Dutch disease’ metaphor. According 
to this scheme the deindustrialisation post­ 1990 in EG had effects analogous to 
the well­ known Dutch disease phenomenon, which occurs in countries ‘affected’ 
by a resource discovery.4 Indeed, public transfers from the central government 
(the so­ called Solidarpakt) to the new Bundesländer can be seen as a ‘discovery’ 
of natural resources. Within the Dutch disease scheme (pioneered by Salter, 
1959; Swan, 1960; Meade, 1951), when a country discovers or receives a large 
amount of natural resources, it experiences a large currency evaluation and a 
subsequent decline of the tradable goods sectors (such as the manufacturing 
sector), followed by an increase of economic dependency on imports from 
foreign countries.
 After the reunification of 1990, the German authorities decided not only to 
put in place a massive system of welfare state interventions in favour of the East, 
but also decided in most of the cases to use a one­ to­one ratio for the conversion 
between the Ostmark and the Deutschmark, which resulted in an immediate and 
considerable real appreciation of the EG products.5 At the same time, EG firms 
entered immediately into the EMU market and had to face full competition with 
both West German and European firms. All these effects together produced a 
large drop of the exports of the new Bundesländer. However, while the change 
in the conversion rate of the two currency had a (relatively) short­ term effect, the 
large inflows of public resources have contributed to a medium/long- term dein­
dustrialisation process with effects, as mentioned above, similar to the so­ called 
‘Dutch disease’ (Sinn and Westermann, 2001).
 An alternative scheme, used in the context of the Italian Mezzogiorno, is the 
so­ called ‘leaky bucket’ metaphor put forward by Savona (1970; 1991).6 Accord­
ing to this scheme, regions with persistent high external trade deficit (and their 
politicians and authorities of regional policy) are affected by a ‘compensation 
stress’: i.e. they require persistent high public spending in order to compensate 
for structural imbalances (the ‘leaky bucket’). This ‘compensation stress’ 
implies:
1 crowding out of loanable funds: i.e. lower loans to GDP ratio compared to 
centre­ northern regions;
2 crowding out of private investments and weakening of local manufacturing 
sector compared to Centre­ Northern regions;
3 worsening of local firms credit risk: i.e. higher nonperforming loans to GDP 
ratio compared to Centre­ Northern regions.
The above effects further disadvantage local firms’ access to credit and increase 
dependency on imports, implying lower growth.
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Patterns of banking integration and financial support to 
territorial economies
The structure of private and public funding of a region (or a country), and in turn 
its degree of dependency on external funding, is strongly related to the structure 
of its trade balance of goods and services. De Bonis et al. (2010) provide an ana­
lysis of the effects of trade integration between the Centre­ North and South in 
the case of Italy. Their conclusion is that trade integration in Italy has produced 
a highly ‘interconnected’ model of territorial funding, where the Centre­ North 
transfers public funds to the South, for redistributive purposes, and at the same 
time the South transfers in similar proportion private financial resources to the 
Centre­ North, in the form of net imports of goods and services. Indeed in Figure 
11.5 we can see that SI is still highly dependent on public resources, on average 
72 per cent of GDP compared to 58 per cent of the Centre­ North between 1997 
and 2005, while private funding is much less relevant, accounting on average for 
44 per cent of GDP compared to 81 per cent of the Centre­ North taken in the 
same period.
 In order to reduce the dependency on external funding, in particular from 
public transfers, in SI and EG we need to increase the importance of private 
funding in these two areas. This implies that we need to ensure the conditions 
under which the banking sector may be capable of replacing the role of the 
public sector in providing financial resources to the economy. In particular, we 
need to strengthen efficiency in the banking sector by means of greater 
competition.
 In Italy this objective was mainly pursued by means of stronger banking integ­
ration between the South and the Centre­ North. Indeed, the integration process 
21%
72%
44%
58%
–7%
81%
South Centre-North
Net imports     Public expenditure     Bank loans
Figure 11.5  Dependency on external funding, public spending and bank loans in Italy 
(total net imports, public spending and bank loans as % of GDP, averages 
1997–2005) (source: our elaborations from De Bonis et al., 2010).
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should imply that the areas with the most efficient banking sector increase their 
banking activities in the areas with the less efficient banking sector.
 In Germany, on the contrary, the East banking sector is still poorly integrated 
with that of the West. The Italian and German banking systems shared similar 
characteristics early in the 1990s in terms of a large number of banks, mainly 
publicly owned, but have evolved in different directions since then. Over the last 
decade both countries have undergone a deep process of consolidation through 
mergers and acquisitions. However, whereas Italy privatised its publicly owned 
banks, Germany kept its ‘three­ pillar’ system of private banks, cooperative 
banks and publicly owned banks (De Vincenzo et al., 2009). Together with the 
reform of public banks’ ownership structure, a set of other important reforms 
took place in the 1990s in Italy, in part as a consequence of the implementation 
of the Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC). The mandatory specialisation 
was gradually removed after 1990, restrictions on geographical diversification 
were lifted and the concept of a ‘banking group’ was introduced in the legisla­
tion. As a result, the share of total assets controlled by public banks and the 
number of banks decreased considerably, whereas the number of bank offices 
and the average size of banks increased. Even though Germany did not witness 
an analogous process of liberalisation, thanks to mergers and acquisitions the 
number of institutions dropped considerably and the average size of banks 
increased as well.
 During the 1993–1997 period large banks in the South witnessed a financial 
crisis (Bongini and Ferri, 2005). At the end of the 1990s loans supply in SI was 
mainly influenced by banks in Centre- North, rigorously controlling financial 
flows of acquired southern banks, characterised by poor profitability and severe 
financial conditions.
 In the present section we examine the evolution of the Italian bank integration 
focusing on the presence over time in SI of banks headquartered in Centre­ 
North. Since the openness of a local credit system can be proxied by the market 
share of banks based outside the region, we follow Nuzzo and Oliverio (2011) 
and consider volume data (i.e. outstanding stocks of deposits and loans).7 This 
choice bounds the analysis to a descriptive level, without taking into account 
advantages and disadvantages in terms of prices and profitability of the degree of 
integration reached in SI.
 Bank integration is a means rather than an objective, while the actual 
objective is enhancing the access to financial services. Therefore in our analysis, 
taking into account our limited perspective, we focus on the size of loans avail­
able in the area compared to non­ performing loans, deposits and value added or 
GDP of the area. The analysis of bank integration is conducted on the basis of 
both consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheets. In this latter case, data 
refer to individual banks rather than to the banking group as a whole.
 In Figure 11.6 we can observe that the presence in SI of banks headquartered 
in the Centre- North of Italy has grown significantly since the banking liberalisa­
tion of early 1990s. On individual basis, it has reached a market share close to 
60 per cent for loans and around 45 per cent for deposits; branches account for a 
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market share of approximately 42 per cent. Once we control for banking groups, 
all values increase reaching a level close to 90 per cent for loans and around 80 
per cent for deposits and branches.8
 Hence, the degree of openness of the credit market in the South has signifi­
cantly increased during the last two decades. The increase of market shares data 
on a consolidated basis compared to those on an individual basis reflects the fact 
that bank integration has occurred mainly through external channels, i.e. acquisi­
tions of shares of individual banks without changing brand or legal headquarter 
(see Nuzzo and Oliverio, 2011).
 Moreover at the end of 2009, from a consolidated point of view, the share of 
activity in the South of banks based in Centre­ North was 15 per cent for branches 
and deposits, while 13 per cent for loans (Figure 11.7).
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Figure 11.6  Market shares in the South of banks headquartered in the Centre­North of 
Italy: loans, deposits and branches (% values) (source: Nuzzo and Oliverio 
(2010), elaborations on data from Bank of Italy, supervisory reports. End of 
year stock data. Loans to households and firms based in the South including 
non­performing loans and net of repurchase agreements (repos). Data not 
adjusted for securitisations and reclassification. Deposits includes certificates 
of deposit and passive repos of households and firms based in the South. 
Share of branches with respect to total number in the area. The analysis does 
not include Bancoposta and the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. Bank geographical 
classification is considered with respect to the location of legal headquarters 
of the individual bank or of the holding in case of banking groups. The ana­
lysis is conducted both on the basis of consolidated and individual balance 
sheets.).
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 The effects of bank integration have been threefold. First there is no evidence 
of a drain of private funds from the South to the Centre­ North. In Figure 11.8 we 
can see that in the South the loan to deposit ratio has remarkably increased and 
since 2006 is above 100 per cent. More importantly, banks based in Centre­ 
North have contributed to the flow of financial resources to the South to a greater 
extent than banks headquartered in the area.
 In Figure 11.9 we can see that the loan to deposit ratio for customers based in 
the South of banks headquartered in the Centre­ North is, since 1998, above 100 
per cent, whereas that of banks headquartered in the South has remained below 
80 per cent for the whole period considered.
 Moreover, as shown in Figure 11.10 the financial support to business activ­
ities of industry and tertiary sector in SI, as measured by loan to valued added 
ratio, has increased in the period 2003–2007. Finally, banking integration has 
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Figure 11.7  Share of activity in the South of banks based in the Centre­North of Italy (% 
values) (source: Nuzzo and Oliverio (2010), elaborations on data from Bank 
of Italy – Supervisory Reports. End of year stock data. Loans to households 
and firms based in the South including non-performing loans and net of 
repos. Data not adjusted for securitisations and reclassification. Deposits 
includes certificates of deposit and passive repos of households and firms 
based in the South. Share of branches with respect to total number in the 
area. The analysis does not include Bancoposta and the Cassa Depositi e 
Prestiti. Bank geographical classification is considered with respect to the 
location of legal headquarters of the individual bank or of the holding in case 
of banking groups. The analysis is conducted both on the basis of consoli­
dated and individual balance sheets.).
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Figure 11.8  Loan to deposit ratio based on debtor’s residency in Italy (% values) (source: 
De Bonis et al. (2010), elaborations on data from Bank of Italy – Super­
visory Reports. End of year stock data. Loans to households and firms based 
in the South or in the Centre­North including non­performing loans and net 
of repos. Data not adjusted for securitisations and reclassification. Deposits 
includes certificates of deposit and passive repos of households and firms 
based in the South or in the Centre­North. The analysis does not include 
Bancoposta and the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti.).
implied a more efficient credit selection process in SI. In fact, from Figure 11.11, 
we can see that firms’ credit riskiness has converged in the two areas. In par­
ticular, in SI the share of new non­ performing loans over total loans decreased 
between 1999 and 2008 from slightly above 4 per cent to around 2 per cent.
 These results are important as several studies have previously pointed out that 
the lower degree of banking development in SI compared to the rest of the 
country has significantly contributed to the North–South divide in terms of lower 
probability of lower rate of entrepreneurship, fewer entries of new firms and 
lower rate growth of the area (see for instance Guiso et al., 2004).
 Let’s examine the case of East Germany banking sector. In contrast to the 
case of South Italy, East Germany has not improved its banking integration with 
West Germany. In particular, Figure 11.12 shows that the loan market share of 
local banks in EG is remarkably higher compared to SI, about 30 per cent higher 
during the 2000s. Hence, the degree of openness of the credit market in EG has 
remained relatively lower. In Figure 11.13, we can examine one implication of 
this lower banking integration. While in SI bank loans as percentage of GDP 
have increased from 42 per cent to 62 per cent during the 2000s, in EG they have 
decreased from 49 per cent to 44 per cent.
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Conclusions
In the present analysis we have argued that Germany did not experience an 
intensive process of banking integration like Italy, although in both countries 
thanks to mergers and acquisitions realised after banking liberalisation the 
number of institutions dropped considerably and the average size of banks 
increased as well. A striking difference is that East Germany banking integration 
with West Germany has not significantly increased compared to the case of Italy. 
In fact the loan market share of local banks in East Germany is remarkably 
higher as compared to that in South Italy.
 Moreover, we have shown that in South Italy the financial support to the ter­
ritorial economies has significantly increased as a consequence of the increased 
banking integration with the Centre­ North. In contrast, in Germany lower 
banking integration of the Neue Bundesländer with the Alte Bundesländer has 
implied lower financial support to the less- developed territorial economies from 
the banking sector.
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Figure 11.9  Loan to deposit ratio based on banks and customers residency in Italy (% 
values) (source: De Bonis et al. (2010), elaborations on data from Bank of 
Italy – Supervisory Reports. End of year stock data. Loans to households 
and firms based in the South or in the Centre-North including non-perform­
ing loans and net of repos. Data not adjusted for securitisations and reclassi­
fication. Deposits includes certificates of deposit and passive repos of 
households and firms based in the South or in the Centre-North. The analysis 
does not include Bancoposta and the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. Bank geo­
graphical classification is considered with respect to the location of legal 
headquarters of the individual bank or of the holding in case of banking 
groups.).
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Figure 11.10  Loans to value added ratio of firms in Italy (% values) (source: De Bonis et 
al. (2010), elaborations on data from Bank of Italy – Supervisory Reports. 
End of year stock data. Loans to firms based in the South or in the Centre-
North including non­performing loans and net of repos. Data not adjusted 
for securitisations and reclassification. The analysis does not include Ban­
coposta and the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. Value added at current prices of 
manufacturing, constructions and services sectors.).
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Figure 11.11  New non-performing loans of firms in Italy (as % of total loans) (source: 
De Bonis et al. (2010), elaborations on data from Bank of Italy – Credit 
Register. Firms’ yearly flow of new non-performing loans over stock of 
loans at the beginning of year net of non­performing loans. Data not 
adjusted for securitisations and reclassification. Bancoposta and the Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti are not included.).
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Figure 11.12  Loan market shares of local banks in East Germany and South Italy (% 
values) (source: Nuzzo and Oliverio (2010), elaborations on data from 
Bank of Italy and Bundesbank).
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Figure 11.13  Bank loans in East Germany and South Italy (as % of GDP) (source: Nuzzo 
and Oliverio (2010), elaborations on data from Bank of Italy and 
Bundesbank).
 In order to reduce the dependency on external funding, in particular from 
public transfers, in SI and EG we need to increase the importance of private 
funding in these two areas. This implies that we need to ensure the conditions 
under which the banking sector may be capable of replacing the role of the 
public sector in providing financial resources to the economy. In particular, we 
need to strengthen efficiency in the banking sector by means of greater 
competition.
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 In Italy this objective has mainly been pursued by means of stronger banking 
integration between the South and the Centre­ North. Indeed, the integration 
process should imply that the areas with the most efficient banking sector 
increase their banking activities in the areas with the less efficient banking 
sector.
 Therefore our findings suggest a lesson that Germany can learn from Italy by 
showing the potential advantages for the less­ developed territorial economies 
deriving from higher banking integration with the more developed ones, along 
the lines followed in Italy.
Notes
1 Throughout the chapter we use the words ‘South Italy’ and ‘Mezzogiorno’ interchange­
ably. The area includes Abruzzi, Campania, Puglia, Molise, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily 
and Sardinia. We refer to the rest of the country as Centre­ North.
2 See of instance Iuzzolino (2009) for a review of the literature.
3 Jansen (2004) estimates that for the period 1991–2003 the amount of transfers to the 
New Bundesländer has been over €80 billion annually. The peak occurred between 
1993 and1998, while after that period the amount of public transfers steadily declined.
4 See Corden and Neary (1982) and Sell (1988).
5 Currency holding of up to 4.000 Ostmarks per person were converted at a one­ for­one 
ratio. Savings in excess of 4,000 Ostmarks per person were converted at a two Ostmark 
to one Deutschmark ratio. Currency holdings acquired shortly before unification were 
converted at three Ostmark to one Deutschmark ratio. Pensions were converted at a 
one­ for­one ratio. Financial claims such as housing loans were converted at the two­ 
for­one rate. Prices and wages were converted at a one­ for­one ratio. See for instance 
Oliva (2009) who explains in details how the conversion process occurred.
6 More recently, De Bonis et al. (2010) have provided empirical evidence for the ‘leaky 
bucket’ metaphor in the case of the Italian Mezzogiorno.
7 For other works that analyse banks’ integration considering volume data, see Manna 
(2004), Baele et al. (2004), Cabral et al. (2002), Hartmann et al. (2003).
8 The gap between individual and consolidated basis data is the highest for Sicily and 
Sardinia, since the two main banks based in the region (Banco di Sicilia and Banco di 
Sardegna) belong to banking groups headquartered in the north of Italy.
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